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ABSTRACT

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR) is one of the central
institutions promoting adherence to fundamental human right norms in the Americas, yet
States fully comply with only 5% of its judgments. This low rate of compliance threatens
the Court’s effectiveness and undermines the legitimacy of this regional human rights
system. This dissertation analyzes the problem of noncompliance with ICHR judgments.
Furthermore, it connects the problem of noncompliance and existing explanations in the
ICHR with broader theories from the study of international relations in order to ground this
regional case study in the larger debates about international legal norms in international
politics. It is based on a qualitative analysis of 129 cases of the ICHR that examines court
documents including judgments on merits, reparations, and cost; monitoring orders; and
resolutions. Preliminary observations in my analysis indicate, counter-intuitively, that
States acquiesce their international responsibility for human rights violations in ICHR
proceedings have lower compliance rates with ICHR judgments than States that do not
acquiesce responsibility. Specifically, the compliance rate for obligations that involve
acquiescence is only 20% while the compliance rate for obligations that do not involve
acquiescence is 50%. This observation is explained by analyzing the interaction between
the States and the Court in the proceedings. I argue that acquiescence is the first step in a
strategy designed to minimize consequences for high-level national authorities involved in
a Court case of being threatened by an International Court judgment. Indeed, where the
State strategy to protect authorities is unsuccessful, the amount of compliance that States
will be willing to supply in cases is 1%. On the contrary, when the Court releases
authorities from responsibilities by issuing restrained judgments and, accordingly, this
State strategy turns into success the rate of compliance of cases with acquiescence is
similar to the rate of compliance of those cases without acquiescence. The study also made
apparent that cases with acquiescence were controlled in a much-diminished way by the
Court in comparison with those non-acquiescence, intensely monitored cases. I conclude
that these findings are not sufficiently considered by key theories of international relations.
Based on this analysis, I propose statutory reforms that take into account the State-Court
interaction process. These reforms extend from the stale, dominant paradigm of Court
assistance and deterrence into alternative modes of negotiation to counteract
noncompliance.
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EMERGING PATTERNS IN JUDGMENT COMPLIANCE
CHAPTER ONE: STATES, COURTS AND THE SURPRISING
NONCOMPLIANCE PROBLEM
I.

INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s, Louis Henkin presented what is, perhaps, the best-known argument for

State compliance, asserting that most States comply with most international law most of the
time, citing reputation, reciprocity and domestic policy. 1 His belief that efforts should focus
on observing the overwhelming cases of compliance was one reason that theories shifted
away from describing international law noncompliance, toward describing compliance. 2
While legal norms set the standard by which “compliance is gauged” 3 and Henkin’s idea
that States almost always comply has been used to explain compliance, compliance with
judgments of international Courts has received less attention than it deserves and even less
attention has been paid to the phenomenon of noncompliance with international human
rights courts’ judgments. 4
In the Inter-American Court of HR’ (ICHR) the reality is that only 5% of the
judgments are met with full compliance, while 86.04% of cases remain in the stage of

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (Columbia University Press. 1979).
Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International law, international relations and compliance, 32
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 538 (2002). The scholarly concern for explaining treaties is
expressed at the beginning of their work, “We also focus primarily on compliance with treaties, rather
than with the broader categories of rules […] that international lawyers term 'customary international
law'.
3 Id. at. They alluded more generally to IL, saying: “[…L]aw and compliance are conceptually linked
because law explicitly aims to produce compliance with its rules: legal rules set the standard by which
compliance is gauged.”
4 Id. at, 538. The scholarly concern for explaining treaties is expressed at the beginning of their work,
“We also focus primarily on compliance with treaties, rather than with the broader categories of rules
[…] that international lawyers term 'customary international law'.
1
2

1

monitoring. 5 The rate of overall compliance with the Court’s international human rights
judgments issued as of 2010 is below pre-1997 rates. Thus, in that span of time, the ICHR
and its current compliance system has proven itself increasingly less, rather than more,
capable of making human rights (HR) compliance obligatory. This suggests in very clear
terms that, more than 32 years after the ICHR’s first contentious case, 6 the Inter-American
HR System’s (HR System) purpose is still largely unrealized and its legitimacy threatened. 7
If it is true that “nowhere [is noncompliance] more evident or more problematic than in the
field of HR law” 8 determining whether “HR make a difference” 9 requires moving beyond
why States comply with international HR law to fully reckoning and explaining the
phenomenon of noncompliance.
The work of previous scholars considers noncompliance mainly from the
perspective of compliance when, indeed, compliance with norms shows different patterns
that compliance with judgments: mostly compliance with norms mostly noncompliance
with judgments. Each main International Relation (IR) theory (realism, institutionalism,
liberalism and constructivism) addresses some characteristics of noncompliance. In
5 Inter-American Court of HR, Annual Report 2010, at 9-13 (henceforth 2010 Report). This report, the
decisions and other Court documents are available at this web site: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr. >.
(This statistic was calculated on the basis of data from the Court's 2010. The report States that, of the
129 cases decided as of the end of 2010, 111 are being monitored. The remaining 8,96% are cases
closed without monitoring and different reasons.
6 The Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits) 29 July 1988, ICHR, Ser. C No. 4 that was included in
1988 Annual Report, however it’s important to clarify that the Court had previously ruled a contentious
case inadmissible in the Viviana Gallardo et. al v. Costa Rica by Order dated September 8, 1983 as
recorded in the1984 Annual Report at 41.
7 OAS, Official Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65. Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), opened for signature, Nov.
22, 1969, entered into force, July 18, 1978, reprinted in OI.L.M. 673 (1970) and in Basic Documents
Pertaining to HR in the Inter-American System, Updated to May 1996, OAS (1996) at 25/ Given the
reality exhibited here, failure to modify the system will endanger the ICHR’s future and the
achievement of its purpose: consolidation of justice based on respect for each man’s and woman’s HR,
especially for victim rights.
8 Oona A Hathaway, Do human rights treaties make a difference?, 111 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1938
(2002). Discussing the different theories of compliance, Hathaway has noted that “[t]he disinclination of
international lawyers to confront the efficacy of international law is nowhere more evident—or more
problematic—than in the field of HR law.”
9 Douglass Cassel, Does international human rights law make a difference, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. (2001).
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addition, the theories are not always compatible, even when taken cumulatively; they leave
gaps in our understanding about noncompliance.
Specifically, IR theories recognize the interaction between the actors involved in
compliance and noncompliance. In this interaction, the Court as a “norms-motivated
actor” 10 has assigned it some tactics to increase the probability that its judgments will be
upheld. The Court may act strategically because noncompliance is costly to the system and
its “position [within the] system.” 11 However, other than recognizing that international
institutions (such as Courts and their judgments) are the forum for norm articulation and
enforcement, IR theories fail to fully acknowledge or explain that Courts have a role in the
interaction with States to impact ideas about noncompliance (e.g., participation in state
strategies). This is why IR theories do not systematically account how the exercise of the
relationships between States and Courts may affect the structure and dynamic of
noncompliance, including the role that ideas might play.
Furthermore, the states’ and Court’s roles in the process of judgment
noncompliance has not received the same systematic scholarly attention. The researchers
have directed their analytic attention to the role of the State’ actions in the noncompliance
problem. Subsequently, given the increased prominence of non-State actors in global
politics has challenged the leading International Relation-based compliance theories, which
ultimately left Courts relatively under-treated in the research on the international system.
Therefore, there has been significant attention in other, domestically-oriented literatures on
compliance with judgments that highlight judicial decision-making, but similar attention

10 Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Compliance: Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Explaining
Adherence to Judicial Rulings, 38 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, 822 (2013).
11 Georg Vanberg, Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional review,
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 349 (2001).

3

has seldom been paid in the international arena. The attention has been scarce, isolated and
recent. This is especially true for the reality of international judgments in Latin America,
which have not yet been the focus of systematic study. 12
The literature on Court actions, over the last twenty years, has created a gap
between the creation of authorities/Courts meant to counteract States’ failures in complying
with international judgments and the view, represented by IR-based compliance theories, of
the Courts as cooperative normative institutions. This gap arises from underestimating the
Court’s role (participation) to influence noncompliance in their interaction with States
either because of an exclusive focus on the powers of the State (realism and
institutionalism), non-state actor (liberalism) or the System (constructivism) as in IR
theories.
Compliance does not happen merely because we have international institutions,
such as international Courts. International Courts exist because they perform valuable
functions for States and States can modify their behavior in light of norms, although the
extent to which they do so is contested. What is at issue is whether States modify their
behavior in light of international Court judgments, rather than just norms. Courts can make
a difference in compliance rates if their judgments create specific opportunities and impose
meaningful constraints that affect State interest. In this process, do discourse and
persuasion matter? Are calculations of interest and power all that really count? Or does the
interaction between the two bring an added element into the equation?
Kapiszewski & Taylor, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, 805 (2013). (Forms of compliance that are not always
compatible with independent literatures) (As it was said domestically oriented literature has focused
on compliance with judgments; there has to be something similar on the international plane. Thus,
while one large body of work addresses compliance by civilians, public authorities (e.g., executives,
legislatures, or bureaucracies), and subnational public authorities (e.g., lower federal or State Courts)
with domestic laws and with the judgments of national Courts, the other addresses State compliance
with international law and international Court judgments. In which the international Court judgments
have not received systematic attention than deserve.)
12
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The premise of this dissertation is that in order to understand or more fully describe
compliance/noncompliance, one must explore State action and reaction to courts and their
judgments. Therefore, this dissertation addresses one research question: How do States
move toward or away from compliance in their interaction with the Court and its
judgments?
This dissertation explores the question of noncompliance with ICHR judgments, by
exploring the interaction between States and the Court through the dialogue mechanisms of
the Court and States’ routine or strategic responses, which related to each judgment and
occurred during judicial proceedings and the monitoring process. These responses are
analyzed independently and in interaction. This dissertation identifies emerging patterns in
judgment noncompliance and uses them to ensure that practical considerations and
reflections are ultimately the basis for empirically-based compliance theory. This
foundation can also serve as the ground for sound statutory and political reform
recommendations that aim to reduce or remove the underlying reasons of noncompliance.
My central conclusion is that the interaction between States and the Court is the
causal mechanism for the judgment compliance since it affects the amount of compliance
that States will be willing to supply. In the course of this interaction international
institutions like the ICHR can affect international law and global politics/governance by
providing legal, symbolic resources that translate into the power to name violations in
particular intrusive law remedies. Nevertheless, political factors often limit the international
Court and its nuanced, complex interaction with the State. This happens since the Court
diminishes its potential influence on state behavior feeding the context for State strategies
rather than leveraging the interaction in which these political factors are developed. The
ICHR’s participation in State strategies on compliance is demonstrated by describing how
5

these emerging patterns unfold in the cases in question. This participation is built around on
an interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive finding from the analysis of the ICHR case
law—states parties that acquiesce in ICHR proceedings involving national high-level
authorities have lower compliance rates with ICHR judgments than states parties that do
not acquiesce. What is most impressive about my finding is that it revealed patterns that put
in evidence that the reality of compliance problem does not always work the way the
current governance (IR) theory says the reality does or should be.
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 1, Part II discusses
the concept of compliance. Section A defines and explains judgment compliance while
Section B clarifies the current debate between compliance and effectiveness. Following by
Section C that presents a brief discussion of what are international institutions. Part III sets
out a brief narrative of the events leading to the creation of the ICHR, reviewing the
historical, political and legal commonalities that support the States’ empowerment of the
ICHR with an enforcement role, despite the lack of support demonstrated through ICHR
judgment noncompliance. Part IV describes the roles of the Courts. Part V reviews
compliance theories, applied to the context of HR. This section presents four international
relations theories -realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism- that offer
competing but complementary assumptions to explain the conditions under which States
comply with judgments, and the role of Courts in compliance. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of the methodological process and a description of the coding scheme that guided
this study. In this Chapter, the full process, which uncovered a surprising preliminary
finding. This finding is that acquiescence leads to lower judgment compliance rates.
Chapter 3, Part II shows the main quantitative results relating to (non)acquiescence and
judgment (non)compliance. Part III discusses the qualitative analysis results, particularly as
6

they relate to patterns of behavior/actions concerned with the protection of high-ranking
authorities. Following the coding system presented in Chapter 2, I divide the interaction
between the States and the Court into five stages: signaling, exchange, negotiation,
Monitoring, and sanctioning. Chapter 4, Part II offers illustrative cases that support the
qualitative analysis with a set of narratives. It first points to the appearance of acquiescence
in which key patterns from signaling, exchange and negotiation are illustrated and then
proceeds to illustrate the shape of compliance in which key patterns from Monitoring and
sanctioning are exhibited. Then, the Chapter turns in Part III to deviations from the
fundamental patterns presented. Chapter 5 draws conclusions and offers prescriptions. Part
I presents a detailed summary and discussing the results. Part II concerns the theoretical
and policy implications of this dissertation. Part III introduces the limitations of this study
and recommendations for further research.

II.

CONCEPTUALIZING JUDGMENT-COMPLIANCE:

TECHNICAL MEANING AND THEORETICAL ASPECTS
A.

Judgment compliance

In a political context, judgment compliance involves at least two actors—a Court
and the party burdened by its judgments (for this dissertation, the ICHR and States party to
the Inter-American HR System, respectively). Compliance has a specific technical meaning
for the purposes of this dissertation, operative with actions or inactions, through which
States fully comply or fail to comply with, one or more Court-ordered reparation. However,
compliance is not a dichotomous variable; most instances fall somewhere between the two
absolute poles within a continuous variable lying between compliance and noncompliance:

7

partial compliance. Noncompliance is the opposite of following international rules (for this
dissertation, the rules established by the Inter-American Convention 13).
The concept of compliance, as considered by this dissertation, compares what is
expected of the State (as stipulated in the judgment) with what the State does (effect of the
judgment on State behavior). International judgments set the standard for compliance. 14 It
poses the question: How can State behavior be managed toward compliance? I.e., what
measures can be adopted to adjust State behavior to the international judgment expectation.
Descriptive measurement is crucial for exploring and explaining actual compliance
patterns.
IR theories explain compliance issues differently, which have common features
(e.g. all posit that compliance affects the behavior of actors in the system), but also diverge
in critical ways (e.g. compliance’s effects on actors’ behavior and whether intervention can
alter the impact compliance has on such behavior). Still others have argued that relating the
impact of norms is superfluous because international norms can affect State behavior even
when States fail to comply. 15 Conversely, scholars have described compliance as
conformity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule 16 and as internalization of
international norms to avoid more than mere consequences. 17 This critical divergence has

13 POLITICAL RIGHTS, AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights, reprinted in BASIC Documents. OAS/Ser. K/XVI/1.1.,
Document 65, Rev.1, Corr.1 of January 7, 1970, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.123
(henceforth: the Convention or AC)
14 Raustiala & Slaughter, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 538 (2002).
15 Id. at, 539. Compliance “[a]s a concept, [...] is agnostic about causality […] the impact of legal rules
limited to compliance, legal rules may change State behavior even when States fail to compl[y…]”
16 ROGER FISHER & ROBERT K GOLDMAN, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (University Press
of Virginia Charlottesville. 1981). Also see RONALD BRUCE MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 30 (The MIT Press. 1994).
17 Harold Hongju Koh, Why do nations obey international law? 106: 2598-2659 (2656-7) (JSTOR
1997). FRIEDRICH V KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 36; 43 (Cambridge University Press. 1991).
Koh and Kratochwil emphasized obedience as behavior resulting from the internalization of norms.

8

thwarted previous efforts to synthesize existing compliance works into a single coherent
theory.
In contrast to the bulk of compliance literatures, which is focused on norms, and
often on norms in theoretical abstraction, the present work is focused on judgments. Only
an international Court, for the purpose of this dissertation “the ICHR” or “the Court,” as the
institution that issues international judgments and defines compliance, has exclusive faculty
of determining when a judgment has been wholly satisfied. 18 The Court has defined
compliance, in the 2010 Annual Report, as a consequence of “[e]ffective implementation of
the Court’s judgments” and its jurisdictional correlate, implementation, as “the
effectiveness of the system.” 19 The next section addresses the debate about compliance and
effectiveness. 20

B.

Case-Specific Effectiveness

Scholars emphasize the difficulty in drawing a causal inference between compliance
and effectiveness. 21 Compliance was driven out of institutional studies because it appeared
to be, but was not, a confusing proxy for measuring causal effects. 22 The confusion arose
because scholars examined different phenomena (judgment-compliance and primary norm

18 2010 Annual Report, at 10, para. 3. As a State fulfills the duties emanating from multiple Courtordered reparations, the Court declares full or partial compliance with the individual reparation, until
the Court has closed the case, declaring full compliance with each of the reparations. Cases that remain
open past the Court's initial deadlines are considered in noncompliance. Such cases are said to be in the
stage of monitoring compliance (i.e. noncompliance or absence of compliance).
19 Id., supra note 5, at 9, par. 2
20 Kal Raustiala, Compliance & (and) Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L., 387, 391-99 (2000). (defining distinct concepts of "compliance" and "effectiveness" and
contrasting them with other concepts, such as "implementation"), at 392 ("Implementation refers to
the process of putting international commitments into practice: the passage of domestic legislation,
promulgation of regulations, creation of institutions (both domestic and international), and
enforcement of rules.")
21 Lisa Martin, “Against Compliance” in JEFFREY L DUNOFF & MARK A POLLACK, INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 591-2 (Cambridge
University Press. 2012).
22 Id. at.
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compliance), dividing the literature among those defining compliance and effectiveness
together and separately. 23
Focusing on judgment-compliance, Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter
liken compliance to Courts’ effectiveness in garnering support from domestic
politics/players that prompts their government to respect judgments. 24 Helfer acknowledges
that, with this definition, international enforcement mechanisms are unavailable for most
courts. 25 They assert that even if a State fails to comply with international Court’s
judgments (i.e. compliance is slow, partial or low), the judgments and Court remain
effective if compliance costs come from the judgment’s “meaningful constraints.” 26
Focusing on primary norm compliance (i.e. the international Court’s ability to
encourage compliance with underlying legal obligations), Kal Raustalia, detaching the
concepts, asserts that compliance is conformity between behavior and a specified legal
rule. 27 Effectiveness, on the other hand, is “observable, desired changes in behavior”
attributable to that rule. 28 Since many international Court judgments mirror “pre-existing”
State behaviors, 29 the value of immediate adherence, full or high compliance is discounted
when evaluating courts’ case-specific effectiveness because compliance can occur “for
reasons entirely exogenous to the legal process.” 30

Laurence R Helfer, The effectiveness of international adjudicators, 468 (2014). Andrew T Guzman,
International tribunals: a rational choice analysis, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 188 (2008).
Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 227, 244 (2012).
24 Laurence R Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a theory of effective supranational adjudication,
107 YALE LJ, 273, 290 (1997). Helfer, 469 (2014).
25 Helfer, 467 (2014).
26 Id. at.
27 Raustiala, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L., 393 (2000).
28 Id. at, 387.
29 Helfer, 467 (2014).
30 Id. at, 469. Shany, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 227 (2012). Shany seems to follow
similar logic to that presented by Raustalia regarding judicial remedies: “[A] low-aiming Court, issuing
23
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Difficulty between compliance and effectiveness applies to norms. However, for
Court judgments, “the real effectiveness test […] is not compliance but the counterfactual
of what the outcome would have been [in the] absence of the international Court.” 31 “Even
if other factors may also have been important,” 32 it is reasonable to assume that a judgment
materially altered a State’s behavior if, while operating under a judgment a State changes
its behavior – towards or even away from compliance –the judgment materially influenced
the change. Thus far, no one has satisfactorily demonstrated the influence of judgments in a
way that answers “the counterfactual – would the State have done the same without the
order”? 33 Even in the absence of this evidence, the claim that compliance is the measure of
impact is invigorated to the core of institutional studies.
Posner and Yoo measure international adjudicatory effectiveness in terms of
whether States comply with the Court’s decision. 34 Helfer and Slaughter say that
compliance does not take into account the Court’s purpose exclusively, that compliance is
not the same as effectiveness, and confusing the two only causes problems. 35 Helfer and
Slaughter argue that Posner and Yoo omitted how political and discursive constraints
provide insight into the relationship between effectiveness and broader explanatory
factors. 36 The Court’s influence often depends upon States’ capacity, particularly through

minimalist remedies, may generate a high level of compliance but have little impact on the State of the
world.”
31 Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 33, 52 (2008).
32 Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial compliance: a comparison of the European and InterAmerican Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT'L L & INT'L REL., 39-40 (2010).
33 Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to
Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 493, 505 (2011).
34 Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIFORNIA LAW
REVIEW (2005).
35 Laurence R Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States create international tribunals: a response to
professors Posner and Yoo, see id. at, 11; 19-20
36 Id. at, 30-1; 43; 47. Helfer and Slaughter argue that Posner and Yoo fail to account for the political
climate of Court decisions, failing to consider informal limitations like rules. For instance, even
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domestic politics, to carry out international judgments. As Simmons notes, compliance also
relies on commitments and incentives. She asserts that when costs and benefits weigh in on
a State’s decisions to act, it is possible to determine which State actions were (or were not)
influenced/incentivized by the Court’s efforts to produce compliance. 37 Guzman clarifies
that judgment compliance can be a factor in determining Court effectiveness. 38
While it may be reasonable to assume that international Courts matter, in order to
determine the purpose(s) for which international Courts are effective, more critical ex-ante
assessment of the international Court’s current roles and goals, 39 contextualized through an
in situ exploration of the Court practicalities and its interactions with other actors, is
required.

C.

What are International Institutions? 40

The role of international organizations such as International Courts in international
relations depends on how each of the leading IR theories interprets what the institutional
system entails. Scholars in the IR literature they have provided vague definitions of
independent Courts are limited in their real possibilities by politics and the attitudes of the surrounding
legal authorities (i.e., legal discourse). In some instances, States can also communicate limits to a
formally independent Court’s scope of power because Court operates within a context where the
interests of States are easily communicated. Thus, Helfer and Slaughter argue that independent Courts
are constrained by State mechanisms (formal, structural and discursive) and pre-established rules of IL
rather than exclusively political measures.
37 Beth A. Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance, 46 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 843
(2002).
38 Guzman, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 171, 187, 188 (2008). He emphasizes that “even
when a State fails to comply with a tribunal’s ruling, the tribunal may be effective at promoting
compliance if it imposes sufficient costs on the State to discourage future violations of the underlying
legal rule.” Shany, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 244-5 (2012). Yuval Shany claims that
encouraging primary norm compliance may present more descriptive and sizable challenges than
judgment compliance.
39 Shany, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 225 (2012). Dinah L Shelton, Form, function, and
the powers of international courts, 9 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 12-3 (2009). See in the
same vein: Karen J Alter, The multiple roles of international courts and tribunals: enforcement, dispute
settlement, constitutional and administrative review, (2012) in DUNOFF & POLLACK, Interdisciplinary
perspectives on international law and international relations: the state of the art (367). 2012.
40 See in general to this section: John J Mearsheimer, The false promise of international institutions, 19
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 8-9 (1994).
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international institutions. For example, definitions to satisfy every identified and
regularized pattern of activity between states in which expectations converge. As a result of
this absence of definition, an instrumental account emerges to define when and why
institutions are created and permits a correct analysis. Mearsheimer’s definition framed the
concept of the institution. He produces a well-established conceptualization that has the
merits to be compatible with the use of the notion between most institutionalist
authorities. 41
He describes institutions as a set of rules with five components. Set of rules is based
in decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states and competition with each other.
This component of institutions is connected to discretional state choice; however,
Mearsheimer’s definition has not considered (at least, explicitly) that for cooperating or
competing —coincidence of interest, coordination, and coercion— are also necessary, as
they can be the limits for institutions.42
The remaining components of Mearsheimer’s definition are: Institutions are a set of
rules that commands and impedes forms of state behavior. They are negotiated. Their
negotiation assumes the mutual acceptance of standards of behavior defined regarding
rights and duties. They are formalized in international agreements and consolidated into a
formal international organization such as International Courts. 43
To answer the question about how the interaction between States and Court do or do
not work to produce compliance, we must examine the different IR theories separately.
However, a brief discussion of the institutional system that is explored is in order first.

Id. at.
Id. at.
43 Id. at.
41
42
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III. THE STATES AND COURT IN THE CREATION OF
THE ICHR SYSTEM
After WW II, hemispheric governments were concerned by the territorial integrity
of the American nations. Accordingly, they approved a system of collective security to
battle global aggression and conflict in the postwar by the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro.
On April 30, 1948, by the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS
Charter in effect since December 1951) the Organization of American States, the oldest
multilateral, regional organization in the world, was founded. OAS was founded by the US
and twenty other States as a forum for issues of mutual concern 44 such as democracy, HR,
security, and development. It currently comprises the thirty-five States of the Western
Hemisphere. 45 In the same meeting (the Ninth International Conference of American States
in Bogotá), American State members adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, the world’s first general human rights instrument. This declaration together
the OAS Charter (OAS, April 30, 1948) and The Universal Declaration of HR (UDHR,
Dec. 10, 1948) marked the beginning of the States’ desire to create a HR regime and codify

44 GORDON MACE, et al., GOVERNING THE AMERICAS: ASSESSING MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS
(Lynne Rienner
Publishers. 2007). Since its creation, the OAS has been condemned to the eternal task of rolling a large
stone to the top of a hill, which Gordon Mace and Jean-Philippe Thérien (2007) have described as a
“Sisyphus” effect (see also Corrales and Feinberg 1999). Peter J Meyer, Organization of American States:
Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 2014). id.
at.
45 OAS website, www.oas.org. OAS members States. BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser. LV/1.82, doc. 6 (discussing the member states of
the OAS), at 53. There are thirty-five member states of the OAS. They are Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.
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rules that gradually protect individuals from their own governments. 46 The OAS member
states inspired in the HR protection, primarily seated in the Inter-American HR System, is
placed under surveillance of the OAS.
The US has sought to use the OAS to advance economic and security objectives in
the Western Hemisphere and to fight communism. 47 The US objectives were jeopardized
by systematic assassinations, disappearances, torture, detentions and other harassments
backed by top-down authorities of authoritarian regimes. Even worse, when heads of State
seem willing – as later happened — to sponsor strategic alliances of security and
intelligence to commit massive trans-frontier violations of HR and preserve impunity for
those implicated. 48 Amidst the rise of authoritarian regimes in the Americas on the 1950s,
the idea of the HR regime started to be forged, according to Jack Donnelly, because of

CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 8 (Oxford University Press. 2008).
As Tomuschad noted, the UDHR was the beginning of the States desire for the creation of such a regime
that would protect individuals from their own governments. See Annemarie Devereux, Australia and
the International Scrutiny of Civil and Political Rights: An Analysis of Australia's Negotiating Policies,
1946-1966, 22 AUST. YBIL, (55;57;58;60;62;64;79) (2002). In no case did the States perceive the
devastation of WWII as a complete legal crisis for HR; therefore, the Holocaust was not perceived as
invalidating an existing HR rule or regime and thus States fail to expose the need for more robust
enforcement. E.g. creation of an international HR Court with universal jurisdiction since also powerful
States can block the creation of institutions. In fact, Australia’s 1948 proposal for creation of such a
Court failed due to opposition by two powerful States—the UK and the US. By the late 1940s, the US
had begun to hedge on constructing “a new world order.” Power calculations explain the collateral
intervention of the US and China. Deveraux writes that a universal HR Court “never came close enjoying
the support of the majority.” HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 447 (Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt. 1973). Thus, Arendt affirmed that at the end of WWII, HRs were in need of new norms
because HR discourse itself was contributed to the atrocities of the twenty centuries because it is the
powerless who are exposed to abuses and HR had become unenforceable. She writes, “the rights of
man, which has never been philosophically established but merely formulated which had never been
politically secured but merely proclaimed, have, in their, traditional form, lost all validity.”
47 Noam Chomsky, The umbrella of US Power, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, 10 (1999). According to
Chomsky, Lars Schoulstz and Edward Herman found that the US has tended to flow disproportionately
to Latin American governments sacrificing HR. The first, “which torture their citizens… to the
hemisphere’s relatively egregious violators of fundamental HR,” and the second, that aid is correlated
with improvement in the investment climate. See details in LARS SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED
STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA (Princeton University Press. 2014).
48 Goiburú v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 September 2006, Ser. C No. 153, paras.
84 and 89.
46
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dominant power; the US wielded its hegemonic power in support of the Inter-American HR
system’s creation and operation. 49
OAS members created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the
Commission) in 1959. The Commission is the first autonomous agency of the interAmerican HR system whose mandate stems from the OAS Charter. The Commission’s
function is to promote the observance and defense of HR in the Americas. In particular, this
agency monitors and reports on the general HR situation in the member states. It also
provides a venue for the denunciation and resolution of HR violations in individual cases,
as a quasi-judicial body.
Later, the American Convention was adopted at the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on HR held November 7-22, 1969 in San Jose, Costa Rica. This Convention
came into effect on July 18, 1978, when the eleventh instrument of ratification by an OAS
member State was submitted. 50 As to date, the US has not ratified the Convention, 51 despite
the fact that US participates in the Inter-American HR System. 52 The annual reports of the
OAS and ICHR show that, as of 2014, the US provides 41% of the OAS budget 53 and the

49 Jack Donnelly, International human rights: a regime analysis, 40 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 625,
also 637-8 (1986).
50 Id., at 49
51 The States that have not yet ratified the Convention are Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada,
Guyana, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vicente & Grenadines, and the U.S. The States that have
denounced the Convention are Trinidad & Tobago, Peru and Venezuela on May 26, 1998; July 08, 1999;
and September 10, 2012, respectively. Peru’s denouncement of the Convention was reverse on January
29, 2001.
52 Tom J Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox,
19 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 520-1 (1997). KATHRYN SIKKINK, MIXED SIGNALS: US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND
LATIN AMERICA (Cornell University Press. 2007).
53 OAS, 4th Quarterly Resource Management and Performance Report, January 1 to December 31, 2013,
February 20, 2014. The OAS budget is expected to total $167 million in 2014. The US is the top source
of funding for the OAS. It contributed at least $65.7 million in FY2013—equivalent to 41% of the total
2013 OAS budget. In 2013, the largest member State donors after the US were Canada ($22.6 million),
Brazil ($8.7 million), Mexico ($7.9 million), Colombia ($3.5 million), and Argentina ($2.6 million).
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OAS provided 40,9% of the ICHR’s 2014 income. 54 However, politically, States that have
not ratified have less credibility to encourage other States to follow the norms HR decisions
in the regime. 55
This HR regime (as many other regimes) did not impose very many explicit and
specific duties regarding compliance and inter-State action does not enforce them. 56 Indeed,
when regimes seem to empower governments to challenge one another, as it can be
illustrated through the Inter-American HR regime, 57 such challenges are a rarity. 58 When
they do occur, as in the Inter-State cases (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica 59 and Ecuador v.
Colombia), 60 they are short-lived.

61

Reason to argue that States perceive HR as peripheral

due to the intangibility of HR that addresses issues like dignity. 62 HR do not “involve
substantial reciprocity, which weakens possibilities of mutually beneficial self-executing

See 2014 Annual Report, at 77. According to “Program— Budget of the Organization,” approved by
the General Assembly during the forty-third special session, November 2013, AG/RES.1 (XLIII-E/12),
available at http://www.oea.org/presupuesto/. Thus, the Court’s budget for 2014 was 1.59% of the
OAS budget (US$2.661.000,00), approved by the General Assembly.
55 Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 856, 887 (2009).
56 Andrew Moravcsik, The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe, 54
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 217 (2000).
57 This System is represented by the OAS Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, American
Convention and OAS Charters. Id., supra 11, American Convention, Article 45 stipulated that right.
58 Jo M. Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 116
(Cambridge University Press Second Edition. ed. 2013).
59 IACHR, Inter-State Case 01/06 Nicaragua v. Costa Rica Report No 11/07 (2007)
60 IACHR, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Admissibility, Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina (Ecuador v.
Colombia) Report No. 112/10 (Oct, 21m 2010)
61 Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 2013. Farer,
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 31, 36 (1997). “As Farer anticipated, to date no interstate case has yet
reached the ICHR.”
62 ARENDT, The origins of totalitarianism 447. 1973. As Arendt insists-4kmk4k that “the rights of man,
which has never been philosophically established but merely formulated which had never been
politically secured but merely proclaimed, have, in their, traditional form, lost all validity.” They are
powerless phantoms unintentionally exposed to abuse. Likewise, their vapidity or intangible nature is
evidenced by Hathaway, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, (2002). When she says that since a nation’s actions
against its own citizens do not directly threaten other States, “the costs of retaliatory noncompliance
are low and don’t independently affect State power calculations.”
54
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agreements.” 63 In consequence, “international HR treaties cannot be understood as
mechanisms of cooperation for mutual benefits of all parties.” 64
The OAS member states put in consideration the possibility that a Regional HR
Court may be apt to mediate the tension between the oppressor State (whose policies,
practices and abstentions are detrimental to human dignity) and the protector State (which
theoretically promotes the interest and well-being of its citizens). 65 Thus, instead of
disciplining inter-State public relations or structuring domestic HR climates, an
international or regional HR Court judgment is almost entirely applied within State borders
and is most often used to inspire State strategies and policies. 66 Since domestic law tends to
“reflect deeply held national values,” these judgments are often met with high resistance. 67
It is, therefore, not surprising that States often do not comply with international HR
judgments.
The question then becomes: why do States create international or regional HR
Courts to adjudicate and enforce HR? 68

Beth Simmons, Treaty compliance and violation, 13 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 288 (2010).
Eric Neumayer, Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?, 49 JOURNAL
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 927 (2005).
65 TOMUSCHAT, Human rights: between idealism and realism 8. 2008. Moravcsik, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, (2000). Hathaway, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, (2002). Oona A Hathaway, Why do countries
commit to human rights treaties?, 51 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2007).
Neumayer, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, (2005). Simmons, ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
(2010).
66 Moravcsik, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 217 (2000).
67 Helfer, 469 (2014).
68 Moravcsik, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 217 (2000). Similarly, he asks “why governments construct
international regimes to adjudicate and enforce HR.” States enhance the credibility of domestic policies
and consolidate democratic institutions (vis-à-vis non-democratic political threats) by delegating
authority to international and independent institutions. Morazvcsik cites this as the States’ rational
motivation for engaging in international processes of cooperation and integration despite the
associated loss of sovereignty. Terry M Moe, Political institutions: The neglected side of the story,
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION, 227-8 (1990). As Moe explains, HR norms are democratic
governments’ expressions of interest in ‘‘locking in’’ democratic rule through the enforcement of HR,
which are used to insulate and constrain the actions of future governments.
63
64
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In 1979, OAS Member States created a regional Court for the protection of HR, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR). This Court is produced among the 82
articles’ American Convention that established more than 24 rights. The norms that outline
the structure, function and authority of the Court are part of the American Convention, the
Court’s 1979 Statutes 69 and its Seven Rules of Procedure since 1980 to 2009. 70 The Court
is settled in San Jose, Costa Rica, and it is made up of seven judges elected in their personal
capacity who are from the OAS Member States. The Court is created for the purpose of
judicial interpretation and application of the Convention and other inter-American HR
treaties, in particular for the issuance of judgment on cases for HR abuses and consultative
opinions.
This case (of Court creation) is not so much a contest between the US and Latin
American and Caribbean States as part of a broader battle over the direction of ICHR life in
the coming years. At the center of this struggle is the concept of Court authority
(conceptualized at various times or actors as competence, power, jurisdiction, etc.)— it is
not a particularly new idea, but one that has gained considerable momentum lately. Since
the basic instruments of the OAS did not reflect the Caribbean reality or interests,
adherence to the ICHR was “slower and halting.” 71 Moreover, with the US poised to use

Organization of American States (OAS), Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1
October 1979.
70 Rules of Procedure of The Inter-American Court of HR, January 1, 2010 was approved by the Court
during its LXXXV Regular Period of Sessions, held from November 16 to 28, 2009. [hereafter Rules of
Procedure] (These Rules of Procedure entered into force on January 1, 2010). The previous Rules of
Procedure were 1980, 1991, 1996, 2000 and 2003.
71 Laurence R Helfer, Overlegalizing human rights: International relations theory and the
commonwealth Caribbean backlash against human rights regimes, 102 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1864
(2002).
69
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the Court to support its public foreign policy HR agenda, 72 Caribbean and Latin American
States were weary that judges could be beholden to State governments. 73
Drafters of the Convention appealed that, "the problems of our hemisphere are more
unique to the American than they are universal or European. They can only be solved
within the framework of our own legal, cultural, political, and social traditions," 74
detaching from UN and European HR instruments, 75 indeed, OAS Member States designed
an independent Court 76 that can assume a wide array of roles as an autonomous, impartial
and neutral arbiter, mediator, investigator and judge; 77 however, recognition of its
competence is voluntary. 78 This means cases can only be brought against States that have
ratified the American Convention and have previously recognized the competence of the
Court, 79 unless a State accepts jurisdiction expressly for a specific case. At least in theory,

SIKKINK, Mixed signals: US human rights policy and Latin America. 2007.
Posner & Yoo, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 12-35 (2005). Posner and Yoo show that Courts with judges
beholden to State governments are used more, have higher rates of compliance and are likely to be
more effective than preachy, independent Courts. They point to the 5% of ICHR judgments that were
met with full compliance – a figure that is debatably misleading without deeper comparative analysis of
partial compliance and noncompliance. They also argue that because States have no way of ensuring
that the judges will be faithful to the State preferences set forth in a treaty, customary IL, or arbitration,
States prefer tribunals that are dependent on the interests of the States they serve.
74 Thomas Buergenthal, American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities and
Differences, The, 30 AM. UL REV., 155-6 (1980).
75 Council of Europe, report on the Inter-American Specialized Conference on HR (Strasbourg, 22
December 1969), reprinted in THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & ROBERT E NORRIS, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM § 4 (Oceana Publications. 1986).
76 Helfer & Slaughter, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW,
(2005). Helfer and Slaughter note that States are
recognizing the importance of independent Courts and tribunals. This is evident in the rising number of
States ratifying treaties that establish independent international Courts (as opposed to arbitration) for
disputes and submitting to the Court’s jurisdiction, even when it is optional. More significant that
creation is that these Courts are used more often, at least contrary to Posner and Yoo (see supra
footnote 53). Helfer and Slaughter point to statistics indicating that over 80% (14,946 of 18,277) cases
have been heard by international tribunals in the last 13 years (as of 2005). Even if this figure is
controlled for the number of States that have ratified the Courts and the number of years that the Court
has been operation, caseload is only one way to measure of the increased use of international Courts
and tribunals.
77 Thomas Legler, The Organization of American States and Effective Multilateralism, ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD, 313 (2014).
78 Id., supra 11, American Convention, Art. 62.1
79 Id., Article 62.2
72
73
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there is complete freedom for OAS Members to ratify the American Convention, to
recognize or to reject the competence/optional jurisdiction of the Court. 80
The Convention-mandated procedures empower the Court to ensure State
compliance with the rights set forth in the instrument 81 and in the Charter of the OAS. 82
The Court is responsible for monitoring this implementation by States parties. To do so, the
Court is granted with the adjudicatory function. This function is the mechanism by which
the Court determines if a State has incurred in international responsibility for having
violated any of the rights stipulated in the Convention or other applicable HR treaties. The
ICHR’s judgments describe the meaning and extent of the HR, State obligations, and
procedural and probatory regulations. The States Parties to the Convention, who have
accepted the Court’ jurisdiction and the Commission (when its recommendations about the
international responsibility of the States for HR violations have not been complied) have
the right to submit a case to the Court, pursuant with Article 61(1) of the Convention.
Individuals such as Victims and Representatives, groups of individuals, or organizations
that allege violations of the HR do not have direct recourse to the ICHR; they must first
submit their petition to the Commission and go through the procedure for cases before the
Commission.
For thirty two years, this watchdog’s bark (ICHR) was much “bigger than its bite”
since it was sometimes “unwilling and often unable to stop widespread HR abuse in the

Id., Article 62.3. Twenty-one of the States Parties of the American Convention, including all Latin
American States, have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. These States are: Argentina,
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The only three States Parties to the American Convention that have
not accepted jurisdiction of the ICHR are Dominica, Granada and Jamaica.
81 Id., supra 11, American Convention, Article 33
82 Charter of the Organization of American States (American Charter), April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
U.N.T.S. 48.
80
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region.” 83 Some suggest that since 1965 the Commission’s authority to examine specific
human cases of HR violations, 84 which it always does before the Court hears a case, has
prevented/delayed the Court from taking more assertive action. 85 Since 2002, the
Commission has reviewed more than 10,234 petitions, 86 while the Court has only received
154. 87
The Court ruled its first case inadmissible in the Viviana Gallardo Costa Rica (case)
on 1983, but only until 1988 in the Velasquez-Rodriguez (Honduras) case the Court ruled a
judgment on merits. 88 The Court issues judgments on merits but also on reparations and
costs and monitoring judgments. Seventy percent of the Court cases include claims of
extrajudicial execution, torture, illegal detainment, deprivation of liberty and unfair trial
and sentencing. 89 The Court is also responsible for monitoring the implementation of its
judgments by states parties. The Court’s judgments may include multiple Court-ordered
reparations, in consequence, determining whether a State has complied with judgment is a
faculty exclusively belonging to the Court. As a State fulfills the duties emanating from

Courtney Hillebrecht, The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International Human Rights
Law: Case Studies from the Inter- American Human Rights System, 34 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 960
(2012).
84 www.oas.org/en/Iachr/annual/2013/docs-en/AnnualReport-Introduction.pdf
85 Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 6. 2013. “The
Commission did not forward contentious cases to the Court until 1986, seven years after the Court’s
inception.” Farer, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 544 (1997). "The Commission's seeming indifference to the
Court, even reluctance to send it business [...] once the Court appeared on the scene, more than one
Commission member saw a danger that States might attempt to delay Commission action and
undermine its prestige […]” PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1003 (Oxford
University Press. 2013). (“Initially the Court and the Commission saw each other as rivals. The
Commission, established over two decades earlier, was very reluctant to refer contentious cases to the
Court […]”)
86 www.oas.org/en/Iachr/annual/2013/docs-en/AnnualReport-Chap2A-B.pdf at 45
87 www.oas.org/en/Iachr/annual/2013/docs-en/AnnualReport-Chap2A-B.pdf at 54
88 The Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits) ICHR, 29 July 1988, Ser. C No 4 that was included in
1988 Annual Report and the Viviana Gallardo et. al v. Costa Rica by Order dated September 8, 1983 as
recorded in the 1984 Annual Report at 41.
89 Percentage calculated based on the database created for this dissertation. I extracted the type of
violation from the operative paragraphs of Inter-American Court Judgments on merits. More details
available in Chapter III, Results.
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these reparations, the Court declares when States have full compliance with individual
reparations and closes the case by stating full compliance with all the reparations. Cases
that remain open past the Court’s initial deadlines to comply are considered in
noncompliance, as it was mentioned above. Such cases are said to be “on the stage of
monitoring compliance with Judgments.” 90 This phase of follow-up compliance with
Judgments is called “the monitoring process.”
On 1999, the Court clarifies that as an organ with jurisdictional functions, it has the
authority inherent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction (i.e., compétence de la
compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz). 91 On 2002, the Court was accused of “unilaterally
extending its jurisdictional function to create a monitoring function.” 92 The Court was also
accused of “interprets its own judgment,” constituting a 'post-judgment stage' [...]; [which]
did not fall within the judicial sphere of the Court, but strictly within the political sphere of
the General Assembly of the OAS (GA).” 93 On November 28, 2003, through its first
Judgment on Competence, the Court “rejects as inadmissible the State’s questioning of the
competence of the Court to monitor compliance with its judgments” 94 because its authority
to monitor judgments was rooted in promoting “effectiveness of decisions on
reparations.” 95 Likewise, the Court clarified its “inherent and non-discretionary” 96
competence to monitor compliance to reporting noncompliance to the GA. In the same

2010 Annual Report, at 10, para. 3
Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, 19 August 2014, Ser. A No.21, Requested by The Argentine Republic,
The Federative Republic of Brazil, The Republic of Paraguay and The Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
para. 17.
92 Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Competence) ICHR, 28 November 2003, Ser. C No 104, c); operative
para. 214. 6)
93 Id, paras. 26 and 41. The state asserts that, according to Article 65 of the Convention; only the
General Assembly had that authority
94 Id., paras 3 and 4
95 Id., paras. 23 and 72
96 Id., para. 44
90
91
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way, the Court also explained its competence to require States that have been found
internationally responsible for reporting periodically on compliance 97 pursuant various
precepts. Such as Article of the Convention, 98 the Statutes of the Court, 99 and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 100
The Court also considers that as the “ultimate interpreter of the Convention” it is
competent to issue interpretations of all its provisions, even those of a procedural nature,
with full authority. 101 On 2009, the Court unanimously approved the legal grounds for the
ICHR’s competence to monitor compliance with its judgments via in Article 69 of the
Rules of Procedure. 102 The Court considers that its faculty to create rules also stays explicit
in the exercise of its advisory function which presupposes the acceptance of the Court’s
right to decide on the scope of its jurisdiction. 103 Article 64(1) of the Convention granted
the Court competence to resolve request of advisory opinion on the interpretation of the
Convention or other treaties concerning the protection of HR in the States of the
Americas. 104 This function is “a service” by which the Court provides to all the members of
the inter-American HR system” 105 interpretations and clarifications about the meaning and

Id., paras. 131 and 133
Id., supra 11, American Convention, Articles 33, 62 (1) and (3) and Article 65
99 Id., supra 62
100 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.1, May 23, 1969, Vienna, [entered into
force on January 27, 1980] U.N. Doc A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (Under this provision, “a
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”)
101 Id., supra 11, American Convention, Article 55. Advisory Opinion OC-20/09, 29 September 2009, Ser.
A No.20, para. 18, and Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador (Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs), ICHR, 21 November 2007, Ser. C No. 170, para. 15
102 Rules of Procedure, Article 69 (The attributions are listed in the Rules of Procedure of the InterAmerican Court)
103 The Constitutional Court v. Peru (Competence), ICHR, 24 September 1999, Ser. C No. 55, para. 33
104 Id., supra 75
105 Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human
Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, 6 October 1987, Ser. A No. 9, para. 16, and American Convention,
Article 55 of the American Convention on Human Rights, supra 11. para. 15. “Other Treaties” Subject to
the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (American Convention, Article 64), supra 11, para. 39, and
97
98
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purpose of international HR law provisions. (See further details about the Court's functions
in the proceedings and monitoring processes in a map of action-process in Appendix C.)
Indeed, the Court has no formal and effective mechanism to enforce its
judgments. 106 The Convention provides only that the Court shall present its annual report to
the OAS General Assembly. 107 When the Court submits recommendations to the General
Assembly pertaining to the cases in which States are in noncompliance, 108 the General
Assembly is empowered to discuss the case and adopt political measures against the State.
Yet, political pressure to comply with the Court judgments has not materialized, as the
General Assembly has not pronounced on any of the Court’s noncompliance reports. 109 The
Court’s Annual Report is not included in General Assembly’s agenda. The Permanent
Council -the political body made up of OAS ambassadors- receives the report and controls
the General Assembly’s agenda, impeding political debate. 110 As Cavallaro noted, the
Court’s requirements are not at all echoed by the OAS. It is reasonable to say, “the Court

Control of Due Process in the Exercise of the Powers of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (American Convention, Articles 41 and 44 to 51), supra 11, para. 18.
106 Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 7, 28. 2013.
107 Id. at. American Convention., Art. 65
108 Id., Statute Art. 30.
109 For instance, the ICHR’s calls to the General Assembly regarding the following cases remain
unanswered: Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador, Loayza Tamayo v. Perú, Castillo Petruzzi v. Perú, Villagrán
Morales v. Guatemala, Paniagua Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Yean and Bosico Girls et al. v. Dominican
Republic, and is last but arguably most important case, Trinidad and Tobago’s James et al. case. See
Annual Report 1998, at 40, par. 7, that the Court clearly States:“[…I] n accordance with Article 65 of the
American Convention, [it] inform[ed] the General Assembly of the Organization of American States that
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, State party to the American Convention on HR, ha [d] not [upheld]
the provisional measures adopted in the James et al. Case. As a result, it request[ed] that the General
Assembly urge the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to comply with the orders of the Court.” The OAS'
General Assembly ignored the Court’s demand that Trinidad and Tobago be forced into compliance. The
petition was made in light of the State’s disobedience, when on June 4, 1999 Trinidad and Tobago
executed Joey Ramiah in disregard for the Court’s provisional measure requesting the preservation of
his life and physical integrity. Even though he was executed two days before the last meeting of the OAS
General Assembly, the issue was not included on the agenda
110 Farer, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, (1997). The political organs of the OAS have maintained a hands-off
approach with the HR instruments.
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lacks strong political backing from the OAS.” 111 Without such support, the ICHR lacks the
power to enforce compliance.
The OAS General Assembly has not assumed an active role in censure of States by
applying costly political sanctions that would allow a positive influence on State
compliance. 112 As the European system’s observer to the American drafting conference
expected, most governments [would prefer] to avoid the procedure of reporting
noncompliance to the General Assembly because it is attended by several hundred
delegates and widely publicized. 113 The drafters of the Convention lacked the foresight to
grant the General Assembly the right to adopt political measures against the State's in the
event of noncompliance. Even if such rights were granted, they remained inhibited in light
of the US embargo against Cuba 114 and US military interventions (Guatemala, Dominican
Republic, Granada, and Panama), which violated the sovereignty provisions of the OAS
Charter. 115 OAS members States, even when they seem concerned about HR violations, are
inhibited themselves from taking (or pressuring) a political decision/sanction against
another State. They are inhibited for fear the region’s larger countries would use the OAS

James L Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating regional human rights litigation in the
twenty-first century: The case of the Inter-American Court, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 784
(2008).
112 Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, El sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos:
aspectos institucionales y procesales, SAN JOSÉ: INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (1996).
Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 29. 2013.
113 Council of Europe, Report on the Inter-American Specialized Conference on HR (Strasbourg, 22
December 1969), reprinted in BUERGENTHAL & NORRIS, Human Rights, the Inter-American System. 1986.
114 Arthur Schlesinger explained that embargo, in place since 1961, was the result of the Kennedy
administration’s fears that the spread of the Castro ideology would destabilize Latin America, as Cuba
established itself as an example of revolution, decent life and connection to the Soviet Union. Foreign
Relations of US, 1961-63, vol. xii, American Republics, 13f., 33
115 Legler, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD, 319 (2014).
111
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General Assembly to intervene (with economic sanctions or military forces) in the smaller
ones, of jeopardizing its economic interests, or of having its own practices evaluated. 116
Despite limits of the sorts cited herein, through their various roles, International
Courts started to carry out their roles in international politics, surpassing low expectations
of achievements. 117 HR became a part of international politics because its discourse and
rhetoric are related to stability and State security, 118 coordination with other areas of
interest 119 (e.g., trade, environmental issues, international development assistance and
diplomacy) and maintenance of domestic political support and domestic and international
legitimacy. 120 Thus, today, Courts represent potentially powerful players able to reshape
IR, mainly if one considers the effect of the Courts’ judgments. 121

IV. THE ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
International Courts have four State-delegated roles defined on the bases of
mandates: dispute resolution, constitutional review, administrative review, and
enforcement. 122 The dispute resolution role, in which international Courts assist States in

116 Farer, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, (1997). Member States rarely speak out to promote compliance
with the tribunals’ rulings in other States in fear of retribution.
117 Id. at, 514; 544.
118 COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF
COMPLIANCE § 104 (Cambridge University Press. 2014);Courtney Hillebrecht, Unpacking Political Will:
Domestic Politics and Compliance with Human Rights Tribunals.
119 HILLEBRECHT, Domestic politics and international human rights tribunals: the problem of compliance.
2014.
120 Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics, International Human Rights Adjudication, and the Problem
of Political Will: Cases from the Inter-American Human Rights System, CONFERENCE PAPERS -MIDWESTERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 984-5 (2009).
121 Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 2013.
122 Karen J Alter, The multiple roles of international courts and tribunals: enforcement, dispute
settlement, constitutional and administrative review, (2012) in DUNOFF & POLLACK, Interdisciplinary
perspectives on international law and international relations: the state of the art (345-70). 2012.
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settling their disputes, is the most characteristic. This role is an opportunity to issue orders
for problem solving, facing contentious States, petitions or justifications. 123
Through its constitutional review role, the Court assesses the legal validity of
legislative and government actions based on a conflict with higher order legal
obligations. 124 In IL, these higher order laws are the founding treaties that constitute
supranational political systems and they may also include basic rights protections of
member States. 125 Constitutional review of State international acts enables the international
Court to nullify illegal international acts, but not to invalidate “illegal” national acts. 126
Scholars draw equivalencies between enforcement of international HR agreements and the
capacity to perform constitutional review of State acts or elevating international trade
agreements to a form of higher order law with precedence over conflicting national laws
and policies.
When a stakeholder contests a decision made by an administrative player, some
international courts perform administrative reviews, in which they ensure that the decision
upholds the law and prescribed procedures and is legally defensible. In practice, it is often
perceived as encroachment on prerogatives. Thus, the international Courts often use the

Id. at, (354). As Alter recognizes, HR bodies do not include dispute settlement provisions.
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE 21 (Oxford University Press. 2000). See in DUNOFF & POLLACK, Interdisciplinary perspectives
on international law and international relations: the state of the art. 2012.
125 JEFFREY L DUNOFF & JOEL P TRACHTMAN, RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Cambridge University Press. 2009). See in DUNOFF & POLLACK, Interdisciplinary
perspectives on international law and international relations: the state of the art. 2012.
126 Karen J Alter, The multiple roles of international courts and tribunals: enforcement, dispute
settlement, constitutional and administrative review, (2012) in DUNOFF & POLLACK, Interdisciplinary
perspectives on international law and international relations: the state of the art (353). 2012.
123
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administrative review function to support the State, reaffirming its decisions against
complaints. 127
In its last but arguably most important role, enforcement, the international Court
monitors State compliance with international rules and assigns consequences for
noncompliance. In this role, international Courts do more than monitor compliance with
norms. Some monitor judgment compliance according to their mandates, observing and
checking the States’ progress toward reparations ordered. Even though there is no
international government apparatus through which the international Court can enforce these
judgments, the hope is that the Court’s authority encourages compliance. 128 Monitoring,
which draws power from the latent potential to shame those that “underperform,” has long
been theorized as a potent form of social control. 129 Courts use this power within their role
to establish reputational costs. 130 This is important when a States’ capacity to comply with
international judgments is negatively impacted by its inability to fulfill its traditional roles
(economic and military) during the monitoring process. While the lack of enforcement
mechanisms distinguishes international and domestic law, international law is not that
dissimilar from constitutional and public law in the domestic realm. 131

Karen J Alter, The multiple roles of international courts and tribunals: enforcement, dispute
settlement, constitutional and administrative review, (2012) in id. at, (352). As of 2006, there were 12
permanent international Courts with administrative review authority (48% of international Courts). A
large percentage of these operate in the international economic arena, where administrators are often
responsible for implementing supranational regulations.
128 Id. at, (350-1). If that does not occur, pressure from others, including States, helps
129 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York,
NY: Vintage, 1995), 201-2, in Judith G Kelley & Beth A Simmons, Politics by Number: Indicators as Social
Pressure in International Relations, 59 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 57 (2015).
130 These powers include multiple State-specific compliance orders employing words for reputation
and control. Thus, scarce ability to enforce judgments and scarce retributive aspects conceded in
international Court mandates are supplemented with a great deal of power to name and shame.
131 Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law,
HARVARD LAW REVIEW (2009). Oona Hathaway & Scott J Shapiro, Outcasting: enforcement in domestic
and international law, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL (2011).
127

29

V.

COMPLIANCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THEORIES
International Relations (IR) theories on compliance have traditionally assume that
compliance is an act driven by State's actions, not reflecting entirely the interaction with
Courts, in the international system to produce compliance. IR theories share the belief that
States can uphold international judgments based on a calculated interest 132 (geopolitical,
economic interest, even relative power of domestic political groups) or ideas develop
around international systems. 133
The four variants of this IR approach (outlined below) differ in the types of sources
that they claim motivate the State’s actions in IR— and I apply them to explore how these
theories would explain the problem of noncompliance in the context of ICHR judgments.
1.

Realism

Realism explains IR through analyzing material power—states act to protect or
aggregate material power vis-à-vis other states. Thus, extensive noncompliance means that
compliance with international rules brings no benefits to states in terms of their material
power, position, and prospects and the states fail to comply does not threaten the material
power of states. Or, put more plainly, noncompliance is an inconsistency between State
interests and the international rules, including judgments: States act rationally with survival
and competitive advantage in mind. 134 Traditionally, each country’s economy, military

ALEXANDER M BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS XI (Yale
University Press. 1986). Bickel believe that, “it is many actions of government have two aspects: their
immediate, necessarily intended, practical effects, and their perhaps unintended or unappreciated
bearing on values we hold to have more general and permanent interest.”
133 Hathaway, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1955 (2002).
134 JOHN J MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS
(WW Norton & Company. 2001).
(Explaining that a realist conceptualization of the world rests on four assumptions: the first is survival,
132
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capacity or military spending and population are the sources of power underlying realism.
According to this view, States are the unique actors with the power and material
capabilities to survive in the logic of inter-State competition and affect politics, but military
and economic forces determine a State’s ability to compete 135 and influence dominance
relationships. 136 To eliminate competition for hegemony and avoid violent relationships, 137
States willingly manage power relationships using international politics. 138 This balance of
power encourages ever-more (militarily and economically) powerful States. 139

emphasizing that “survival is the principal goal of every State,” which results from absence of a central
authority, makes all other States potential enemies. The second is that States are rational actors acting
to maximize their likelihood of continued existence. The third and fourth are military capacity, and
economic, respectively. Both, as the author notes, are what make the Realist vision of IR essentially ‘a
story of Great Powers politics.’ In sum, the States act rationally with survival in mind using their
economic and military forces)
KENNETH NEAL WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 121 § 5 (McGraw-Hill New York. 1979). Waltz,
who as the Father of Neorealism emphasized that, according to the Realist world view “[…s]tates must
ensure their survival through maintaining or increasing their power in a self-help worl[d…]”, which
would justify States acting only for self-interest.
135 MEARSHEIMER, The tragedy of great power politics. 2001. Also see David P. Fidler, A Theory of OpenSource Anarchy, 15 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 266-7 (2008). Fidler emphasizes that
under the logic of inter-State competition, the mercantilism accounts for how economic activity
(development, trade and private enterprise) underlies the State-based notion with private production
of resources that affect the State’s international political position – either expanding its influence or
establishing its relative position. The security dilemma, for instance, follows this logic. For more details,
see, e.g., Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the security dilemma, 30 WORLD POLITICS, 167 (1978).
136 It is from the dominance that hegemony emerges. The hegemon (leader State) creates rules for
geopolitically subordinate States by implied power, ‘the threat of the threat,’ rather than direct military
force. Hegemony is recognized as “the best strategy for a country to pursue, if it can.” STEPHEN M WALT,
THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES 5 (Cornell University Press. 1987). (He describes the predominance of one
country over other countries) and ROSS HASSIG, MEXICO AND THE SPANISH CONQUEST 23-4 (University of
Oklahoma Press. 2006). (Describing domination as ‘the threat of the threat’.) (Walt had correctly
observed that States balance against threats rather than against power alone. They recognize that
power plays an important role, but in conjunction with geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and
perceived intentions, etc. For details, see the author’s arguments presented in the Balance of Threat
theory)
137 WALTZ, Theory of international politics. 1979. Waltz States that hegemonic domination used by
offensive realists only contributes to interstate conflicts and, thus must be replaced by the defensive
realists’ assumption regarding the balance of power system, which ensures that there will not be
attacks among them.
138 Under this scenario, favored in Kenneth Waltz’s foundational Theory of International Politics,
consensual peace is the price paid for ceding to the balance-of-power. International politics, and
consequently compliance, is then reduced to a power fee, paid by the States that share it. Waltz, who
summarizes the Realist credo: “[b]alance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two
requirements are met: that the order be anarchic (an anarchic system, where absence of a central
authority reduces the international system to anarchy) and that it be populated by units wishing to
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States can commit to tasks like creating and shaping IL, including review and
enforcement institutions, such as international Courts, but they do so to maintain their share
of power, or even increase it. Or, put in other words, serve their own interests. For realists,
states may mobilize their power to comply with international HR commitments by coercion
– powerful States seeking their own interests and ideological preferences, pressuring
weaker States toward or away from compliance with HR. 140 In consequence, realists do
acknowledge the existence of institutions but reject the idea that cooperation affects State
interaction and interest seeking. 141 Complying with the rules and fulfilling the international
commitment depends solely on the State’s interest. 142
Echoing Slaughter’s conclusion, there is nothing misleading about a State
committing to an obligation that it does not fulfill. 143 Since a State probably chooses
noncompliance when it sees no material or power benefit in compliance, material interests
and power relationships, not the force of international HR requirements, determine State
actions. 144 The international institutions, then, are left without independent force to
confront State utilitarian behavior, making they a reflection of such state calculations of

survive[…].” At least to this point, it seems to coincide with Mearsheimer’s ideas as expressed in The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
139 Fidler, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 266 (2008).
140 Helfer, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1842 (2002).
141 Fidler, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 267 (2008). David P. Fidler, All Politics Is Global:
Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, 5 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS (2007). The text lucidly
clarifies that the realist State-centric, power-oriented approach rejects regulatory cooperation, which
intergovernmental organizations have.
142 Helfer, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, (2002).
143 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Principal Theory, 3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2
(2013). Given that realists argue that law can only be enforced through State power, this theory begs
the question: why would a State decide to use its power for compliance unless it had a material interest
in the result? If a State has a material interest in the result of IL, the State will use its power to comply
with IL mandates.
144 Id. at.
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self-interest based on concerns about relative power, not a cause; 145 as a result, institutional
outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. 146
2.

Institutionalism

Institutionalism, like Realism, accepts that States are rational unitary actors sharing
incentives, relinquishing coercive power in order to seek objective self-interests in an
anarchic world. 147 However, instead of focusing on State interests, they focus on
institutions, claiming that, in certain situations, formal and informal international
institutions can have an independent effect on state behavior. This assertion is what really
distinguishes institutionalism from realism. Accordingly, institutionalism explains
noncompliance as ineffectiveness of international institutions (e.g. intergovernmental
organizations, the Court, or monitoring processes) to move States away from rational, selfinterested behavior toward “cooperation” with mutually agreed upon rules. 148 In other
words, under this view, the Court is an institution (a regime composed of substantive rules

Mearsheimer, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, (1994). Mearsheimer claims that IL and its institutions are, a
State desire- a simple expression of a State’s utilitarian behavior, not a cause. Some Neorelists – an
outgrowth of classical realism—have theorized that IL has no independent impact on the State's
behavior. Raustiala & Slaughter, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 553 (2002). According to
Slaughter (under this view) IL is, therefore, an epiphenomenon because the content is largely
controlled by power or coercion.
146 Mearsheimer, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, (1994).
147 Slaughter, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 8 (2013). This view accounts for three nuances:
intergovernmental institutionalism (e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act:
national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community, 45 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (1991).); neoliberal institutionalism (e.g., Robert O Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism:
A perspective on world politics, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY (1989).) and new institutionalism (e.g., Duncan Snidal, Political economy and
international institutions, 16 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (1996).)
148 Robert Keohane, 0.(1984) After Hegemony, COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY, PRINCETON, NJ (1986). This author works recognized that the central insight is that
“cooperation” may be a rational, self-interested strategy for countries to pursue under certain
conditions.
145
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and procedural mechanisms) and States fail to comply with Court judgments due to action
or inaction by monitors in the implementation process. 149
The Court’s monitoring encourages compliance by channeling State interest into
benefit and by tarnishing the international image of States who do not comply by making
noncompliance public. When State behavior does not reflect the international commitment,
institutions provide throughout the system information about these instances of
noncompliance, 150 with consequences for cooperation, reciprocity and reputation. Since a
State’s reputation is directly related to its historical behavior, noncompliance that is noticed
increases the probability of repercussions. Guzman emphasizes that consensual IL affects
State compliance to the extent that other States believe that the State in question has a
commitment that should be honored. 151 On that basis, direct sanctions (punishment or
retaliation) are the most suitable short-term incentives, while reputational costs affect a
State’s long-term compliance. 152 When the stakes are relatively modest such as in the
context of HR, States seek to preserve their reputation by complying. On the issues that
receive the most IL attention such as economics, arms, war and borders, States fail to
uphold their promises to cooperate on these issues and sanctions are unlikely to be
effective. 153 Institutional intermediation can increase the cost of noncompliance in terms of

Barbara Koremenos, et al., The rational design of international institutions, 768 (2001). In this view,
legal institutions are “rational, negotiated responses to the problems [States] face.” Slaughter’s idea that
institutions are used to set boundaries and overcome the uncertainty that undermines cooperation by
setting expectations – molding principles, norms, and decision-making procedures Slaughter,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 10 (2013).
150 Slaughter, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 10-3 (2013). Slaughter noted that making
transparent information about State behavior available IR between States. This increases efficiency
because the rules of the game are pre-established, and States know how to behave.
151 Guzman, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 72-84 (2008).
152 Id. at.
153 Hathaway, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1951 (2002).
149
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reciprocity or reputation only. 154 Or, put more plainly, “cheating can be a serious barrier to
cooperation.” 155 However, institutionalists emphasize only State absolute gains and
underemphasize relative gains. 156 Domestic factors can also hinder compliance and when
noncompliance is the result of multiple actors Institutionalism is best complemented with a
pluralist IR explanation, as in Liberalism and Constructivism discussed below.
3.

Liberalism

Going beyond the simplistic view of the rational unitary actor, Liberalism argues
that the state’s international behavior is determined by political actors and processes within
the state. These actors and processes shape the state’s national interests by using domestic
politics (e.g. representative governments, elections, lobbying, law-making process) and
transnational activities (e.g. trade, civil society activism). 157 States remain important
players in international politics under this theory, however, neglects the State actor’s direct
power in it because the State only filtered the impact of non-State actor. 158 Accordingly,

Snidal, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 124 (1996). States appear less concerned with
cooperation and international organizations than with creating a norm that coordinates reciprocity, as
Snidal argued. Slaughter, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 10 (2013). She recognizes that
“[…c]ountries that know they must interact with the same partners repeatedly through an institution
will instead have incentives to comply with agreements in the short term so that they might continue to
extract the benefits of co-operation in the long terms,” paragraph 10.
155 Mearsheimer, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 19 (1994).
156 Id. at, 19-21.
157 Andrew Moravcsik, Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics, 51
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 5 (1997). The author lists the three assumptions at the heart of Liberalism.
First, non-State actors are fundamental in world politics; second, States represent some dominant
subset of domestic society, whose interest they serve; and third, State behavior is determined by the
configuration of preferences in the international system. Fidler, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS, (2007).;
Fidler, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, (2008). Fidler noted that in DANIEL W DREZNER, ALL
(Cambridge Univ Press. 2007). Drezner follows Liberalism’s account of
POLITICS IS GLOBAL 6
intergovernmental organizations’ or non-State actors’ role in international regulatory politics. He
describes a two-step dynamic. First, State preferences originate from domestic actors and institutions
and second, interests and capabilities are distributed as a function of these preferences. Likewise,
Fidler notes that intergovernmental organizations or non-State actors impact State policy through
domestic politics and transnational activities that shape the content of State policy preferences in IR.
158 Fidler, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 269 (2008).
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under liberal theory, noncompliance is a failure of domestic actors and political processes
to support and advance compliance as a State interest.
When the State is seen as a multiplicity of actors, international norms and
judgments exert impact on State interests as incentives. 159 Scholars claim that liberal States
rest on international norms in their international relations, and on international Court
judgment in resolving international disputes—at least in their relations with other liberal
States. 160 Moravcsik’s republican liberal theory suggests that compliance with HR regimes
changes behavior in liberal nations. 161 This would explain why Liberalists assume – and
perhaps they are right – that “compliance with the European HR System (largely by liberal
democracies) is stronger than it is with developing HR System [such as the African or
Inter-American], which addresses a collection of [liberal] democratic and [ex-]
authoritarian States.” 162
Using the liberal internationalist model of transnational legal relations, Courts have
secured HR incorporating international norms and judgments into the domestic legal
system (a global policy form). According to Slaugther, Courts may have greater long-term
impact on the strength of the domestic judicial system. However, they only influence State
behavior when compliance has become a preference. 163 If compliance happens to be, for
whatever reason, a State’s preference (of non-state actors), it may appear that the institution
Robert O Keohane, International relations and international law: two optics, 38 HARV. INT'L. LJ, 119
(1997).
160 JEFFREY L DUNOFF, et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 30
(Aspen Publishers. 2010).
161 Moravcsik, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 219-220; 229 (2000). He emphasizes that incipient
democracies (“newly established and potentially unstable democracies”) grow more roots in HR
regimes than established democracies or non-democracies. In the incipient, popular sovereignty and
enforcement of HR are used to reduce the uncertainty that threatens to undermine the democratic rule
of law.
162 DUNOFF, et al., International law: norms, actors, process: a problem-oriented approach 30. 2010.
163 Slaughter, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 19 (2013). International Tribunals such as
International Criminal Courts (ICC) and International HR Tribunals (ECHR and ICHR).
159
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is influencing the political actors and processes within the State, but as Goldsmith and
others have argued, this appearance is illusory. 164 IL has few mechanisms for considering
State preferences. 165 As Hathaway asserts, under this view, “State decisions in the
international realm [require] understanding the domestic politics that underlie them.” 166
4.

Constructivism

Under this school, “States have no preexisting interests; rather, State interests are
created and changed by and through [the interactions of state and non-state actors. Thus, IR
is explained by looking at the social construction of ideas that occurs through these
interactions]. Participation in international institutions helps States achieve shared
understandings.” 167 These understandings, in turn, alter a State’s perception of its own
interests. State behavior is mediated by social norms. 168 These social norms, including
compliance and noncompliance, are socially constructed. 169 Thus, noncompliance indicates

Eric Posner & Jack Goldsmith, The new international law scholarship, GEORGIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, FORTHCOMING, 463, 472 (2006). See also JACK L GOLDSMITH & ERIC A
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press. 2005).
165 Slaughter, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 18 (2013). She affirms that this divergence presents
a special challenge to IL scholars.
166 Hathaway, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1953 (2002).
167 DUNOFF, et al., International law: norms, actors, process: a problem-oriented approach 30. 2010.
168 James G March, og Johan P. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The organizational basis of
politics (New York: The Free Press). As illustrated by Olsen, State behavior is mediated by social
norms, rather than State interest, consequently, it could be affirmed that international social norms
shape and change foreign policy over time, rather than State interest exclusively. Slaughter,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph (2013). Following March and Olsen, Slaugther explains that
Constructivists distinguish between a ‘logic of consequences’—where actions are rationally chosen to
maximize the interests of a State—and ‘logic of appropriateness’, where rationality is heavily mediated
by social norms. For example, Constructivists would argue that the norm of State sovereignty has
profoundly influenced international relations, creating a predisposition for non- interference that
precedes any cost-benefit analysis States may undertake. These arguments fit under the Institutionalist
rubric of explaining international co-operation, but based on constructed attitudes rather than the
rational pursuit of objective interests.” For further information, see James G March & Johan P Olsen, The
institutional dynamics of international political orders, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 943-69 (1998).
169 Expanding on Constructivist ideas in the works presented by: ROBERT O KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: TWO APPROACHES 379-96 (Springer. 1989).; and KRATOCHWIL, Rules, norms, and decisions:
on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs. 1991.
On the basis of these works it has been asserted that early Constructivist scholars emphasized
164
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weak social construction of the norm of “compliance” with HR rules, 170 or, lack of
participation in the set of ideas and interactions under the HR System.
The way in which international institutions are involved in the social construction
processes of an actor's interests has been examined by Martha Finnemore. State interests,
she explains, “are constructed through social interaction.” 171 She provides three case
studies of such construction. 172 By focusing on how international institutions use
persuasive rhetoric and language to influence State behavior and construct the social reality
of the international system, constructivists are often seen as more optimistic about progress
in IR than versions of realism. 173 These institutions are actors in the international
bureaucracy, pursuing their own interests, even those contradictory to the interests of the
States 174 that created them (e.g. HR Courts). 175 The administration in power must comply
with international norms and judgments in order to prevent domestic actors from rising up
mechanisms that drew on the normative power of rules and the importance of shared knowledge and
discourse in shaping identity and interests.
170 JEFFREY T CHECKEL, WHY COMPLY?: CONSTRUCTIVISM, SOCIAL NORMS AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (Arena. 1999). From a constructivist perspective, compliance is less a matter of rational
calculation or imposed constraints than of internalized identities and norms of appropriate behavior. It
is a line of theory that is particularly congenial to many IL scholars. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF
(Cambridge University Press. 1999).; Alexander Wendt, Constructing
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
international politics, 20 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (1995). Wendt provided detailed explanations of the
importance of social meaning for this school and contributed to understanding of State behavior within
IR in Constructing International Politics.
171 Martha Finnemore, National interests in international society, 6-7 (1996).
172 Id. at, 45; 73; 121
173 MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL
POLITICS 16 (Cornell University Press. 2004). This piece has the merit of placing more attention on the
role of bureaucracies in IR on topics such as free trade or HR protection and in that context, IL
institutions become more than pawns of the States.
174 THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, et al., THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE §
66 (Cambridge University Press. 1999). While constructivists in IR have not generally tackled
compliance per se, they are starting to take into account, as see in CHECKEL, Why comply?:
constructivism, social norms and the study of international institutions. 1999. Because constructivism
replaces simplistic notions of rationality in which States only pursue survival, power or interest.
175 MARGARET E KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 5; 7 (Cambridge Univ Press. 1998). The authors spend a great deal of time explaining the role
of transnational actors, stating, for example, that transnational corporations have used persuasive
rhetoric, including lobbying, to help form "norm entrepreneurs", which are able to not only influence
State behavior, but also to alter State beliefs about issues like use of land mines in war or international
trade. Slaughter, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, paragraph 23 (2013). She makes similar observations in it.
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against it. 176 Since State interests seem to no longer be the only interests that matter,
modifications of interests form continuous “feedback loops” that effect social changes. 177
Constructivists see the structure of IR as primarily ideational, rather than material; they are
not necessarily wedded to focusing their analysis on the State as unit. 178 It remains unclear
why leading constructivists focused on construction of State interests, which are more
material than purely ideational. 179 However, studying the nature of State behavior and its
formation is integral in Constructivism methodology to explaining the international system.
Constructivism endorses an immaterial and ideational ability of international institutions to
affect IR by shaping State’s perception and interest. While they acknowledge the role of
institutions in the international affairs, the Court’s impact is filtered through social
norms. 180 Constructivism provides for the possibility that international institutions affect
social norms, however, States are granted certain privileges to act in constructivism as
States wield greater material power than institutions. More interesting, constructivism
focuses on the process of change rather than on its ends and cannot predict the future of
international politics 181 such as compliance with international institutions.
Individually, each IR theory (realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and
constructivism) explains noncompliance in a different way. Realism explains
noncompliance as an inconsistency between the international judgment and state interests:
states fail to comply because it is not in their interest to do so, or because the political costs
of compliance outweigh the benefits. To describe case-specific noncompliance, we must

BARNETT & FINNEMORE, Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics. 2004. They
also explore how bureaucracies affect State behavior.
177 Fidler, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 270 (2008).
178 Finnemore, 6-7 (1996).; WENDT, Social theory of international politics 29-33. 1999.
179 Fidler, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 270-1 (2008).
180 Id. at, 270.
181 Id. at, 132-3.
176
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determine whether the demands of the judgment would result in a gain or loss in terms of
material power. Institutionalism explains noncompliance as the ineffectiveness of
intergovernmental or monitoring process institutions to move states away from rational,
self-interested behavior toward cooperation with mutually agreed upon rules: States fail to
comply due to action or inaction by monitors in the implementation process. For liberalism,
noncompliance can be a consequence of domestic political actors and processes that do not
value compliance and, thus, do not articulate and advance compliance as a state interest:
states fail to comply because of domestic factors. Constructivism tells us that ideas,
including noncompliance, are socially constructed. So, noncompliance indicates weak
social construction of “compliance” with HR rules and judgments. None of the IR theories
explain more than a portion of compliance and noncompliance; they are individually
insufficient.
In aggregate, these IR theories recognize the interaction between the actors
involved in compliance and noncompliance. In this interaction, the Court might act
strategically, using some tactics/strategies to increase the probability that its judgments will
be upheld because noncompliance is costly to the system and its “position [within the]
system.” 182 However, IR theories do not provide a detailed explanation of the court’s
capacity to exercise its state-delegated power nor how that power can participate of states
preferences, impacting ideas about compliance and noncompliance (e.g., feeding or
confronting strategy of states). In this way, IR theories limit the Courts’ powers to justify
their decisions and earn a role in the State’s actions through their interaction.
Realism and Institutionalism subordinate the courts’ powers (or their participation)
in the process of interaction that produces noncompliance to the power of States. The
182

Vanberg, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 349 (2001).
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reason is that realism and institutionalism focus on interstate interactions. The court’s
exercise of power cannot be accommodated in the scenario in which states exercise their
material power to affect compliance i.e., they do not assign material power to parties other
than the States. Thus, under these theories, the role of Courts, their ability to influence IR
and participate in state strategies via interaction is underestimated. Realism asserts that
Court does not hold independent power. Thus, Courts reflect state calculations of selfinterests based on the concept of power; as a result, institutional outcomes reflect the
balance of power. Institutionalism places the Court as a “norms-motivated actor” 183 and
assigns it some cooperative functions in the international system. Institutions can change
state behavior but not independently because they performed valuable tasks without
frontally challenging State sovereign.
Similarly, liberalism and constructivism subordinate the courts’ powers (or their
participation) in the process of interaction to the power of non-state actors and the ideas of
the system. Liberalism and Constructivism acknowledge the possible influence of Courts
on national and international politics, but only within the formation of state preference or
socially constructed ideas, neglecting its ability to exercise direct material power.
Liberalism recognizes, to some extent, that the Court interacts with non-state actors and the
system at the cost of limiting the Court’s power in its interactions because the real action
for liberalism comes through non-state actors facilitating or blocking international politics
and compliance. Constructivism assumes that compliance and noncompliance are equally
constructed by the interactions of States, state actors and international institutions like
Courts (constructivism). However, even when it appears to give theoretical importance to
the courts it places too much emphasis on the process than outcomes (such as compliance
183

Kapiszewski & Taylor, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, 822 (2013).
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and noncompliance), which does not take into consideration the Court’s normative ability
to influence compliance. Thus, these IR theories do not systematically account for the
nuance and complexity of the interaction between States and Court, and its consequences
for compliance.
Table A. IR Theory and ICHR noncompliance 184
IR Theory

Realism

Institutionalism

Liberalism

Constructivism

General Explanation of Extensive Noncompliance in
the Inter-American System

Category of Noncompliance Identified in
Qualitative/ Quantitative Analysis of
Specific Cases

Extensive noncompliance means that
compliance brings no material power benefits
and noncompliance does not threaten the
material power of states (i.e., extensive noncompliance shows that HR norms do not
independently affect state power calculations in
a condition of structural anarchy)
Extensive noncompliance means institutions are
not altering rational, self-interested state
behavior in the context of HR (i.e., institutions
are not “lengthening the shadow of the future”
for states in HR terms in international politics)

Noncompliance because cases trigger
state opposition to the intrusiveness,
scale, or substantive conclusions of
judgments because such judgments
threaten the state’s material power visà-vis other states

Extensive noncompliance means domestic
interest formation does not support compliance
(i.e., domestic political processes do not seem to
place much value on compliance and, thus, do
not articulate and advance compliance as a state
interest)
Extensive noncompliance means that social
construction of “compliance” with HR rules and
judgments as an idea/norm is weak across ICHR
members (i.e., compliance with HR rules is not
constitutive of participation in the IA human
rights system)

Noncompliance because cases lack
grounding in domestic political interests
and processes, leading to a failure of
“bottom up” support for compliance
with judgments

Noncompliance because cases involve
weak intergovernmental institutions
(e.g., lack of authority or capacity) that
fail to exercise constraint on rational
state interests in non-compliance

Noncompliance because cases reveal
weak or non-existent support for or
belief in compliance as an idea within
countries and/or across the region

In summary, the states’ and Court’s roles have not received the same systematic
scholarly attention. Over the last twenty years, literature on Court actions demonstrated a
gap between the creation of authorities/Courts meant to counteract States’ failures in
complying with international judgments and IR based compliance theories. This gap
arises from placing too much emphasis on States, non-state actors or System without a
184 Professor David Fidler’s table, Maurer Law School, IUB. Professor Fidler formulates this table to
summarize the explanations that the IR theories offer to the extensive noncompliance with ICHR
judgments.
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deeper account the Court’s potential ability (as international institution) to
influence noncompliance through their interaction with States, non-state actors,
and the System,
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHODOLOGY
I.

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the methodology that guided the study. It consists of

three sections. The first is a brief description of the general assumptions underlying the
qualitative approach, the particular variant that I used, how the sample was selected, and
finally (the tool) – analytical software. The second section discusses the data analysis
process; the third explains how I created the original codes, how and why they evolved,
and how particular codes fit together.

Methodological approach
As argued in Chapter 1, since noncompliance has been defined almost exclusively
in relation to compliance and from the perspective of State actions, relatively little is
known regarding how noncompliance plays out in the interaction between States and the
Court during the Court proceedings and monitoring processes. Qualitative research is
particularly well-suited to inquiring into unexplored areas about which very little is
known. 1 The qualitative methodology used in this dissertation is Grounded Theory
(hereinafter: GT), which involves generating explanatory theories and hypothesis from an
analysis of the data set rather than generating initial theories at the outset, which are then

1

See generally CARL F. AUERBACH & LOUISE B. SILVERSTEIN, QUALITATIVE DATA: AN INTRODUCTION TO CODING
(NYU press. 2003).
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tested, by data analysis. 2 It turns away from preconceived ideas, extant theories, and large
samples in favor of analysis of data-based categories 3 and sequential data collection in
order to construct theory. 4

A.

Grounded theory as a methodological approach and data

gathering
Qualitative research is quite diverse, but for this research question—How do
States move toward or away from compliance in their interaction with the Court and its
judgments? — It can be employed to analyze judgment patterns related to interactions
between States and the Court in both the proceedings and monitoring that provide a
“thick” 5 description of the phenomenon being studied. While quantitative analysis can
reveal causation, the potential relationships between factors contributing to compliance
are not always well reflected by numerically defined variables. Thus, even quantitative
studies yielding significant results reveal very little about compliance. 6 Alternately,

Kathy Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative research 61
(London: Sage 2006).
3 ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET M. CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND
TECHNIQUES (Sage Publications, Inc. 1990).
4 Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative research. 2006.
5 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS
§ 5019 (Basic books. 1973).
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY § 5110 (Basic books.
1983). Clifford Geertz, Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (2002).
6 I prioritized the qualitative analytic model over the traditional quantitative model I’d originally
envisioned. A consistent assessment of noncompliance required going beyond the cause testing
applied in IR and IL, to examine why States create Courts empowered to constrain it and why such
Courts might exercise powers. Since the role of the Court has not received the same systematic
scholarly attention, current theory cannot highlight the structural differences or similarities between
the States and Court that lead to behavioral patterns that favor compliance/noncompliance in their
reciprocal interactions. We know a great deal more about how the Court works than we did at the
beginning of this process, particularly about the practical realities of noncompliance and the State,
Court and their interaction, which the quantitative method was unable to uncover.
2
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qualitative analysis can uncover multiple and complex interactions, 7 resulting in a deeper
and more meaningful understanding of underlying motivations for compliance.
Qualitative methods are well-suited for assessing the mechanisms of behavioral
change. 8 They can be used to understand the particular paths through which legal rules
affect individuals, States and organizations and, then, to generate theory. 9 Under GT,
patterns— what the data says— 10 are generated through a data analysis procedure. This
data analysis procedure is called theoretical coding. Accordingly, the theoretical coding is
used to fully explore and analyze all existing data. This theoretical coding can be used to
trace paths between Court judgment and subsequent action by State in order to generate
hypotheses/theories. 11 In this method, the theory is the process (i.e., a processual,
abstract, and descriptive theory) in which concepts associated through relationships
constitute an integrated framework to explain or predict phenomena.
This dissertation analyzes the process in which certain factors cluster together in
particular ways; it can affect compliance in predictable ways, and interact. 12 As discussed
in Chapter 1, existing ideas regarding the factors that influence compliance are grouped
into independent literatures. 13 They do not provide a comprehensive theory of
compliance, but a unified theory for multiple factors, which could be too abstract to be

See generally Kapiszewski & Taylor, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, 804 (2013).
See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5 (2012).
9 Id. at.
10 AUERBACH & SILVERSTEIN, Qualitative data: An introduction to coding and analysis. 2003.
11 David Collier, Understanding process tracing, 44 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS (2011).
12 Julien Etienne, Compliance theory: A goal framing approach, 33 LAW & POLICY (2011). (1)
13 One large body of work addresses compliance by civilians, public authorities (e.g., executives,
legislatures, or bureaucracies), and subnational public authorities (e.g., lower federal or State Courts)
with domestic laws and with the rulings of national Courts, while the other addresses State
compliance with international law and Courts.
7
8
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useful. 14 The option is distinguishing factors contributing to compliance from those
contributing to noncompliance this is crucial to understanding the effects of each within
its particular context/process. In practice, noncompliance speaks (or can speak) less to the
relevance of factors encouraging compliance and more to the strength of the factors
encouraging noncompliance. 15
The use of qualitative methods depends on the previously acquired knowledge
and the question asked. 16 The Straussian GT school considers, for instance, researchers
with a general idea of the area under study. These researchers need forcing the emergence
of theory with structured questions. My dissertation centers on the Straussian strategy
since it allows starting the research with extant theories (or brief literature) in connection
with explaining a problem. These extant theories do not require be tested against since
the generated and real data that is meaningful are the themes that emerge. Accordingly,
theories are posited for two reasons: having a general idea of where to begin and to
motivate questions only. The application of questions helps beginners (like me) to force
responses into restricted theoretical codes. For instance, literature and questions are
useful to check whether theoretical codes interpret the data appropriately. See further
details of this strategy adapted from Jones and Alony, 2011 (in footnote). 17

Kapiszewski & Taylor, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, 824 (2013).
Schauer, Frederick, Comparative Constitutional Compliance: Notes Towards a Research Agenda
120-42 (130–31) in MAURICE ADAMS & JACCO BOMHOFF, PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW
(Cambridge University Press. 2012).
16 See Shaffer & Ginsburg, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5 (2012).
17 Michael Jones & Irit Alony, Guiding the use of grounded theory in doctoral studies–An example from
the Australian film industry, (2011). (This strategy also considers: Making conceptual descriptions
(descriptions of situations, process, interactions); theoretical sensitivity comes from methods and
tools; the theory (grounded on data) is interpreted by an observer, (the extant theories are not used);
the credibility of the theory comes from the rigour of the method; basic social processes need not be
identified; the researcher is active; data is structured to reveal the theory; coding is more rigorous
and defined by technique; the researcher use open (identifying, naming, categorizing and describing
phenomena), axial (the process of relating codes to each other) and selective (choosing a core
14
15
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B.

Focus

This dissertation limits its focus on State behavior to state relationships with the
ICHR and analyzes their influence on the ICHR, and vice versa. This analysis is, thus,
primarily an exercise of looking at what is happening under the surface of the interactions
between States and the Court within judicial proceedings and monitoring as the
consequence of judgment compliance. From the exercise that I undertook – a surprising
preliminary finding was identified. This finding is that acquiescence leads to lower
judgment compliance rates. This finding emerged strongest from the process and formed
a substantial conceptual part of my analysis. Paying attention, on purpose, to this finding
along with an understanding of its particular components did not exist in the domain of
knowledge to a far greater degree than my data demonstrates. This chapter thus explains
the full process that uncovered a formerly unexplored finding of my study.
Having described the method and focus, it is now necessary to introduce the cases
to which the method of exploration was applied.

C.

Case Selection

Between its founding and 2010, the Court has ruled on 129 cases. I started by
using a 28 cases sample. Sampling was a continuous process that required information to
elucidate the relevance of the emerging categories. 18 The process of exploration of my
data made it possible to identify the unexpected preliminary finding of the relationship
between acquiescence and compliance that was previously mentioned. The data gave to
this preliminary finding its status of influencing everything, thus, I understand the

category and comparing other categories to that) coding and it is a form of qualitative data analysis
(QDA)).
18 Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative research 189. 2006.
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pervasiveness of this finding to identify patterns of association between cases. However,
there was no numerical data on whether States that have acquiesced have higher or lower
rates of compliance with Court judgments. To elaborate the finding, I had to verify using
both compliance and noncompliance through an extended sample. 19 Consequently,
towards the end of my research, a database documenting 129 cases listed in the InterAmerican Court’s 2010 Annual Report was created to explore patterns of
compliance/noncompliance (please find details by case in Appendix A).
129 cases constitute a sufficiently large sample to uncover patterns, gain a deeper
understanding and generate theory. 20 There are 20 States amidst these cases, and there is
a 14-year time difference (1996-2010) between the oldest and most recent judgments
included in the sample. Rather than measuring the same amount of time for each case,
this research explores the entire monitoring process until 2015, including 19 years for the
oldest judgment and, at least, five-year post-judgment for recent cases.
JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(Cambridge University Press. 2012).
20 Out of the 129 cases, 118 were under the monitoring and 11 are not it. In these 11 cases, the
process has not normally developed until its completion and the Court to do not place them under
monitoring or to remove from it. The Court ruled the case inadmissible (did not accept the
interposed petition) and shelved the case in: Viviana Gallardo v. Costa Rica by Order dated
September 8, 1983 as recorded in the 1984 Annual Report at 39, Appendix II; in the Fairén Garbi and
Solis Corrales v. Honduras by Judgment dated March 15, 1989 as recorded in the 1989 Annual Report
at 71 the Court released the demanded State from all responsibility, Appendix III; in Cayara v. Peru
via judgment on objections dated February 3, 1993 as recorded in the 1993 Annual Report at 25,
Appendix III the Court accepted three of the objections interposed; in the Nogueira de Carvalho v.
Brazil by Judgment the case was shelved since the lack of evidence to demonstrate the international
responsibility of the State, dated November 28, 2006 that was included in 1988 Annual Report at 1213; the Court admitted objection and shelved the case in the Maqueda v. Argentina by Judgment
dated January 17, 1995 that was included in 1995 Annual Report at 31, Appendix II and in the
Alfonso Martín del Campo Dobb v. Mexico, the Court admitted objection by Judgment dated
September 3, 2004 that was included in 2004 Annual Report at 8, Appendix XIX; the Court does not
require monitoring for the Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras by Judgment on Reparations dated July
21, 1989, and in Aloeboetoe v. Suriname in the reparations and costs judgment dated September 10,
1993. Finally, the Court terminated the case by party request in Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, by order
dated September 10, 1996. The Court closed the case for compliance without ordering monitoring in:
Gangaram Panday v. Suriname by Order dated November 27, 1998 and did not order monitoring in
Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua in the judgment dated January 29, 1997 that was included in 1997 Annual
Report at 39; Appendix I
19
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This selection method forms a reasonable approximation of reality that is not
easily distorted. In addition, it accounts for differences between cases that provide
accurate updates on the States’ historical behavior. Thereby, it gained
representativeness. 21 Amplifying the window of access to all the cases was central to the
generation of my theory and it was the basis for the Results Chapter Three.

D.

NVIVO Software

I chose to use NVIVO software to aid in analysis because it offers a set of tools
for analyzing large volumes of rich, textual data. This research on noncompliance is a
large-scale qualitative analysis that entails inherently complex and indeterminate
evaluations of large volumes of data — more than 738 types of remedies related to 129
cases. 22 Since NVIVO’s tools allow classification, sorting and arrangement of
unstructured information, it was crucial to bottom-up coding and analysis. NVIVO’s
support started with more detailed code and worked up to broader categories, 23 allowing
for an examination of otherwise unverifiable relationships in the data.

21 See Appendix A for further details. Bear in mind that the distribution of the 118 monitored cases
among the 20 member States is available in Appendix A.
22 There are 731 obligations ordered in the 118 cases that were under monitoring as of 2010. In
addition, there are seven obligations ordered among those 11 cases in where it was not open a
monitoring.
23 While broad-brush coding relies on the capacity of the software to facilitate recoding, or coding on
from text at a code, coding in detail makes use of the capacity in the software to cluster like things
together in a hierarchical (tree-structured) system, to gather related concepts in a set, or perhaps to
merge codes.
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II.

DATA ANALYSIS
My dissertation centers on theory generation 24 in which GT analysis uses

organization/reorganization to deconstruct/construct and thereby broadens understanding
of phenomena. 25
This section describes how I deconstructed, and subsequently reorganized data to
provide an understanding of how patterns of noncompliance are related to processes of
interactions between States and the Court in both the judicial proceedings and monitoring
processes. Analysis, using the GT method generally includes two levels of categories:
themes and theories. 26 Themes are repeating ideas and concepts that use relatively
equivalent words, phrases and meanings. Themes stand in logical relation to each other,
and are grouped coherently. One creates a theory by assessing themes –a series of
patterns together, such as the patterns uncovered in the cases. In this way, theory emerges
from data analysis. In order to move themes/patterns into justifiable theories, I used
NVIVO to identify patterns to be categorized.
I established the following coding protocol. 27 First, once my cases were in the
NVIVO platform, I began the initial coding process informed by reading each selected
cases. Within a process of constant comparison, I reviewed and deconstructed judgments

See generally B.G. Glaser, Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis (1992). He stresses that outside the
substantive area in which a theory was generated, GT method should be easily applied.
25 See generally A. Strauss & J. M. Corbin, Basics of qualitative research: Grounded Theory Procedures
and Techniques (2d ed., 1988).
26 MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: AN EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK
(Sage. 1994). Lyn Richards & Tom Richards, From filing cabinet to computer, ANALYZING QUALITATIVE
DATA (1994);T. Richards & Lyn Richards, Using computers in qualitative research, 1 METHODS (1994).
27 JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS 151 (Sage. 2012).(“Protocol coding
is the collection and, in particular, the coding of qualitative data according to a pre-established,
recommended, standardized, or prescribed system.”)
24
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by themes. 28 The goal was to capture the finer nuances of meaning with sufficient
context. 29 The first half-dozen or so cases were coded this way. Afterwards, I was able to
develop a workable list of codes to apply case after case.
Subsequently, I analyzed State responses and Court requests according to a code
list (or system), in such a way as to identify relevant patterns. With this information, I
began the process of axial coding - constructing data that was deconstructed during initial
coding – and grouping categories into main and subcategories. 30
The final step was selective coding – the process of integrating and refining
categories

31

(with respective subcategories) for the compliance outcomes. Initially their

placement into a visual coding schema by which elements in a category are more similar
to each other than those outside it. All categories in the same place serve to facilitate
comparison and assembly of sets. However, a hunch led to the development of a
theoretical schema that explained how each of the categories related to each other. Thus,
putting the set together is more like making theoretical connections between categories
that occur together, or somehow influence each other. 32 The following lists grouped the
final (main) categories (see Appendix B for the full code system):
I.

The Compliance Outcomes

II.

Judgment attributes

III.

State responses

IV.

Court requests

A Strauss, Corbin (1998) Basics of Qualitative Research, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING
GROUNDED THEORY. THOUSAND OAKS, 102-828.
29 H HENRY RUSSELL BERNARD & GERY W RYAN, ANALYZING QUALITATIVE DATA: SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES
(SAGE publications. 2009).
30 SALDAÑA, The coding manual for qualitative researchers. 2012.
31 Id. at.
32 PATRICIA BAZELEY & KRISTI JACKSON, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS WITH NVIVO
(Sage Publications
Limited. 2013).
28
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V.

Relationship State responses—Court requests

The code list begins with the outcomes: full compliance and noncompliance.
These two primary categories force States and the Court in their international relations to
formulate and articulate their interests and goals connected with the international HR
process. The States’ language showed descriptions about the Court judgments. In this
way, the code shifted its focus to descriptive information as the second category. This
descriptive information allows comparing, filtering and identifying patterns of association
between judgments and cases. While this second group was informative about the
outcomes, this dissertation ultimately focused on the third and fourth group of codes.
These groups allowed visualizing the interaction between States and the Court. Here the
States and reports on their compliance, and the Court’ language reflected interpretations,
assumptions, and evaluations of their behavior.
The third group contains the concrete State responses that connect to conceptual
reasons why compliance is a global political concern for States. These responses
comprised twelve subcategories. These subcategories operate distinctly from the five
Court requests that are the fourth group that connect to other goals/principles. The coding
system permitted the identification of those efforts by which States and the Court solidify
their interests and goals and tracks the individual progress (or lack thereof). It identified
proposals that facilitate or prevent the progress of their efforts.
The focus on this interaction emphasized the relationship between State and the
Court and how they address the noncompliance problem. The fifth group coded is the
impact of State responses on Court requests and vice versa. This relationship is developed
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from two processes, structured in five Stages and regarding specific goals. What follows
is an example of this process of coding/creation of categories and subcategories.

III. DEFINING THE CREATION OF
CODES/CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES.
This sub-section includes the codes of the coding schema that used to report the
analyses in the Results chapter.
A.

Deriving 1st group of codes (for compliance outcomes)

This group is comprised of two primary codes: Full compliance (Fc) and
Noncompliance (Nc). These are main codes and their corresponding definition as
follows:
Compliance
Outcome
Full
compliance

Explanation

Example

An obligation is coded as “full compliance”
when the Court clearly uses the word "full" or
"total." This occurs when States both intend to
and do fully comply.

Noncompliance

An obligation is coded as “noncompliance”
when the Court declares that the State has not
responded during the monitoring, no steps have
been taken or the State has indicated that it will
not comply.

The State has fully complied with the Judgment
issued on [...], in accordance with that set forth
in Article 68(1) of the American Convention on
HR, that obliges the State Parties to the
American Convention to comply with the
judgments issued by the Court.
The State is in substantial non-compliance with
the measures ordered in the Judgment on
preliminary objection, merits, reparations and
costs of […].

Fc and Nc are primary codes that describe the State’s steps related to comply with
each obligation imposed. Each obligation was coded for this distinction in both Court
monitoring orders and State responses/reports. The Court’s monitoring orders are where
the Court’s determination is made explicit. 33 The Court compares the initial deadline for
completion (in each Judgment on Reparation and Costs), the type of reparation, how long
the State has taken to comply (i.e. length of the monitoring process) to determine
compliance outcomes. These codes are extracted from the operative paragraphs of
judgment on monitoring.

The number of obligations imposed in a judgment in the cases under study ranged from 2 to 17.
While, States rarely comply with all of a judgment’s obligations, they rarely ignore all of the
obligations contained in a judgment; States treat each obligation separately.
33
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B.
Deriving 2nd group code (for judgment attribute)
This group is comprised of four descriptive codes (judgment attributes): violation,
obligation and institution, and high-ranking authorities. They collect descriptive
information for all judgments within a case and between cases. Table below illustrates the
types of violations that fall under one of the following coded categories: physical
integrity rights, political and civil rights, and social, economic and cultural rights.
Type of violation
Physical integrity
(subset of political and civil rights)
Political and civil rights
(henceforth: PC)
Social, economic and cultural
(henceforth: SEC)
Justice (subset of PC- include
violations of due process and
procedure)
Privacy and property
(henceforth: PP)

Corresponding articles of the
American convention
4, 5, 6, 7-1, 7-2
12-16, 18- 20, 22, 23
26 34
7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 8- 10, 24, 25
3, 11, 17, 21

Examples of the act of violating
code
Torture, extrajudicial executions,
enforced disappearances
Deficient condition of detention
center for minors
N.A.
Failure to investigate, prosecute and
punish those responsible, arbitrary
charging with crimes
Failure to ensure the right to ancestral
and other types of property as the
return of illegally seized property

INDIVIDUAL

The type of violation describes when the Court determined which facts are
proved; it decides whether those facts establish a violation of the Convention that is
attributable to the State. The violation is extracted from the operative paragraphs of
judgment on merits.
In addition to coding violation, this research includes data on the obligation and
institution. Obligation 35 and institution together comprise a set of codes that also collect
descriptive information for judgments within a case. The table below defines the types of
obligation indicating the institution invoked, their corresponding costs and action code,
and examples, as follows:
Definition
They require the
executive to provide the
victims and/or their
beneficiaries the
economic, social,
educational and cultural
rights and/or re-establish
the civil and political
rights violated

Obligations
Reparations

Costs and Action code
Capture the financial costs of
compliance that the executive
is ordered to pay: pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damages,
costs and expenses, a
community fund.

Example
Pay to the victim US $57,400
The State shall allocate the
amount of US$ 40,000 for a
community fund

Socioeducational

Represents various costs to the
executive in mandates that
focus on education, health and
welfare

Physical, psychological or
psychiatric care; Housing, the
basic supplies and services;
Scholarships or subventions

34 Social, economic and cultural rights include the right to an education, eradicating illiteracy,
language, adequate nutrition and housing and the right of all persons to legal assistance to secure
their rights, among others (article 26 in relation to the social, economic and cultural rights in the OAS
charter to which it refers). Either by default or by judicial choice, none of my cases involved article 26
claims, even though political and civil rights articles make claims resulting in reparation orders that
appear to target social, economic and cultural obligations.
35 I used the term obligation to distinguish between financial reparations (referred to as
“reparations”) and other types of obligations set for in the judgment.

55

Symboliccultural
measures

GENERAL

Case-specific
changes/
Right being reestablished

With the exception of
obligations of policy
change which require
actions by the executive
branch), require action
beyond the executive to
include other actors such
as the legislative or
judicial branch

Capture the symbolic and
discursive costs associated
with executives being obliged
to make a public apology,
publish/disseminate judgment
and commemorate
victims/events. 36
Capture various costs, as they
are “case-specific changes” in
which the executive reestablishing civil and political
rights for the victims and
beneficiaries

Policy changes

Change administrative
practices

Legislative
changes

Change laws and procedures

Judicial
Accountability

Hold accountable through
criminal, administrative &
disciplinary prosecution

Construction of a memorial in
a street, park or school

Abstention from applying the
death penalty
Reinstating employment or
providing alternatives
Returning the victim to the
place of residence or
facilitating departure in order
Annulment of judicial
(civil/criminal),
administrative, or police
records
Liberation of those detained
illegally
Restitution the property that
has been illegally seized or
traditional territories
Annulment of judicial
(civil/criminal),
administrative, or police
records
Training public officials on
HR
Strengthen mechanism in
arrest centers
Amend, repeal, or adopt new
laws or procedures
Investigate the facts, identify,
prosecute & punish those
responsible for the underlying
crimes

Obligations are extracted from the operative paragraphs of Judgment on
Reparation and Costs and institutions (with the primary competence to act – executive,
legislator and judiciary) from State responses/reports. Obligation and institution were
coded separately but combined at a higher level into a single category. They were
separate since compliance is explained by the inherent difficulty of the obligation — as
opposed to the particular disposition (interest or capacity) of institutions, insofar as the

They are not superficial, conversely, they are suggestive of both the Court’s and the State’s,
“ethical-cultural,” alternatives. Initially individual, they disaggregate because they have cultural
repercussions to society.
36
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two are distinct. However, they were combined since these two factors often interact such
that they jointly influence compliance. Judgments contain two types of obligations:
individual and general. Each obligation carries different associated types of costs, which
could lead to potentially divergent compliance outcomes. Individual obligations capture
financial-intangible costs. General obligations capture policy-making costs. The Court
ultimately decides whether a State has complied with a particular mandate.
In expanding the code institution, this research includes data on high-ranking
authorities. The corresponding definition as follows:
Explanation
High-ranking authorities are (influential) people in
important or powerful positions within a hierarchy.
They are also well-connected to other powerful people
in networks (e.g. political or military) of protection,
domestic security systems and clandestine security
organizations that assure impunity.

Example
[..t]hese actions [of extrajudicial executions] happened
with consent of the government. Following the killings,
justice was denied by civil, military, criminal and
administrative courts and [...t]h[e] disappearance […] was
perpetrated by a paramilitary group, which had the support
of and close links with senior leaders of the State security
forces.” Both had a “special interest in obstructing the
investigation into the death of the tradesmen[…]

These high-ranking authorities often are implicated in the international HR
process by taking part in acts or decisions that constitute HR violation by which their
States are internationally responsible. In these cases, their part in the violation risks being
made public in the international HR process thereby damaging their reputation and
possibly leading to a loss of their position in the hierarchy and even prosecution by
domestic courts. These risks take form when the Court issues a judicial obligation which
includes investigation of the violation, holds accountable through criminal, administrative
and disciplinary prosecution of those responsible for the underlying crimes and considers
the responsibilities of judiciaries or prosecutors that have allowed the violation by
functional misconduct and/or location of the remains of victims.
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Those that have high-rank military for example fall in this category since military
ranks are a system of hierarchical relationships in armed forces. Other examples are highranking individuals in the police force, intelligence agencies, or other hierarchical
institutions. The Goiburu (Paraguay) case illustrates the participation of high-ranking
authorities. In fact, this case brought to light how hundreds of the highest
AUTHORITIES were involved in an “alliance of security forces and intelligence
services” to commit transborder HR violations. This case is about the torture and
subsequent disappearance of Dr. Goiburú (founder of a political party that opposed
Stroessner Matiauda) within an action coordinated by the Paraguayan and Argentine
security forces as part of Operation Condor that commit transborder crimes against
humanity between 1976 and 1983. 37 These crimes were sponsored by the highest
authorities 38 such as Argentinian Jorge Videla, 39 the Bolivian Hugo Banzer, 40 the
Brazilians Humberto Castello Branco, 41 and Arthur da Costa e Silva, 42 the Chilean
Augusto Pinochet, 43 the Paraguayan Alfredo Stroessner and even the Uruguayan Juan
Aparicio Mendez and Maria Borderry, 44 including also high AUTHORITIES from Peru,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. This case brought to judicial light the status of jus
cogens of the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish top-down AUTHORITIES

Goiburú v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 September 2006, Ser. C No. 153,
paras. 84 and 89.
38 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya Úbeda de Torres, " War" in the Jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 33 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 157 (2011).
39 Id. at. 157 (between 1976 and 1983)
40 id., (between 1971 and 1978)
41 id., (between 1964 and 1967)
42 id., (between 1964–1967)
43 id., (between 1973–1980)
44 id., (between 1973–1976)
37
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of States responsible for having perpetrate a “systematic” transborder HR violations. The
same criteria applied in the Almonacid Arellano (Chile) case. 45
The presence of high-ranking authorities very often leads to a tactic of cover-up to
protect. This tactic of cover-up gradually involves top authorities of the State in
complicity (or tacit approval). This is evidenced in that the high-ranking authorities do
not take actions to investigate and prosecute those responsible or repeatedly they are
hiding incriminating information to protect them. High-ranking authorities are extracted
from the Judgment on Merits and State responses/reports. For instance, Colombian
authorities act in complicity with active networks of protection to cover-up HR abuses. In
these violations, the perpetrators are commonly paramilitaries groups. In Rochela
Massacre (Colombia) case a paramilitary group (Los Masetos) was responsible for the
extrajudicial execution of 15 Colombian judges who were investigating HR violations.
These actions happened with consent of the government. Following the killings, justice
was denied by Colombia’s civil, military, criminal and administrative courts. The Court
stated in its Judgment on Merits that “[...t]h[e] disappearance […] was perpetrated by the
ACDEGAM paramilitary group, which had the support of and close links with senior
leaders of the State security forces.” Both had a “special interest in obstructing the
investigation into the death of the tradesmen[,...].” “Los Masetos” as one of the sixteen
“covers frequently used by the paramilitary organization [ACDEGAM] to carry out
killings and divert investigations" [...in which] “highest commanders took part”).
Moreover, in the case Court it was noted that "the disciplinary officials did not
investigate the alleged obstruction of the investigation by senior military commanders or

Almonacid Arellano v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 Sept. 2006, Ser. C No. 154,
para. 64
45
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the alleged support provided by police inspectors and other civilian AUTHORITIES to
the paramilitary groups [...]. 46 This cover-up is recurrently found in cases of Massacres.

C.

Deriving 3rd group codes (for State responses)

This group comprises four categories of codes: remedial words and actions,
authority statements and actions. I apply these codes to State responses that are part of
the Court proceedings as in the text of the judgment on merits has been established and
also integrated State compliance reports in the wording of the judgment. I coded State
responses along with Court Statements when the latter provided context for the former.
The following are their definitions:

Objecting
Acquiescence

Doing noting

Normative
commitment

Promising
compliance

Explanation
It is an authority action in which is coded the State claim
against the admissibility of the case or the jurisdiction of
the Court.
This action was coded under the remedial words category.
The code applied to State admissions of violations before
the Court. I also selected the following sub-codes: early
(i.e. at the first submission or before the Court proceedings
has started) (the State accepts after the legally established
time frame in which to do so) and later (i.e. after the
objection was submitted and rejected or after the dispute
phase has started). The acquiescence is coded together
with Court praises and State requests and it is analytically
separate from compliance.
This authority action applies to neither object nor
acquiesce.

Also coded under the remedial words category. A State
response is coded as a normative commitment when the
State discourse before the Court indicates positive
statements regarding law and HR including accepting
certain facts, praising the Court, apologizing or affirming
commitment to comply, and discussing steps to improve
the HR situation before the issuance of a judgment.
Coded under remedial words, a statement is coded as
promises for compliance when States use phrases
declaring or assuming present or future action toward
compliance. States leverage promises; however, this

Example
The State filed a brief containing
preliminary objections, and also filed
an answer to the application.
I wish to state for the record that my
country (Guatemala, for instance)
accepts and acknowledges its
responsibility in the disappearance and
death of the victim

The State expressly waives its right to
file preliminary objections regarding
the term set forth in [...] Article 51(1)
of the American Convention, in the
understanding that said extension
would have the effect of suspending
such term.
The Court made an “extraordinary
contribution to the access to public
information and the strengthening of
the freedom of expression”

The unjustified delay in the
investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of those responsible for
the facts of the case was accepted to

Rochela Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 11 May 2007, Ser. C No. 163,
para. 90-1
46
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advantage cannot be coded directly.
Requests

Statements

Anticipatory
remedial
action

Requests are part of a statement of authority category. A
State discourse is coded as requests when States seek to
frame the litigation by closing the merits phase of the case,
restricting the Court hearings, or ceasing the controversy
of the facts.
A statement of State is under authority category. A State
response is sub-coded: statement of limited responsibility
and non-intervention when the State uses a discourse by
which the authority of the Court is questioned, critiquing
the victim or witnesses, justifying the abuse, or deflecting
responsibility on individuals.
A State action is coded as anticipatory remedial actions
when the State commits, in advance of issuance of the
judgment on reparation and costs, through bilateral actions
like agreements between the State, the victims, the
commission; unilateral actions or gestures like voluntary
apologies, dissemination of truth.

Strategic
non-judicial
compliance

A remedial action by which is coded the compliance of
non-judicial obligations while States deflect attention in
their duty to comply with judicial obligations.

Means of
exonerating
the guilt and
law obstacles

A State action is coded as means of exonerating the guilty
of authorities and law obstacles when States submit
restrictions and limitations on investigations and
prosecutions

Nonreporting

A State action is coded as non-reporting when a firm and
explicit refusal to accept the authority of the Court is
demonstrated by a single or systematic State behavior,
stopping obligation to report.

Silence

A State action is coded as "silence" when the State is in
‘procedural’ inaction – the practice of saying or doing
nothing when the Court expects something to be said or
done. Text that calls for a response is coded after the State
actually did not respond. There are two sub-codes of
silence: intermittent silence – a periodic break in
reporting, a posteriori silence or reduced
communicativeness – is a means of hiding information and
is related to unresolved issues that the Court has not
uncovered. Since it generally comes after insistence by the
Court, Commission, and Victims, there is sufficient text
for coding. Prolonged silence is a means of imposing
noncompliance; the Court perceives it as a highly
threatening act of disengagement.
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develop an immediate, impartial, and
effective investigation
I believe my statement was clear: it
accepts responsibility. Consequently,
the Court has the right to close the
case, file it [...].
The Executive denounces the
Convention in light of the obvious
usurpation of powers committed by the
Court […]
Symbolic measures, such as apology or
dissemination of truth; a specific
change, such as release and restitution;
policy changes, like improved prison
conditions; and legislative change, like
voluntary ratification of HR
instruments) and friendly agreement
The State has complied with the
[non-judicial] obligations: to publish,
to provide the Inter-institutional
Council for the Clarification of Forced
Disappearances, to pay. The Court will
keep the procedure to monitor
compliance open with to investigate
the facts that occurred to the victim.
The State objected to the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court and noted that
the facts of the case fell on the
amnesties (based on the National
Reconciliation Act), secrecy (military
reluctance to give information about
perpetrators) and delaying procedural
tactics.
The Court observes the complete
absence of State activity to ascertain
the whereabouts of [...] promptly. For
the Court to be able to monitor
effective compliance with this
obligation, the State must submit
complete detailed and updated
information.
The Inter-American Court does not
agree with the reason given by the
State for not appearing before this
Court and for not participating in the
proceedings; as it has been well
established in this case, the Court, as
with any other international organ with
jurisdictional functions, has the
inherent authority to determine the
scope of its own competence

D.

Deriving 4th group codes (for Court requests)

This group comprises two categories of codes: statements and actions of Court. I
apply these codes to Court requests that are part of the text document in the judgments on
merits, reparations and monitoring, they are defines as follow:

Praising

Rewarding

Endorsement

Demanding
Compliance

Enforcement
actions

E.

Explanation
A court statement is coded as “praising” when the Court
offers positive words before the State responses that signal
commitment to HR (such as acquiescence, commitment,
promising compliance, and anticipatory State remedial
action)
A court action is coded as “rewarding” when the Court
destined a series of actions to incentive acquiescence by
favoring States with diminished monitoring and
enforcement
A court action is coded as “endorsement” when the Court
acts in assisting dispute resolution, enforcing agreements
and negotiating with State authorities about the ruling and
compliance.
A statement is coded as “demands for compliance” when
the Court uses threatening words, words for control,
warning, disestablished reputational consequences
representing an aggressive attempt to compel compliance
A Court action is coded as “enforcement actions” when the
Court overreaches its jurisdiction, 47 overreaches the quasi
judicial-review, and referring the case to another body
(e.g., the political and economic bodies of the OAS)

Example
Acquiescence is an “important step
towards the development of [the]
process” and “a positive contribution to
the outcome of the […] case.”
The Court took note of the acquiescence
[…] and decided that the controversy
concerning the facts that originated the
case has ceased. Additionally, it granted
a period of six months to reach an
agreement.
The Court accepts and takes note of the
measures [of apology and a voluntarily
initiation of investigation] taken by the
State on this point.
The acquiescence made by the States
should be translated into prompt […]
compliance with the orders of the Court
by means of reparation measures. The
States should be consistent with the
acknowledgment made [,...].
The Court decides [t]o inform the
General Assembly of the Organization
of American States, in application of
Article 65 of the American Convention,
about the failure of the State to comply
with its obligation to investigate,
prosecute and punish all those
responsible for the HR violations […]

Deriving 5th group of codes (for State-Court relationship)

This group is a single relationship code that defines the connection between two
codes in the coding scheme (State responses and Court requests). Since NVIVO retains
relationships, these relationships can be sequenced to determine their influence, which

The code includes “jurisdictional overreach”, i.e. straying outside the jurisdictional boundaries preestablished by the Court-mandate or treaty regime. For example: when the Court awards reparations
without respecting discursive legal limits, it is overreaches its jurisdiction.
47
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can be diagrammed in visible relationships. In this way, I moved to create the main
structure of these relationships to show how State responses impact Court requests and
vice versa (impact, i.e., action/reaction/counteraction). I used five categories (as the
structure) describing and recording the connection between the request and the response.
Requests and responses interconnect to two processes: judicial proceedings and the
monitoring processes.
By categorizing this way, responses and requests are organized systematically in
ways that can assist the analysis of noncompliance. I can analyze the data from the
perspective of each code separately (State responses and Court requests) and in their
combination (under impact code). I can also check associations and overlaps by
harnessing two of NVIVO software capabilities (matrix coding query and differential
output from matrix coding query). It also allows me to filter cases and run a particular
query to check/compare everything the codes say about a situation and what those things
mean to the others categories. 48
A purposeful action/reaction/counteraction led by the State or the Court to
achieve a goal or deal during the proceedings and monitoring is rooted in influence
strategies. Moreover, this code system was able to produce emerging patterns and
revealed that it was best to code for particular problems, processes, goals, but also, for
strategies. Since these patterns allow for devising strategies in ways to increase the
likelihood of compliance and to increase levels of skill at maximizing the potential of
some actions and minimizing their limitations. What follow is a definition of these
processes and the five stages of the structure of States-Court relationship.

Janice M Morse, Qualitative methods: The state of the art, 9 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RESEARCH, 3, 393405 (1999).
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Type of
processes
Judicial or
the Court
proceedings

The
monitoring
process

Signaling

Exchange
Negotiation
Monitoring
Sanctioning

Definition
The legal process by which the Inter-American Court of HR reviews evidence and argumentation,
including legal reasoning set forth by opposing parties to reach a decision which determines the State
responsibilities, obligations that the State needs to comply and the rights of victims and beneficiaries
involved. The proceedings end with the issuance of merit judgments. The opposing parties are the
Inter-American on HR Commission, Victims, and their representatives, and third parties against the
defendant State.
The system used by the Inter-American Court of HR to control judgment compliance. The process
starts with the notification of the judgment on reparations and costs and ends through the issuance of a
monitoring judgment that closes the case by full compliance.
Structure State action and Court Reaction
At the proceedings, when the Court questions the State’s behavior after the violation event, the State
can acquiesce to show its commitment with HR and promising future compliance. The Court can
accept (totally or partially) or reject the offered acquiescence. If the Court accepts it can praise and
reward the State.
In the proceedings, the Court can endorse totally or partially the State Requests to frame the litigation
In the course of the proceedings, States persuade the Court to deliver based on State statements and
anticipate remedies
The Court reacts to State inaction with demands for compliance to aggressively attempt to compel
compliance and uses inspirational request by appealing to State values or ideals. The code is extracted
from monitoring judgments
The Court reacts to noncompliance issues or State inactions with enforcement actions. It is coded
based on monitoring judgments

The resulting figure displays the mechanism by which the interaction translates into
State interests, goals and outcomes and conditions in which the process occurs. It
addresses my research concern, 49 and “disentangle(s) the threads” of my analysis. 50
2. What are the theorized
phenomenon?
Acquiescence and compliance in a
strategy to protect authorities
3. What are the factors that contributed to the
theorized phenomenon?
• High-ranking authorities
• Costly alternative strategies

1. What are the causal condition of the
theorized phenomenon?
State prior beliefs about the Court reactions

4. What are the interactions between States
and the Court ? States control the proceedings to
restore reputation and control outcome to recover
power

6. What are the consequences of these
interactions? Level of compliance

5. What are their stages, tactics relationship?
• Judicial proceedings: Signaling, Exchange, Negotiation
• Monitoring process:Pressure and Sanctioning

SUSANNE FRIESE, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS WITH ATLAS. TI 214 (Sage. 2014).
IAN DEY, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: A USER FRIENDLY GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 192 (Routledge.
2003).

49
50
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Summary. In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the methodological process
and a description of the coding scheme that guided the study. While the previous chapter
has provided an overview of the scholarship on compliance, the following chapter will
address the emerging patterns about judgment compliance.
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CHAPTER THREE:
STATES-COURT INTERACTION: ACCEPTANCE OF
RESPONSIBILITY (ACQUIESCENCE) IN STATE
STRATEGY
I.

INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents the results and analysis of the interaction between the States

and the Court during the judicial proceedings and monitoring process, particularly as it
relates to patterns of (non) acquiescence and judgment (non) compliance. Article 62 of
the Rules of Procedure grants States the right to accept international responsibility, i.e. to
acquiesce. 1 Such acquiescence is recorded in the Judgments on Merits, Reparations and
Costs, and in the Court’s Annual Reports. 2 Intuitively, it seems unlikely that a State
would refuse or resist compliance with a judgment after accepting international
responsibility for the events in question. Indeed, Manuel Ventura Robles claims that
acquiescence constitutes a sign toward national consolidation of respect for HR in his
work, entitled “The Discontinuance and Acceptance of claims in the jurisprudence of the
ICHR.” 3 Accordingly, acquiescence is considered a sign of commitment to HR.
Therefore, one would expect that States that acquiesce would be more likely to comply

Note that current Rules of Procedure of The Inter-American Court of HR, Art. 62, January 1, 2010
was approved by the Court during its LXXXV Regular Period of Sessions, held from November 16 to
28, 2009. [hereafter Rules of Procedure] (“If the respondent informs the Court of its acceptance of the
facts or its total or partial acquiescence to the claims stated in the presentation of the case or the
brief submitted by the alleged victims or their representatives, the Court shall decide, having heard
the opinions of all those participating in the proceedings and at the appropriate procedural moment,
whether to accept that acquiescence, and shall rule upon its juridical effects.”) (These Rules of
Procedure entered into force on January 1, 2010).
2 Annual Report 2010, at 9-13, 81-6, this report, the decisions and other Court documents are
available at this web site: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr. >. The following figures are calculated on the
basis of data from different Court Annual Reports. The 2010 Report states that, of the 129 cases ruled
as of the end of 2010, 111 are being monitored. Therefore, only 18 cases are not under monitoring
and only seven of those have been declared in full compliance with the judgment as of 2010.
3 Manuel Ventura Robles, Discontinuance and Acceptance of Claims in the Jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, The, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L., 619 (1998).
1
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than States that do not. Furthermore, Ventura Robles claims that acquiescence indicates
that the Court and the system will not be subjected “to a long and difficult process.” 4
Contrary to these expectations, my results reveal that acquiescence does not
increase the probability of compliance nor does it lead to a shorter and easier monitoring
process. Rather compliance rates are lower and compliance times longer when States
acquiesce than when they do not. More paradoxically, the data shows that acquiescence is
frequently associated with Court judgments that would implicate powerful and highranking authorities (henceforth: AUTHORITIES). The compliance rate is even lower if
we expand the scope slightly to all cases involving AUTHORITIES.
As pointed out in Chapter 1, existing theories on State interests (as in IR theories)
and norms (as in IL theories), does not adequately explain patterns resulting from the
interaction between the States and the Courts. Existing theories are concerned with
compliance with norms, not judgments, and these show different patterns: mostly
compliance with norms; mostly noncompliance with judgments. Moreover, the theories
do not systematically consider a role for the Courts in the interaction. As a result, it is not
exactly that these theories do not explain rather that they do not even try to explain
patterns resulting from the interaction between States and Courts. Thus, we need a theory
of compliance with judgments that considers the role that the Courts can play in this
interaction.
I will argue that this interaction provides the missing key to explain the complex
and unexpected relationship between acquiescence and compliance. My analysis of the
data reveals that this interaction is partially the result of incompatible State and Court
goals for the resolution of the case. States choose a pragmatic approach to compliance.
4

Id. at.

67

They seek to avoid suffering consequences, particularly in cases involving violations of
AUTHORITIES. In contrast, the Court manifests itself idealistically. It seeks to promote
deep commitments to HR. An integral part of this goal is obtaining prosecutions for HR
violators domestic to eliminate impunity and ensure the victim’s rights to truth and
reconciliation. Therefore, in cases where the violators are AUTHORITIES, the Court and
the States have incompatible goals.
As also discussed in Chapter 1, Courts have different roles that require the
exercise of different powers. Amid a bundle of powers, the Court interprets the
submissions and identifies the issues(s) and object(s) of the claim in the case; determines
its competence to hear a particular matter; and decides all issues concerning the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Consequently, Courts have more power than States in influencing and
directing judicial proceedings.
States attempt to control the Court proceedings and outcome either by retaining or
by recovering areas of power they believe legitimately theirs. 5 I propose that we can
understand the surprising preliminary finding that acquiescence leads to lower
compliance rates by analyzing acquiescence as a first step in a series actions (promises,
requests, proclamations of limited responsibility and assertions against Court
intervention, anticipatory remedial actions, compliance with non-judicial obligations,
restrictions and limitations on investigations and prosecutions and non-reporting)

5 The Court uses its non-decision making power when it requires the participation of States to make
or implement a decision and excludes unwanted, impossible or unlikely outcomes in favor of States.
Alternatively, States need to convince the Court that a particular path is best or most convenient that
its decision-making power. There are also two dimension of power. Symbolic power by managing
understandings, actors (States or the Court) create a condition where others make a preferred
decision or take a desired course of action without any direct application of decision-making power.
And, the power of the system that means that the nature of the system, not the actor's planned
activity, has a profound effect on the ability of States to have differential (contextual and temporal)
resources.
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designed to minimize consequences for AUTHORITIES of being threatened by an
International Court decision. Nevertheless, for fear it would betray its idealistic goal
(commitment to HR), often the ICHR frustrates State efforts to direct the outcomes,
refuses to settle for bland or restrained judgments, and continues the issuance of
judgments that require actions against AUTHORITIES. In such cases, States, in view of
their goals of protecting AUTHORITIES, either fail to comply or enter long enforcement
monitoring processes.
The remainder of this Chapter consists of two sections. Part II shows the main
quantitative results relating acquiescence and compliance. Part III discusses the results of
the qualitative analysis illustrated in figure B.

II.

ACQUIESCENCE AND JUDGMENT COMPLIANCE:

STATES AND COURTS
Part II reports quantitative data to furnish an overview of how States and the
Court view the relationship between acquiescence and judgment compliance.
Starting with the Court, the compliance data analyzed in this dissertation
demonstrates that the Court does indeed view acquiescence of responsibility, as Ventura
Robles remarked, as a signal or promise of “prompt and effective” compliance. 6 Indeed,
in 75% of the cases with acquiescence, the Court repeatedly praises the act of
acquiescence calling it a positive contribution to the case in particular and to the InterAmerican HR System in general. 7

Montero Aranguren v. Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR, 30 August 2011, para. 7.
Bueno Alves v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 11 May 2007, Ser. C No. 164 paras.
30-34; Bulacio v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 18 September 2003, Ser. C No. 100
para. 37; Kimel v Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 2 May 2008, Ser. C No. 177, paras.
6
7
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The results also reveal that, during monitoring, the Court gives States that
acquiesce more time to act without intervention, delaying control processes and
monitoring less frequently. First, the Court issues its first monitoring judgment to States
25-40; Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 27 November 2008, Ser. C No.
191 para. 26; Ibsen Cardenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 1
September 2010, Ser. C No. 217, para. 37; Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (Merits) ICHR, 26 January 2000,
Ser. C No. 64 para 42; Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2006, Ser.
C No. 149, para 80-119; Rochela Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 11 May
2007, Ser. C No. 163 para. 29; Valle Jaramillo v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 27
November 2008, Ser. C No. 192 paras. 46, 167, 231; Escué Zapata v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations
and Costs) ICHR 4 July 2007, Ser. C No. 165 para. 20; Las Palmeras v. Colombia (Reparations and
Costs) ICHR, 26 November 2002, Ser. C No. 96, para. 74; Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (Merits,
Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 15 September 2005, Ser. C No. 134, paras. 184, 208, 248; Gutiérrez
Soler v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 12 September 2005, Ser. C No. 132, para.
106-59; Ituango Massacre v. Colombia (Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 1 July 2006, Ser. C
No. 148 para. 79; Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs)
ICHR, 26 May 2010, Ser. C, No. 213, para. 18; Zambrano Velez v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and
Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2007 Ser. C No. 166, para. 10 and 30; Albán Cornejo v. Ecuador (Merits,
Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 September 2006, Ser. C No. 171, para. 24; Benavides-Cevallos v.
Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 19 June 1998, Ser. C No. 38, para. 57; Chaparro
Alvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador (Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 21 November
2000, Ser. C No. 170, para. 33; The Plan Sanchez Massacre. v. Guatemala (Merits) ICHR, 29 April 2004,
Ser. C No. 105, para. 50; Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala (Merits) ICHR, 4 May 2004, Ser. C No. 106,
para. 46; Carpio Nicolle. v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 November 2004, Ser.
C No. 117, para. 84; Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 25
November 2003, Ser. C No. 101, para. 10; Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
ICHR, 26 November 2008, Ser. C No. 190, para. 22; “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 24 November 2009, Ser. C No. 211, para 38; Chitay Nech v.
Guatemala (Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 25 May 2010, Ser. C No. 212, paras. 21,
248; Kawas Fernández v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 3 April 2009, Ser. C No.
196, paras. 32-202; Servellón García v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 21
September 2006, Ser. C No. 152, para. 77; González. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 16 November 2009, Ser. C No. 205, para. 26; Fernández Ortega v.
Mexico (Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 30 August 2010, Ser. C No. 215, paras. 25,
244; Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), ICHR, 31 August 2010,
Ser. C No. 216, para. 22; Velez Loor v. Panama (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), ICHR, 23
November 2010, Ser. C No. 218, para. 60; Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay (Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 2 September 2004, Ser. C No. 112, para. 265; Goiburú. v.
Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 September 2006, Ser. C No. 153 para. 52; VargasAreco. v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 September 2006, Ser. C No. 155, paras.
65-134; García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru (Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 25
November 2005, Ser. C No. 137, para. 60; La Cantuta. v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR,
29 November 2006, Ser. C No. 162, para. 56; Baldeón García v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
ICHR, 6 April 2006, Ser. C No. 147, paras. 55, 76, 115; Barrios Altos v. Peru (Merits) ICHR, 14 March
2001, Ser. C No. 75, para. 40; Huilca Tecse v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 3 March
2005, Ser. C No. 121, para. 84; Miguel Castro Castro Prison. v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
ICHR, 25 November 2006, Ser. C No. 160, paras. 148, 198, 267; Montero Aranguren . (Detention
Center of Catia) v. Venezuela (Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 5 July 2006, Ser. C No. 150,
para 57 and 61; The Caracazo v. Venezuela (Merits) ICHR, 11 November 1999, Ser. C No. 58, para.43;
and Blanco Romero v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 28 November 2005, Ser. C No.
138, para. 64 and 100.
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that have acquiesced at thirty nine months on average from the issuance date for the
Judgment on Reparations and Costs, 8 instead of twenty one months on average for States
that have not. 9 Second, monitoring judgments are issued every thirty on average for
States that have acquiesced, 10 instead of eighteen months on average for States that have
not. 11 This frequency affects the ultimate number of judgment monitoring occurrences:
three monitoring judgments on average for States that have acquiesced 12 and five on
average for States that have not. 13
It is clear that acquiescence is not necessary for compliance. Indeed, out of the
129 cases studied for this dissertation, 14 the 7 cases that have fully complied with all
obligations to date did not involve acquiescence. 15 In these cases, there was no

These cases with acquiescence have a standard deviation of 1.5 years. See the pattern in Garrido
and Baigorria v. Argentina (Merits) ICHR, 2 February 1996, Ser. C No. 25; Caballero Delgado and
Santana v. Colombia (Merits) ICHR, 8 December 1995, Ser. C No. 22; Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7;
Blake v. Guatemala (Merits) ICHR, 24 January 1998, Ser. C No. 36; Tiu Tojín, supra 7; El Amparo v
Venezuela (Merits) ICHR, 18 January 1995, Ser. C No. 19; Blanco Romero, supra 7.
9 These cases without acquiescence have a standard deviation of 0.75 years. See the pattern in Baena
Ricardo. v. Panama (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 02 February 2002, Ser. C No. 72;
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 29 March
2006, Ser. C No. 146; Durand. v. Perú (Merits) ICHR, 16 August 2000, Ser. C No. 68; Serrano-Cruz
sisters v. El Salvador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 01 March 2005, Ser. C No. 120; Hilaire,
Constantine and Benjamin. v. Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 21 June
2002, Ser. C No. 94; Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela (Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 5 August 2008 Ser. C No. 182.
10 These cases with acquiescence have a standard deviation of 1.08 years. See the pattern in Garrido
and Baigorria, supra 8; Caballero Delgado and Santana, supra 8; Tiu Tojín, supra 7; Amparo, supra 8;
Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7.
11 These cases without acquiescence have a standard deviation of 1.5 years. See the pattern in
Palamara-Iribarne. v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 November 2005, Ser. C No. 135;
Moiwana Community v. Suriname (Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 15 June 2005,
Ser. C No. 124; Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin, supra 9; Cantoral Benavides v. Perú (Merits) ICHR,
18 August 2000, Ser. C No. 69; Serrano-Cruz sisters, supra 9; Baena Ricardo, supra 9; Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community , supra 9; Juvenile Reeducation Institute , supra 7 ; Apitz Barbera , supra 9.
12 These cases with acquiescence have a standard deviation of 1.1, see the pattern in Garrido and
Baigorria, supra 8; Ximenes Lopes, supra 7; Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7; Tiu Tojín, supra 7; BaldeónGarcía, supra 7; Aranguren, supra 7.
13 These cases without acquiescence have a standard deviation of 1.8. See the pattern in Baena
Ricardo, supra 9; Cantoral Benavides, supra 7.
14 Id., supra 20
15 The following are the Court orders to close the 7 cases for full compliance: The Last Temptation of
Christ v. Chile by order dated November 28, 2003 as recorded in the 2003 Annual at 42; Acosta
8
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acquiescence and the Court began to monitor States early (within two years on average)
and frequently, issuing monitoring judgments approximately every year on average. 16
Furthermore, the data demonstrates that acquiescence does not increase the
probability of compliance; in fact, it seems to decrease it. The compliance rate for
obligations that do not involve acquiescence is 50% while the compliance rate for
obligations that involve acquiescence is only 20%. 17
Acquiescence also does not improve compliance times. I compared compliance
times for fulfilled obligations based on acquiescence. Obligations that do not involve
acquiescence took less than 24 months to reach full compliance. 18 By contrast, those
obligations in which there was acquiescence took more than 45 months, on average, to
reach full compliance. 19
Looking more closely at the cases with acquiescence, 78.5% of these involve
AUTHORITIES - only 22.5% of cases without acquiescence involve AUTHORITIES.
Further, the 7 cases that have complied corroborate the pattern. None of these accepted

Calderon v. Ecuador by order dated February 7, 2008 as recorded in the 2008 Annual at 13; ‘o by
order dated August 6, 2008 as recorded in the 2008 Annual at 13; Claude Reyes v. Chile by order
dated November 24, 2008 as recorded in the 2008 Annual at 28; Mayagna Awas Tingni Community v.
Nicaragua by order dated April 3, 2009 as recorded in the 2009 Annual at 65; Tristan Donoso v.
Panama by Order dated September 1, 2010 as recorded in the 2010 Annual at 43; Herrera Ulloa v.
Costa Rica by Order dated November 22, 2010 as recorded in the 2010 Annual at 46.
16 Id.
17 For obligations reported on the cases that are under the monitoring process (118 cases), 159 of
313 obligations do not involve acquiescence and were complied (they have a compliance rate of
50%), while contrary to rationality, of 418 obligations involving acquiescence 90 were complied
(they have a compliance rate of 21%).
18 I drew a comparison for fulfilled obligations based on acquiescence. I calculated the compliance
times by obligations as of the issuance date for the Judgment on Reparations and Costs through the
Court monitoring-judgment to close each obligation for compliance.
19 Using 1996 as an example: two judgments were issued; in only one case, the judgment notes the
Court's recognition of the State’s acquiescence. Obligations that do not involve acquiescence took 25
months to be complied with. Rather, those obligations in which there was acquiescence took more
than 109 months to be complied with. I compared, for instance, Neira Alegria (Peru) and Amparo
(Venezuela) cases.
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responsibility and no AUTHORITIES were involved. 20 Data on presented main findings
is restated in Figure A.
Figure A.
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The data strongly points to the conclusion that the Court assumes a connection
between acquiescence and compliance. And, States, quite contrary to the Court, do not
connect acquiescence to a commitment to comply, and use it to their advantage,
especially in cases where AUTHORITIES are exposed to reputational damage and, even
worse, criminal prosecution.

20

Id.15
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III. ACQUIESCENCE AND JUDGMENT COMPLIANCE
IN A STRATEGY TO PROTECT AUTHORITIES
It is my claim in this dissertation that the different behaviors of the Court and
States presented above reflect two goals that are not always compatible in the case
resolution. On the one end, an idealist Court (by which I mean the Inter-American Court
of HR, hereafter the Court or ICHR) views acquiescence normatively as a commitment to
HR. On the other end, pragmatic States use acquiescence instrumentally to exercise
power in order to protect authorities. In this section, I therefore, present the qualitative
evidence for my claim, particularly as it relates to patterns of behavior/actions that relate
to the protection of AUTHORITIES. Following the coding system presented in Chapter
2, the interaction between the States and the Court can be divided into five stages:
signaling, exchange, negotiation, monitoring, and sanctioning.
This pattern of interaction is summarized in Figure B below showing the
substantive structure of the relationship between (non)acquiescence and judgment
(non)compliance and its five stages.
Figure B.
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*Please bear in mind that this dissertation counts with Appendix C. In this appendix, I
created a map of possible State positions and Court actions developed during the Court
proceedings and monitoring processes - these activities are analyzed in the following subsections.

A.

Stage 1. Signaling

Once the case is brought before the Court by the application filed by the
Commission, States are publicly connected to HR violations, damaging their reputation
and exposing them to criticism, even before a judgment by the Court. The actions that
States can take at the beginning of the judicial proceedings have the potential of restoring
their reputation including their authorities’ reputation since they signal to international
and domestic forums their commitments to HR. However, the threat to AUTHORITIES –
a necessary piece for understanding my analysis – narrows the choice of actions. There
are three actions that States can take at this stage: do nothing (neither acquiesce nor
object), object, or acquiesce.
In cases where AUTHORITIES are threatened by Court judgments ordering
domestic prosecutions, acquiescence is a preferred alternative over doing nothing. This is
since States can anticipate that the Court’s reaction to acquiescence will be positive and
use acquiescence (either in lieu of or after the submission of preliminary objections) at
the signaling stage to create the perception that their subsequent actions are acceptable
and legitimate. The evidence is conclusive in the State decisions. In the case that States
judge the evidence about their international responsibility as disputable, objecting will be
the tendency rather than doing nothing. Figure C shows the results for these States
positions (see below).
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1.

Doing Nothing

States can do nothing (neither object nor acquiesce) at the beginning of the Court
proceedings. These States do not object since there are no means/grounds to file an
objection. While, States do not acquiesce since there are AUTHORITIES implicated.
Doing nothing puts the State into a risk of its reputation as an actor of the International
System since the Court can take its international responsibility for granted. Gaining
praises by complying with the Court judgments controls this reputational risk. The data
showed that States that do nothing complied more than those States that have acquiesced
or objected. In fact, the compliance rate of cases where States do nothing is 63.8%.
Figure C.

Doing Nothing

Objecting/disputing

Objecting/acquiescing

Acquiescing early
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3
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24
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14

33

6
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N=118. 21 The number here is given for each action and reflects its proportion on the sample. The table
also expressed the cases or a particular action grouped under the absence or presence of AUTHORITIES.

States did not object since they could not meet the Court’s requirements to object.
The Convention grants the Court jurisdiction to consider procedural requirements to
admit or reject preliminary objections. 22 States seem to have learned from rejections that

See Appendix A for further details about the cases.
As of the 90s, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to not allow the State to submit an additional brief
that expanded the scope of its objections in Cayara. v. Peru (Objections) ICHR, 3 February 1993, Ser.
C No. 14 paras. 13, 60-3. At the end of the 90s, it makes clear that the Court will deny State's request
for an extension to submit objection late even when the Court granted the State extra time to file its
answer in Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7. See similar details in Tibi v. Ecuador (Objections, Merits,
21
22
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they cannot submit impertinent objections that look to be an abusive use of the right of a
petition (according to article 42.2. of the Rules of the Court). 23 Thus, States do nothing at
the beginning of the proceedings when they do not have means to substantiate and
support objections. 24 By doing so, States waive the procedure of objections established in
their benefits, and they cannot interpose later objections. 25 There are 17 cases in which
States did nothing; only three have authorities. Out of the 14 that do have authorities,
there are 4 cases in which States were unable to meet the Court’s admissibility
requirements. In these instances, States failed to raise objections on time, so the Court
granted an additional period for States to file their answers to the application. Among
these cases, the Court denied the State's request for an extension to submit preliminary
objections 26 or for an expansion of the scope of their answers to try to include
objections. 27 In the other 2 cases, States were unable to object since they denounced the
Court jurisdiction. 28

Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 7 September 2004, Ser. C No. 114, para. 47; 19 Tradesmen. v.
Colombia, (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 5 July 2002, Ser. C No. 93, para. 27;
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 2 July 2004, Ser. C No.
107, para. 46; and Juan Humberto Sanchez, supra 29, para. 65.
23 Rules of Procedure, Art. 42.2, (“The document setting out objections shall contain the facts on
which the objections are based, legal arguments and conclusions, and supporting documents, as well
as any evidence to be offered”).
24 Id.
25 Neira Alegria. v. Peru (Objections) ICHR, 11 December 1991, Ser. C No 13, paras. 28; Castillo
Petruzzi. v. Peru (Objections) ICHR, 4 September 1998, Ser. C No. 41, paras. 56-7; Loayza Tamayo v.
Peru (Objections) ICHR, 31 January 1996, Ser. C No 33, paras. 41-3; Castillo Páez, supra 26 paras. 413; Mayagna (sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Objections), ICHR, 1 February 2000, Ser. C
No 67, para.5.
26 Fermín Ramírez. v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 20 June 2005, Ser. C No. 126,
paras. 15, 18-19 and 20; Raxcacó Reyes. v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 15
September 2005, Ser. C No. 133, paras. 10, 12, 14, 17-19; Yvon Neptune. v. Haiti (Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) ICHR, 6 May 2008, Ser. C No. 180, para 4.
27 See the pattern in Barreto Leiva. v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 17 November
2009, Ser. C No. 206, para. 25 ("[... the Tribunal considers that this type of arguments [none of the
defendants and later on, convicted people alleged [any] violation of the Rule of Law during the
proceedings] should have been previously put forward, at the appropriate procedural time of the
processing of admissibility before the Inter-American Commission and after, if applicable, as an
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In 8 others still, States did not acquiesce despite the actual evidence since there
were no authorities implicated. The costs associated with doing nothing – will depend on
whether there are authorities involved in a case. When there are not authorities
concerned, the States are not restricted by an emphasis on political priorities (such as
protecting authorities) other than HR. Indeed, States made a statement renouncing their
right to put into question the Court jurisdiction. 29 Moreover, the compliance rate of cases
where States do nothing is 63.8%. 30 Thus, through a tacit admission of culpability and
high compliance, States restore their reputation by gaining praise from the Court and
availing themselves of press reports of their HR – friendly acquiescence - and minimize
on-going criticism.
By doing nothing, the Court would widely take for granted the responsibility of
the State in HR violations. Thereby, the Court would perceive in doing nothing a true or
real culpability without assessing the evidence. Since, without objection or acquiescence,
the Court can potentially give this treatment to AUTHORITIES, therefore, doing nothing

objection before the Court. In view of the fact that this is not what happened, the Tribunal dismisses
these allegations.")
28 Caesar. v. Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 11 March 2005, Ser. C No.
123, para. 6 ("On May 26, 1998, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Convention and the
denunciation became effective one year later, as of May 26, 1999, pursuant to Article 78 of the
Convention. According to Article 78 of the Convention, a denunciation will not release the
denouncing State from its obligations under the Convention with respect to acts of that State
occurring prior to the effective date of the denunciation that may constitute a violation of the
Convention."). For further detail, see paras.22, 24 and 34.
29 Palamara-Iribarne, supra 11, para. 12 (expressly waives).
30 Palamara-Iribarne, Id.; Claude Reyes v Chile (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 19 September
2006, Ser. C No.151; The Last Temptation of Christ (Olmedo-Bustos) v. Chile (Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) ICHR, 5 February 2001, Ser. C No.73; Suárez Rosero. v. Ecuador (Merits) ICHR, 12
November 1997, Ser. C No.35; Acosta Calderon. v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 24
June 2005, Ser. C No.129; López Álvarez. v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 1
February 2006, Ser. C No.141; Ricardo Canese. v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 31
August 2004, Ser. C No.111; The Yakye Axa v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 17
June 2005, Ser. C No.125; De la Cruz-Flores. v. Peru (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 18
November 2004, Ser. C No. 115; Gómez-Paquiyauri. v. Peru (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 8
July 2004, Ser. C No. 110.
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is costlier than the other two strategies. Only 2 cases in which States did nothing involved
authorities.
2.

Objecting

The option to interpose preliminary objections has a significant role in the defense
of the State. Refuge (or not) in mere technicality, objections are the first line of defense to
inhibit the Court from examining the merits of the case or particular claims/aspects of a
case, moreover, they may result in the dismissal of an otherwise accusatory evidence.
States do not make a tacit admission of responsibility (i.e., doing nothing) when they
have enough evidence to retain the possibility to dispute the facts and claims of the
application. States do not acquiesce because the abuse is quickly remembered in the rapid
succession and publicity of the process. Furthermore, these objections also allow
delaying the considerations of cases. States recognize that this lapse of time improves
their defense, softens the abuse and helps to obliterate its recollection. In this view,
objecting also would assist in the process of restoring the name of the State and its
AUTHORITIES. Thus, States object if there is disputable/distortable evidence for alleged
actions or omissions against authorities or institutions of the State and if there is proof but
it is to people or a group in their condition of individuals (at least, initially). In fact, in 72
out of 118 cases, States begin the proceedings with objections (more details of data
below).
If the Court admits State objections that go to the overall admissibility of the case
or the jurisdiction of the Court, States would acquire an effective control of the outcomes.
The Court is tasked with determining its jurisdiction or applying the rules of
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admissibility. 31 The ICHR is well known as “the clearest example of a Court where
noncompliance is the norm.” 32 Consequently, the Court would be able to free itself from
cases that would have a high probability of ending in noncompliance if it admitted the
objection – i.e. gave up jurisdiction or found the case inadmissible if the Court decides it
has jurisdiction. The Court would be acting pragmatically in these cases. The data shows,
however, that the Court acts idealistically by rejecting 60% of objections submitted
completely. 33 The remaining 40% were partially rejected (15%), withdrawn from the
States (15%) before they were ruled and admitted by the Court (10%). However, in only
3% out of those admitted the Court shelved the case. 34 Consequently, nearly all cases
(97%) with preliminary objections continued to the merits phase, followed by a
reparations stage and subsequent monitoring. 35
The rejection rate of objections makes it paradoxical that States insist on
interposing objections. However, even if the Court eventually denies the objection, the
filing of objections can have two other positive outcomes: it protects the reputation of
AUTHORITIES and it postpones the merits phase by extensions of deadlines and

Castañeda Gutman. v. México (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 6 August 2008,
Ser. C No. 184, para. 39; Cabrera García and Montiel-Flores. v. Mexico (Objection, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) ICHR, 26 November 2010, Ser. C No. 220, para.17; Bayarri. v. Argentina (Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 30 October 2008, Ser. C No. 187, para. 19; Tristán Donoso v. Panama
(Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 27 January 2009, Ser. C No. 193, para.15; Escher v.
Brazil (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 6 July 2009, Ser. C No. 200, para 15;
Garibaldi v. Brazil (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 23 September 2009, Ser. C No.
203, para. 17.
32 DOTHAN, Reputation and Judicial Tactics: A Theory of National and International Courts 272. 2014.
33 This percentage includes all objections. Out of 129 cases, there are 80 objections.
34 Cayara v. Peru (Objections) ICHR, 3 February 1993 as recorded in the 1993 Annual Report at 25;
Maqueda v. Argentina (Objections) ICHR, 17 January 1995 as included in 1995 Annual Report at 31;
Alfonso Martín del Campo Dobb v. Mexico (Objections) ICHR, 3 September 2004 included in 2004
Annual Report at 8.
35 According to my data the Court rejects 48 objections submitted, partially accepts 12, admits 8, and
12 state withdrawals.
31
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excused delayed submissions. 36 During the merits, the Court discerns the truth of the
alleged facts and controversial claims supported by the evidence to determine the State
responsibility. 37 Considering that there are not significant signs of liability against States,
the delay may result in a reduction of the zeal of the allegation (i.e., limiting its power
and communicational force) at the same time that strengthens the State defense. States
can leverage the extra time to research the alleged facts, to learn about the views and
reactions of the Court, and to prepare a better defense prior the merits. In this way, States
can dispute the merits, and reinforce their non-culpability. This is corroborated in 24 of
46 cases in which the defense was successful after States disputed (see more details
below).
The decision of objecting would also help in the process of restoring reputation.
Since even when the Court denies objections more often (75%), objecting seems to be a
claim for the non-culpability of States and the innocence of their AUTHORITIES. Then,
States protect their names and authorities by the use of objections since often they carry
to the public a joint significance that the State has been part of a process for something in
which they do not have the responsibility, at least, at that stage of their processes.
Therefore, the objection is actually a defense of the merits of the case at an early
stage in the proceedings that is used when there is not (yet) too much evidence to suggest
the State responsibility. The data corroborates that States tend to object in cases in which
the Inter-American Commission on HR brought States to trial based on 49 means of

Castillo Páez v. Peru (Objections), 30 January 1996, Ser. C No. 24, para. 35 (ñ); Benavides-Cevallos,
supra 7, para. 14.
37 Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez in Bamaca Velasquez (Merits) ICHR,
25 November 2000, Ser. C No. 70, para. 3.
36
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evidence. 38 In cases without objections, the Commission appends to its applications a
probatory backing of 102 means of evidence on average. Thus, these 49 means of
evidence represent a 50% of those that the Commission often used. States can calculate
that this is a medium risk concerning responsibility of the State and its AUTHORITIES.
This risk is even less when States have exculpatory evidence. In fact, in 65% of these 72
cases, States argued means to exonerate the authority of guilt. 39 By the contrary, when
the Commission has considerable evidence (in number and force) States did not object.
States also retain the possibility to dispute the facts and claims of the application
after having objected. Disputing can define the factual framework of the case and helps to
preserve some reputation since States can reinforce the idea about not admitting guilt. In
these circumstances, States leverage the chance to dismiss aspects of the case and (then)
dispute its facts and evidence by objecting. The case becomes controversial when the
State disputes. Every controversial case -considered on the merits- included an extended
discussion of evidence in which the parties offer and controvert the evidence of each.
States dispute the merits when the evidence of their probable culpability is disputable (at

The Inter-American Commission of HR attaches to its applications a probatory backing of 49
means on average. The same average is reached when the data is separated by initial action in the
proceedings (objecting and acquiescing both together). Indeed, States were typically brought to trial
based on 49 means of proof on average (these proofs ranged 12 - 102) against States
39 Escher, supra 22 (Non bis in idem); Gomes Lund ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil (Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 24 November 2010, Ser. C No. 219 (Amnesty); 19 Merchants. v.
Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 5 July 2004, Ser. C No. 109 (Amnesty and
Prescription); Pueblo Bello Massacre. v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 31 January
2006, Ser. C No. 140 (Non bis in idem); “White Van” (Paniagua Morales.) v. Guatemala (Monitoring)
ICHR, 21 August 2014, para.2 (Non-jurisdiction); Juan Humberto Sánchez. v. Honduras (Objection,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 7 June 2003, Ser. C No. 99, (Shelved case); Heliodoro-Portugal.
v. Panama (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 12 August 2008, Ser. C No. 186
(Prescription); Anzualdo-Castro v. Peru (Objection, Merits, Reparations and costs) ICHR, 22
September 2009, Ser. C No. 202, paras. 162-3 (shelved by amnesty); Ivcher Bronstein. v. Peru.
(Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 6 February 2001, Ser. C No. 74, (Amnesty); Dismissed
Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro.) v. Peru. (Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR,
24 November 2006, Ser. C No. 158 (N/A); Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra 9 (Prescription) and Moiwana
Community, supra 11 (Amnesty).
38
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least, initially) and slightly distortable by non-culpability evidence managed. Out of 72
cases with objections, 46 cases were disputed (as it was mentioned above) and 26 cases
were acquiesced.
Concerning those 46 cases that were disputed, States have used 17-25 evidence of
non-culpability on average to dispute the merits. The data shows that the evidence was
disputable when there was no proof of the State responsibility, or it was rendered
incomplete. 40 There was refutable evidence - when the States or their AUTHORITIES
have rejected the facts that originated the controversy. 41 The evidence was also
disputable before declinations and dispute over jurisdiction 42 and when States isolated the
failure to provide justice to a particular governmental institution.43 The facts were also
disputable when the domestic criminal processes have not normally developed until its
completion. 44

Las Palmeras, supra 7 para. 35m) (military judge closes the investigation by lack of proof); Las
Palmeras, Id. para. 35n) (Archive by the absence of proof); Fernandez Ortega, supra 7, para 165 (No
proof since the victim did not participate in the military investigation); Rosendo Cantú, supra 7 para.
79 (Negligence to ensure proof); Rosendo Cantú Id, para. 86 (no conclusive proof); Cantoral-Huamaní
and García-Santa Cruz, supra 7, para. 69 (absence of proof); Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa
Cruz, Id. para. 70 (lack of proof); Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz, Id, para. 74 (proof
indicates there are no victims only terrorists); Montero Aranguren, supra 7 para. 60.62 (lack of
proof); Montero Aranguren, Id. para. 60.63 (none culpability neither responsibility by lack of proof);
41 Rosendo Cantú, supra 7 para. 77 (rejection from National Defense); Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico
(Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), ICHR, 23 November 2009, Ser. C No. 209, para. 195 (facts
denounced after 18 years by non-imputable reasons to the State); Montero Aranguren, supra 7, para.
60.18 (contestable facts by a duality of authorities); Ituango Massacre, supra 7 para. 313 (rejection of
State agents’ participation);
42 Las Palmeras, supra 7 para. 35 (g) (Declination); Fernandez Ortega, supra 7, para. 163 (Disputing
jurisdiction between military and ordinary justice); Rosendo Cantú, supra 7 para.142 (Declination);
Mariparan Massacre, supra 7, para. 96. (90) (Coalition of jurisdiction).
43 Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (Monitoring) ICHR, 19 November 2009, para. 21(b) (incorrect typification
of crime); Radilla Pacheco, supra 54 para. 176 (HR Commission made generic the criminal
typification); Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz, supra 7, para. 72 (Poor intervention of 7
prosecutors in the investigation for more than 18 years); Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz,
Id, para. 73-4 (lack of judicial initiative of the general prosecutor office); Mariparan Massacre, supra
7, para. 96.36 (Lack of judiciary initiative); Mariparan Massacre, Id, para. 227 (Lack of institutional
military support).
44 Trujillo Orozca v. Bolivia (Monitoring) ICHR, 19 September 2005, para. 4(e) (extinction of criminal
action and shelved the case); Mariparan Massacre, Id paras. 96 and 133 (acquittal by the non-pursuit
40
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In addition, the data reveals that for States that have strong judicial proof of a
documentary character, States can control the proceedings and neutralize their
responsibility and of their AUTHORITIES. This is verifiable in 27 cases of this subgroup
that end without judicial obligation ordered by the Court. The management of the
disputable evidence serves, accordingly, to save the State's responsibility - as 24 of these
27 cases came from the dispute. In some sense, these defenses were successful. The use
of such evidence can allow the restoration of reputation and control of the extent and
scope of the proceedings and outcomes.
Even when the Court denies objections, States still retain the possibility to further
action by acquiescing before the issuance of judgment on the merits. 45 Then, States
acquiesce when there is a likely possibility that there would be a difference in the
outcome of the trial. This difference entails damage AUTHORITIES involved. For
instance, States can obtain the Court benefits (praises and rewards) if they waive their
means of evidence and opt for the application of the expeditiousness and diligence
principles, favoring justice for the victim by acquiescing. Likewise, waiving the right to
dispute would demonstrate a necessary consensus to end the controversy. On the
contrary, a waiver due to lack of proof would undermine the character by which the
acquiescence serves to validate the legality of the practice or the binding nature of a norm
which was initially rejected by the State.
of the armed group); Ituango Massacre, supra 7, paras. 125 (43) (Revocation of prison); 125 (46)
(Revocation of condemnation); para. 125.53 (Cases against two high-ranking authorities are shelved
along with prescription in a case against Cmdr.) para. 125.97 (disciplinary process is shelved);
Radilla Pacheco, supra 54 para. 264 (Dismissal due to the extinction of the criminal action since of
the retirement and death of the defendant); Rosendo Cantú, supra 7, para. 147 (Shelved by no proof
against military responsible).
45 Rules of Procedure, Article 61. Discontinuance of a Case. When the entity that has presented the
case notifies the Court of its intention not to proceed with it, the Court shall, after hearing the
opinions of all those participating in the proceedings, decide on the matter and determine the
juridical effects of that decision.
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Concerning those 26 cases that had acquiescence out of 72 cases with objections,
in all these cases there was disputable evidence of the State’s responsibility. States had
more than 25 pieces of proof of non-culpability on average. As we will review below,
when States have only 3 means on average they opt to acquiesce early.
In these cases, there were, also, AUTHORITIES involved in the abuse. States had
means to absolve these authorities of guilt. In fact, these means were used on 54% of
these cases (but, this percentage is much lesser than the 80% that have those cases in
which States opt to dispute). In cases with objection and acquiescence, the evidence of
culpability against States and their AUTHORITIES turned in danger in the course of the
proceedings. In other words, at the beginning of the proceedings, the proof did not seem
extremely dangerous to those cases with AUTHORITIES. It turns plausible objecting
rather than merely acquiescing. However, when in the course of the proceedings
substantial proof is added against AUTHORITIES, States acquiesced later (i.e. after the
objection was submitted and rejected or after the dispute) to offset the incertitude of these
cases by controlling consequences.
This pattern of objecting and acquiescence is depicted, for instance, in the
Ximenes Lopez (Brazil) case. The State contested the case, but after losing during the
preliminary objections, it withdrew part of its argument and accepted partial
responsibility. 46 Only after the Court started hear the case did Brazil acquiesce. Even so,
the Court praised Brazil's acquiescence, failing to see that Brazil’s acquiescence was
meant to advance its own interests and avoid the embarrassing, incriminating hearings

46

Ximenes-Lopes, supra 31, para 34,35
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and testimonies that affect authorities, at the expense of compliance. Eight years and four
months later, the case remained in monitoring. 47
3.

Early Acquiescence

In 25% of all cases, States acquiesced early (i.e. at the first submission or before
the Court proceedings has started). States do not object since there was undeniable proof
of State guilt, and the significance of these cases secured that the State would not deny
responsibility. On the other hand, States must do something since there are
AUTHORITIES implicated. The admissibility of responsibility places authorities’
reputations at risk and exposes them to criminal liability. Nevertheless, States gaining the
power and control of the Court proceedings offsets this disadvantage.
One of the States’ immediate gains is praise from the Court. These praises allow
States to save the reputation of AUTHORITIES and legitimize the more important longterm options – promises, requests, proclamations of limited responsibility and nonintervention, anticipatory remedial actions, etc. These actions can diminish the
consequences for AUTHORITIES (see examples since footnote 46).
States acquiesced early in 30 cases. During the merits, as it was noted above, the
Court discerns the truth of the controversial claims supported by the evidence. In such a
subgroup of cases, States cannot dispute the facts (with evidence) during the merits since
by acquiescing they renounce the right of dispute. However, given that there is
indisputable proof, then it is not worthwhile to spend time in disputing the merits for
States.

47

Id paras. 35,36.
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In these cases, indisputable proof (against authorities) was constituted by
confessions in which AUTHORITIES acknowledged their individual guilt as perpetrators
or HR violators and/or institutional responsibilities. 48 Testimonial evidence about
linkages of subordination and dependency between perpetrators and institutions of the
government are also considered irrefutable proof. 49 The existence of domestic
convictions or extraditions of AUTHORITIES also constitute an irrefutable proof when
this proof precedes the proceedings. 50 Writing evidence (from government actors) that
determines responsibilities against AUTHORITIES is also considered indisputable

48 Rochela Massacre, supra 7, para. 142 (confession of fail to provide justice against perpetrators,
delayed processes, procedural inactivity and juridical problems); Valle Jaramillo, supra 7, para. 149
(state confession); Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, para. 20 (“the participation and responsibility of the
Peruvian State are involved in the proved absence of a complete, impartial and effective investigation
into the murder of Pedro Huilca Tecse, as well as concealment designed to hide the truth, those who
were really responsible and their accomplices.”) 60.39 (confession of high-ranking authorities
against perpetrators); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, supra 7, paras. 197.17 (there are proof elements
that generate more than simple suspicions against highest levels of government that they ordered an
operative against victims) 197.63 (Commission created to find responsible and El Amparo v.
Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR, 4 February 2010, para. 8-9 (responsible are identified).
49 Bulacio Argentina (Monitoring) ICHR, 28 November 2008, para.13 (processes against judges);
Garrido and Baigorria, supra 8 para.24 (“the legal consequences resulting from domestic court” that
was unable “to identify the person(s) criminally responsible for the crimes against Raúl Baigorria
and Adolfo Garrido.”); Tiu Tojín,.supra 7, para. 5, 15 (It was recognized by the high-ranking authority
“the unjustified delay in the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for the
facts of the case” was accepted by Guatemala “to develop an immediate, impartial, and effective
investigation.”); Goiburu, supra 7 para. 61 (11); La Cantuta, supra 7 para. 80.17 (General recognizing
responsibilities of Intelligence Services and linkages with Ministries and militias); La Cantuta v. Peru
(Monitoring) ICHR, 20 November 2009, para. 7; Gómez Palomino, supra 43, para. 54.15) (Statement
recognizing linkages between authorities and responsible group); Amparo v. Venezuela
(Interpretation) ICHR, 16 April 1997, para. 3 and 5 (It was established the relation between
presidential actions and the operation ordered, which would be questioned and exposed during the
judgment process); Blanco Romero, supra 8 para. 51 (6) (General recognizing responsibilities for HR
violation against victim).
50 Bulacio, supra 7 para.14 (prison); Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Monitoring) ICHR, 27
November 2007 para. 6 (b) (Irrefutable proof to dismiss responsible judge and separation of all
responsible police agents); Ticona Estrada, supra 7 para. 144 (Conviction against coronel); Ticona
Estrada v. Bolivia (Monitoring Judgment) ICHR, 23 February 2001, para.6 (a) (Conviction 5 high
military); Rochela Massacre, supra 7 paras. 154 (4 accused and 8 convicted), and 209 (Disciplinary
investigation against high-ranking authorities and judges); Valle Jaramillo, supra 7 para. 147
(Accusation against 10 and 2 convictions); Valle Jaramillo. v. Colombia (Monitoring) ICHR, 28
February 2011, para. 18 (extradition); Servellón-García , supra 7, para. 70.47 (arrest orders);
Goiburu, supra 7, para. 61 (11); La Cantuta, supra 45, para.7; Goiburu, supra 7, paras. 7-8, 11, 14;
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, supra 7, para. 197.66 (2 convictions); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v.
Perú (Monitoring) ICHR, 31 March 2009 (Presidential extradition).
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proof. 51 Besides, groups of evidentiary proceedings that have an accusatory and
compelling character are irrefutable proof. 52 Sometimes the mere failure to enter an
appearance to the claim or the State contumacy made the proof indisputable. 53
Examples include the cases of Myrna Mack Chang, of the Massacre of Plan de
Sánchez, of the 19 Tradesmen, of the Mapiripán Massacre, of the Massacre of the
Moiwana Community, of the Ituango Massacre - in which the State’s intent to commit
gross violations of HR, or its express negligence to avoid them, were irrefutably
proven. 54
The data in the paragraphs above are meant to demonstrate the tendency by which
acquiescing is used rather than objecting in cases where there is evidence. Given in the

Maritza Urrutia, supra 43, para. 127 (resolution from general prosecutor); Kawas Fernández ,
supra 7 (Honduran Attorney General’s Office issues a report stating that Kawas Fernández’s murder
was the result of her environmental activities and that State agents were allegedly involved in
planning her murder and obstructing the investigation); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison , supra 7 para.
197.4 (Report from Commission of Truth and Reconciliation); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, Id. para.
197.15 (Presidential Decree ordered the violation); Huilca-Tecse, supra 7 para. 60.50 (congress
investigation against president and collaborators) 60.53 (constitutional accusation against highranking authorities); Servellón-García, supra 7 para. 79.36) (report of HR office regarding
perpetrators); Chitay Nech, supra 7, para. 65 (The CEH concluded that, 91% of the violations it
registered were carried out during years 1978 and 1983, under the dictatorships of the Generals
Romeo Lucas García (1978-1982) and Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983). On the date of the
disappearance of […], General Romeo Lucas García exercised the role of President of the Republic and
Commander in Chief of the Army and General Ángel Aníbal Guevara Rodríguez was the Minister of
National Defense [as their responsibilities were determited]”).
52 Escue Zapata, supra 7, paras. 110 and 163; Escue Zapata v. Colombia (Monitoring Judgment) ICHR,
18 Mayo 2010, para. 11; El Caracazo, supra 7 para. 69.15 (Criminal persecution against 2 highranking State agents); Gómez Palomino. v. Peru (Monitoring) ICHR, 01 July 2009, para. 11 (Criminal
persecution against 12 State agents alleging the crime of lesa humanity); Gómez Palomino. v. Peru
(Monitoring) ICHR, 05 July 2009, para. 17 (creation of investigatory commission and extension the
scope of the criminal persecution against Prime Minister of Peru); Baldeón-García, supra 7 para.
73.35) (Attorney General’s Office of HR started a criminal persecution); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison,
supra 7, para. 197.61. (Existence of judicial investigations); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison Id, para. 197.
70 (Accusation against high-ranking authorities); Huilca-Tecse v. Perú (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 August
2013, para. 5 (a) (Criminal investigation against prime minister and high-ranking authorities);
Servellón-García, supra 7 para. 79.40 (Criminal processes against military members); Bulacio, supra
7 para. 6 (process against high-official); Jaramillo, supra 7 para. 6 (investigations).
53 Carpio Nicolle, supra 7; Barrios Altos, supra 7.
54 Myrna Mack Chang, supra 7; The Massacre of Plan de Sánchez, supra 7; 19 Tradesmen supra 29;
The Mapiripán Massacre supra 7; The Massacre of the Moiwana Community, supra 11; The Ituango
Massacre, supra 7.
51
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cases there are AUTHORITIES, thus, acquiescing is also used rather doing nothing.
There are 24 cases with AUTHORITIES out of 30 cases with early acquiescence.
It is neither worthwhile disputing the evidence when the State has not too many
means to defy the core facts in dispute. 55 In addition, States that acquiesced early did not
produce the evidence needed to overturn the allegations against them since States have
few judicial pieces to counteract the weight of the contradictory evidence. In fact, in these
cases, State judicial pieces to include in its defense fell to 3 of 25 (on average). I have
already presented this data. In this way, the possibility of using exculpatory evidence also
diminished. The risks of authorities to be incriminated increases due to States having
fewer mechanisms to exonerate the authority of guilt. In effect, States were able to use
them for 27% of this subgroup of cases. Recall that in cases with objections, the
mechanism to exonerate was used in 65% of the cases. Therefore, if States do not have
proof to promote a defense nor means to limit responsibility by their AUTHORITIES, the
case is indisputable, and an early acquiescence is a way to control the damage.
Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure allows the Court to discontinue review of the
case after it has received acquiescence. One would observe the beneficial effects of a
Court that takes a pragmatic reaction to acquiescence. However, in resolving
acquiescence, the data shows that the Court again reacts idealistically – as we have seen
above in its consideration of objections. In this way, the Court rather than closing cases
and striking them out from the docket, accepted either fully or partially all acquiescence
submitted, conserving its jurisdiction over them. 56

Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 804 (2008).
Rules of Procedure, Article 64 (“Continuation of a Case. Bearing in mind its responsibility to protect
HR, the Court may decide to continue the consideration of a case notwithstanding the existence of the
conditions indicated in the preceding Articles.”)
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56

89

The Court conserves cases since the international HR process of responsibility is a
matter of international “public order” not just a conflict between the parties in a case. 57
Given this public nature of the process, the Court praises the act of acquiescence as a
positive contribution to the System (as shown in section II of this Chapter). 58 These
praises offset costs derived from the admission of guilt. When States have recognized
their culpability through acquiescence, they are admitting that they have broken a
normative commitment to the International order. The Court considers acquiescence as an
action that mitigates responsibilities.59
States leverage Court considerations to save reputation and put legitimacy face to
their AUTHORITIES. Even more important States gain long-term benefits, they gain in
an interaction in which they have the Court acquiescence rewards. These rewards are the
use of alternative actions during the Court proceedings and a diminished monitoring.
States use these rewards to protect AUTHORITIES. The acquiescence also allows States
to start altering the distribution of power between States and Courts during the
proceedings. By this alteration, States gain more power than the Court to influence, direct
and control the Court proceedings. Regarding benefits, acquiescing turns out to be less
costly in political terms and may likely account for the State’s low compliance in these
cases (see in the next stages).
Kawas Fernández, supra 7, para. 24 (Since the proceedings before this Court relate to the
protection of HR, a matter of international public order that goes beyond the intent of the parties, the
Court must ensure that acts of acquiescence are acceptable for the purposes of the Inter- American
system. To this end, the Court does not limit itself to merely verifying the formal conditions of the
said acts, but relates them to the nature and gravity of the alleged violations, the requirements and
interests of justice, the particular circumstances of each case, and the attitude and position of the
parties). Rosendo Cantú, supra 7, para. 22; Kimel, supra 7, para. 24; Chitay Nech, supra 7, para. 18;
Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra 7, para. 17; “Cotton Field,” supra 7, para. 25; Ibsen, supra 7, para. 34;
Fernandez Ortega,supra 7, para. 22; Velez Loor, supra 7, para. 63; Xakmok Kasek Community v.
Paraguay (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 24 August 2010, Ser. C No. 214, para. 30.
58 Id. supra 7.
59 Rules of Procedure, Article 62
57
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All in all, in 44 out of 56 cases in which States acquiesced (early or later), there
are AUTHORITIES (78.5%). Moreover, depending (again) on the type of proof that
threatens AUTHORITIES, States include promises of compliance along with their
acquiescence. If admitting guilt serves as a mitigating factor of responsibility (as I said
above), a promise may decrease the likelihood of receiving a judicial obligation. The
judicial obligation is one of the seven categories described in Chapter 2, Section B.3 by
which States are ordered to prosecute authorities (further details in stage 4). The Court
commanded a judicial obligation to prosecute authorities in 40 out of those as mentioned
earlier (56 cases).
Promising compliance
The data also reveals that when we restrict our attention only to cases with
AUTHORITIES, there are 39 (out of these 56) cases with promises. Chapter 2 described
promises as phrases used to ensure present or future State actions toward compliance.
These promises attest that States have the disposition to internalize the norm of
accountability and to work in correcting the violation. 60 With these commitments, States
provide "some" security and predictability to the Court that States will conduct future
obligations. There are a diversity of promises regarding the judicial responsibility,
particularly, prosecuting and punishing. For instance, in the Tiu Tojin (Guatemala) case,
the State stated during the Court proceedings “the unjustified delay in the investigation,
prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for the facts of the case” was accepted
by Guatemala “to develop an immediate, impartial, and effective investigation.” 61

60
61

Tiu Tojín, supra 2, paras. 5, 15
Id.
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In the Gutiérrez-Soler (Colombia) case the State stated during the Court
proceedings as in the Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs appears “[the State is]
willing to investigate, try and punish the individuals responsible for the injuries sustained
by Mr. Wilson Gutiérrez-Soler,” even “without there being any conviction,” and “as an
obligation limited to its best efforts.”

62

In the Huilca-Tecse (Peru) case the State stated during the proceedings on
Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs:“the participation and responsibility of the
Peruvian State is involved in the proved absence of a complete, impartial and effective
investigation into the murder of Pedro Huilca Tecse, as well as concealment designed to
hide the truth, those who were really responsible and their accomplices.” 63
In the Benavides Cevallos (Ecuador) case the State stated during the proceedings
“responsibility for the arrest, unlawful detention, torture and murder of Benavides
Cevallos perpetrated by official agents.” 64
In the Garrido and Baigorria (Argentina) case the State stated during the Court
proceedings as in the Judgment on Merits “the legal consequences resulting from
domestic court” that was unable “to identify the person(s) criminally responsible for the
crimes against Raúl Baigorria and Adolfo Garrido.” 65 In the Bueno Alves (Argentina)
case the State stated during the Court proceedings as in the Judgment on Merits “it

62 Gutiérrez v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 12 September 2005, Ser. C No. 132,
para. 92
63 Huilca-Tecse v. Perú (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 3 March 2005, Ser. C No. 121, para. 20
64 Benavides-Cevallos v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 19 June 1998, Ser. C No. 38,
para. 35
65 Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Merits) ICHR, 2 February 1996, Ser. C No. 25, para. 24
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[…will] make its best efforts to conclude as soon as possible the investigations into the
facts which caused damage to Mr. Bueno-Alves.” 66
In the Vargas Areco (Paraguay) case the State stated during the proceedings on
Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs that Paraguay undertakes “to further the
proceedings initiated before regular criminal courts until final judgment is rendered.” 67
A couple of juridical consequences were constructed from these promises. On the
one hand, the parties to the case place particular attention to these pledges since they
often represent symbolic ways of reparation, and, particularly, they can work as a tool to
future claims. When third parties of the procedures claimed noncompliance during the
monitoring, for instance, they appeal to the existence of acquiescence and promises. The
parties seem to expect States capable of acting from moral. On the other hand, States
calculate a positive reaction from the Court since these promises reinforce their
commitments. Under this understanding, they seem to expect that their promises can
influence future obligations. At least, it has happened for cases with AUTHORITIES.
The value of persuasive discourse -including commitments and promises of
compliance- is that the Court ends up by feeling less comfortable in rejecting
acquiescence from States that are more likely, as they express in their promises, to offer
to concede or appear compelled with their HR. Accordingly, it seems to be the case that
the Court confers simultaneously legitimacy to the State actions and praises the
expressions used in the acquiescence. For example, in the Escue Zapata (Colombia) case,
the Court stated in its Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs “acquiesce is a positive

66 Bueno Alves v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 11 May 2007, Ser. C No. 164 para.
210
67 Vargas v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 September 2006, Ser. C No. 155, para.
10
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contribution toward the proper fulfillment of the Inter-American human rights
jurisdictional function and, in general, the enforcement and the effectiveness of the
principles enshrined by the American Convention.” 68 Likewise, in the Zambrano-Velez
(Ecuador) case the Court in its Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs remarks the
value of acquiesces, particularly, “[…as a] positive step toward the vindication of the
victims’ memory and dignity.” 69
Therefore, the Court behavior exhibited regarding these promises can be
predictable if it takes into account that the Court conferred legitimacy for State
statements of responsibility rather than the act of complying.
Such legitimizing occurs since the Court expects States to renew commitments to
justice and accountability that the HR System proclaims. 70 States act as the Court
expects, turning acquiescence into an opportunity for declaring a formal normative
commitment that signals HR compliance even while they are in violation. These
commitments make States into partners with the Court in the advancement of the HR
project. The Court seems to react positively to a language that was as close as possible to
an almost fully embodied commitment to HR norms. 71 States routinely invoked a
discourse that includes compliance, non-repetition, and remediation. As such “[t]he

Escue Zapata v. Colombia, (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2007, Ser. C, No. 165, par.
20.
69 Zambrano Velez v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2007, Ser. C No. 166, para.
10.
70 Rules of Procedure, Article 64, the Court may decide to continue the consideration of a case, after it
has received acquiescence. The Court decides its admissions based on nature and gravity of the
alleged violations, the circumstances of the case, and the position of the parties to accept
acquiescence are taken into account. Gelman v. Uruguay (Merits and Reparations) ICHR, 24 February
2011, Ser. C No. 221, para. 26; Rosendo Cantú, supra 7, paras. 16-26. Id. supra 41.
71 The positive Court reactions to acquiescing are part of a discourse that uses 3 common phrases: In
33 cases, the Court used the phrase “positive contribution.” The phrase “valuable contribution” was
used 3 times. The last phrase used by the Court was “important step toward” in 6 cases. These cases
were enlisted on footnote 7. I will discuss some of these cases in Part IV.
68
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Government’s strategy is recognizing responsibilities and proposing integrated
procedures for attending to the victims based on the right to truth, to justice and to obtain
fair reparation.” 72 These commitments and expressions have empowered the victims and
their representatives, the Commission, advocates, civil society and non-state actors with
the tools to pressure governments toward compliance during monitoring.
Stages 4 and 5 produce many of the compliance data. However, a picture emerges
from the Court proceedings. This picture notes that in 56 cases, States acquiesce,
particularly justice violations, since the chance to deny responsibility is minimal and
there is undeniable proof of State guilt. Moreover, these States offer little information
about the alleged HR violation and violators. By this reason, it is feasible to assume two
things. First, the data suggests that the irrefutable accusatory evidence along with its
publicity/visibility is a factor in increasing State's willingness to acquiesce, Secondly,
acquiescence becomes a defense in the proceedings and has, in fact, various political
purposes, among them, be the first action in a concatenated series of activities. It is yet
much too early, at this first Stage to establish if acquiescence or its related behaviors
involve a meaningful commitment by the State to prosecute authorities. To the same
extend, it is much too early, of course, to tell whether and how well the Court will be able
to discharge one of the most pressing and elusive of its goals: the prosecution of HR
violators.

B.

Stage 2. Exchange

States that have acquiesced can gain more control of the proceedings by initiating
a stage of exchange after the Court accepts the acquiescence and before the facts of the

72

Barrios altos, supra 7, para. 31.
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case get to the public. 73 States can preempt the Court’s exposure of information and
issuance of judgments through requests. The option of requesting is, restricted to the 56
acquiescence cases (out of 118) and does not apply to the 16 instances in which States did
nothing or to those 46 cases where States objected and then disputed the petitioners’
factual allegations.
The Court is tasked with responding to these State requests. Such requests would
then restrict the Court from assessing evidence during the merits of the case or free the
Court from the factual analysis. A Court like the ICHR could find these requests
attractive to economize on the process and monitoring responsibilities. The data shows,
however, changes in how the Court responded to State requests. The Court admitted most
of the requests in judgments issued before 2007. Since 2007 the Court recognized adverse
consequences of applying admissibility. The magnitude of the HR abuse is not recorded
in its totality in judgments, undermining the victims’ rights. Consequently, the Court
changed to a tendency of inadmissibility. This change (from admissibility to
inadmissibility) also changed the State response by reducing the number of requests. The
Court may also restrict information in the absence of State requests.
Basically, because of all these restrictions of information, States immediately gain
in that their AUTHORITIES remained free from reputational damage. States also were
released to use a subsequent action-strategy. A significant long-term benefit is that States
prevented either entirely or to some extent taking actions against their AUTHORITIES in
the case that the Court admits State’s requests.

73

The data reports that the Court has accepted all offers of acquiescence.
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1.

The type of State requests

The Court case involves complex patterns of facts. These “facts require proof
(information) to demonstrate the physical occurrences of the violations alleged and the
State knowledge of or participation in these events, as well as the role of authorities in
their investigation.” 74 In cases in which acquiescence is joined to AUTHORITIES (44
out of the 56), States have acquiesced to the specific violations alleged to control the
damage against AUTHORITIES that comes from the factual controversy that originated
the case. If the information (evidence of guilt) is not stopped before the Court deliberates
its judgment, it ends by substantiating the narratives of proven facts about the
participation of AUTHORITIES in HR violations within the Court’s merits judgments. 75
A demonstrated participation ends in future reputation damage, and even worse, a
domestic criminal prosecution of AUTHORITIES. 76
In this way, States retain the option to request until critical information comes to
light. States can request even after the oral proceedings have started. Oral proceedings are
not mandatory according to the Court Rules of Procedure, the Court, however, opens this
oral phase to gather evidence. Accordingly, 3 types of requests seek to impede the
damage by restricting the merits phase of the case, the controversy of the facts or the
Court hearings.

Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 793 (2008).
The Court performs factual analysis in the following cases: Albán Cornejo, supra 7 para.25;
Baldeón-García, supra 7, paras. 56-58; Blake, supra 8 para. 29; Caballero Delgado and Santana, supra
8, para. 17; Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz, supra 7 paras. 35-37; Escué Zapata v. Colombia
(Interpretation of Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 5 May 2008, Ser. C No. 178, para. 21; Kimel,
supra 7, para. 27; Maritza Urrutia, supra 43, para. 44; Ximenes Lopes, supra 7, para. 79, 81; Tiu Tojín,
supra 7, para. 26; Vargas-Areco, supra 7, para. 66.
76 Thus, an adversarial consideration of the merits or living testimonies and fact-finding end damage
States. See Albán Cornejo, supra 7; Blanco Romero, supra 7; Caballero Delgado and Santana, supra 8;
Molina-Theissen, supra 7; Ximenes Lopes, supra 7.
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An illustration of request restricting the merits phase of the case is the Aloeboete
(Suriname) case. In this case, after two declarations of acquiescence by Suriname, the
State Agent declared during the Court proceedings as appears in the Judgment on Merits
"I believe my statement was clear: it accepts responsibility. Consequently, the Court has
the right to close the case, file it [...]." 77
The Court, in this case, noting the admission of responsibility and ceasing
controversy regarding the events that gave rise to the case. 78 On December 4, 1991, the
Court closed the case without issuing reparations and costs judgments.
Through Court concessions, States gain control in the process. As the Aloeboetoe
Case illustrates the Court delegated (in the State) responsibility for reparations to the
victims. 79 When on December 4, 1991, the Court closed the case without issuing
reparations and costs judgments. Two years later since the Suriname government opposes
reparations and costs claimed by the Commission, the Court reopened the case and
ordered concrete action through a ruling issued on September 10, 1993. 80
Regarding requests restricting the controversy of the facts, In Venezuela’s
Amparo case, the State accepted responsibility81 and asked the Court’s permission to
negotiate reparations directly with the Commission. 82 Consequently, by judgment dated
January 18, 1995, the Court took note of the acquiescence of responsibility […] and
decided that the controversy concerning the facts that originated the case has ceased. 83
Additionally, it granted the parties a period of six months to reach an agreement on
Aloeboete v. Suriname, (Merits) ICHR, 4 December 1991, Ser. C No. 11, para. 22
Id., para. 1.
79 Id., para. 1.
80 Aloeboete v. Suriname, (Reparations) ICHR, 10 September 1993, Ser. C No. 15, para. 25 and
considering 1.
81 El Amparo v. Venezuela (Merits) ICHR, 18 January 1995, Ser. C No 19, paras. 1 and 3.
82 Id.
83 Id., para. 1
77
78
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reparations. 84 After eighteen years and two months, only the financial reparation had
been met with compliance while the State has not prosecuted the responsible parties. See
footnote concerning other cases in which the States managed agreements to control
financial reparations. 85
The Court generally held more than one oral hearing to gather evidence. States
request restriction of these hearings since they may verify the facts that support legal
claims and generate - around the shaming and naming effect - international publicity that
affects and puts pressure on offending states. For instance, in the Myrna Mack
(Guatemala) case, the State acquiesced because of the existence of indisputable proof
since the victim's family unsuccessfully tried to pursue justice at the domestic level for
nearly a decade in the 1990 assassination of an HR activist by paramilitary. Then, the
State sought to convince the Court that its acquiescence to the facts eliminated the need
for Court hearings or preserving the application. Guatemala requests to avoid that
incriminatory information becoming public. The Court rejected the State requests. The
Id., para. 3
Benavides-Cevallos, supra 65, para. 35 (the Ecuadorian State acknowledges its responsibility in the
events in question and undertakes to make reparations through the friendly settlement
arrangement); Blanco Romero v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 28 November
2005, Ser. C No. 138, para. 27 (the State of Venezuela "acknowledge[s] its international responsibility
in the instant case" and "offers a friendly settlement"); Garrido and Baigorria, supra 66, para. 28 (the
Government has requested of the Court, “the suspension of the proceedings” for a period of six months
for the purpose of reaching an agreement”); Gutiérrez Soler, supra 63, para. 26 (Requests […] the
opportunity to reach […] a friendly settlement on reparations and indemnities, for which the State
proposes a maximum delay of six months); Huilca-Tecse, supra 64, para. 44 (Following the State’s
acquiescence, the representatives and Peru reached an agreement on the methods and time limits for
complying with the reparations); Molina-Theissen, supra 2, para. 7 and 10 (During the procedure for
the friendly settlement of several cases being processed before the Commission, the President of the
Republic of Guatemala, at that time, Alfonso Portillo, acknowledged the State’s “international
responsibility” in the case of Molina Theissen); Tiu Tojín, supra 2, para. 5 (The State indicated that it
had adopted some of the recommendations of the Commission to repair the violations to human
rights, specifically: an act of apology presided by the Vice-President of the Republic, payment of an
economic compensation to […]); Vargas-Areco, supra 68, para. 10 (The State undertook “to further on
the proceedings initiated before regular criminal courts until final judgment is rendered” and “to
allow a term of 1 (one) year to provide fair reparation, given that administrative formalities must be
complied with to include in 2006 National Expense Budget the compensation to be paid to the
victim’s judicially recognized heirs.”).
84
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State left the proceedings and refused to hear witness testimony. In addition, the State
rescinded the acquiescence, claiming the existence of an “excessive interpretation” of its
statement. 86 These actions tried to lock accusatory information. Similar language used in
an ample request. In Mariparan massacre (Colombia) case, State asks the [...] Court to
take this acquiescence into consideration and give it full legal effect, therefore limiting
the hearings on the merits and the subsequent proceeding to the study of reparations and
costs, as well as to pleadings on the merits regarding compliance […]. 87
Once the Court admitted the State’s requests, the controversial process, factfinding (i.e., an analytical procedure to judge the adverse claims about evidence of the
parties) 88 and factual analysis became unnecessary. 89 A negative consequence is that less
factum and information make the Court jurisprudence become less visible in generating
pressure from third parties. That entails that States won control over the accusatory
information and proceedings. In 33 cases, States use one of the three types of requests to
restrict the Court from assessing information during the merits of the case. 90 This number
is regarding cases in which acquiescence joins to AUTHORITIES (44 out of the 56). In
22 cases, the Court admitted State requests.
2.

Two tendencies to resolve State requests

As noted above, a Court like the ICHR, with a budget that is well below that of
other Courts; could find means of expedited case resolution, like acquiescence and its
Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 25 November 2003, Ser. C
No. 101, paras. 70, 73 and 75
87 Mariparán Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 15 September 2005, para.
33 (4).
88 They are elastic and informal. Cantoral Benavides, supra 11, para. 45.
89 The Court did not perform factual analysis in the following cases: El Amparo, supra 8, para. 20;
Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7, para. 42; Blanco Romero, supra 7, para. 32; Garrido and Baigorria, supra
8, para. 27; Gutiérrez Soler, supra 7, para. 31 and 50; Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, para. 60; MolinaTheissen, supra 7, para. 42.
90 Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 802-3 (2008).
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associated requests, attractive since it allows economizing on the process and monitoring
responsibilities. 91 The data tells us another story and the Court developed two tendencies
in responding to State requests. The Court tended to admit most of the requests issued
before 2007. 92 Since 2007 the Court tended towards inadmissibility. 93 The reason for
this change is that the Court discovered that the reduction of factual information about
HR violations is an adverse consequence of its admissibility decisions. The Court tried to
block these effects with inadmissibility. 94 This Court action-decision changed the way by
which the States responded. The most visible change was that the number of submitted
requests decreased after 2007.
91 Only for the purpose of illustrating since these international courts each play different roles. As of
2011, the Court’s budget was US$4 million, while the ICC and ICTY had budgets of US$150 million
each.
92 There are requests in 24 cases in which a judgment was issued before 2007. In 18 cases, State
requests were admitted. The following 10 cases illustrate the admission: Aloeboete v. Suriname,
(Merits) ICHR, 4 December 1991, Ser. C No. 11, para. 22 and decision 1 (restricting case); Bulacio,
supra 7, para. 31 (s) (restricting case); Garrido, supra 8, para. 28 (restricting case); Maritza Urrrutia,
supra 43, paras. 16 and 30 (restricting case); Barrios-Altos, supra 7, paras. 31 and 38 (restricting
case); Amparo, supra 8 decision, para. 1 (restrincting case); Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7, paras. 27
and 35 (restricting hearings); Carpio Nicolle, supra 7, para. 36 (restricting hearings); Gómez
Palomino, supra 43, para. 16 (restricting hearings); Molina-Theissen, supra 7, para. 2 (restrincting
facts).
In 6 cases State requests were rejected before 2007. The following 4 cases illustrate the
rejection: Gutierrez Soler, supra 7, para. 26; Blake, supra 8, para. 27; Myrna Mack Chang, supra 7,
paras. 75 and 81 and Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, paras. 27 and 63.
93 There are requests in 6 out of 24 cases in which a judgment was issued after 2007. In 3 cases were
admitted: Cantoral-Huamani, supra 7, para. 123; Baldeón-García, supra 7, paras. 26 and 45 and
Montero Aranguren, supra 7, paras. 51 and 58.
In 6 cases were rejected such as Servellon Garcia, supra 7, para. 23; La Cantuta, supra 7, para.
44; Chitay Nech, supra 7, para. 14.
94 Since 2003, the Court started timidly to question the restriction of the proceedings requested by
States at the moment to acquiesce. Indeed, in the Myrna Mack Chang (Guatemala) case the Court
stated, "[T]he Court can determine whether the [acquiescence] made by the defendant State offers a
sufficient basis, in the terms of the American Convention, to continue the hearing on the merits and
to determine the possible reparations [...]." See Myrna Mack Chang, supra 7, para. 105; Rosendo
Cantú, supra 7, para. 21; Ibsen Cárdenas, supra 7, para. 33; Gelman, supra 59, para. 26. Later, the
Court was explicit to say that "[...T]he acquiescence is acceptable for purposes of the Inter-American
System of HR, which seeks to satisfy, [when] [...] [acquiescence] does not impede in the
administration of justice in the case. Thus, the Court does not limit its authority to confirming,
recording, or taking note of the acknowledgment or verifying the formal conditions of such actions,
but rather it must [...] determine, insofar as is possible, and in the exercise of its competence, the
truth of what occurred in the case." See Kimel, supra 7, para. 24. It was reaffirmed in Rosendo Cantú,
supra 7, para. 22 and Ibsen Cárdenas, supra 7, para. 34. See Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra 7, para. 17
(regarding the truth).
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Admissibility tendency, I found requests in 24 cases in which the judgment was
issued before 2007. The Court admitted 18 of these 24. Regarding these judgments issued
before 2007, the Court admitted the restriction of oral evidence reducing hearings
(entirely or partially), 95 testimonies and expert opinions, and the narratives of proven
facts to fewer paragraphs. 96 States calculate this positive reaction as the principles of
expeditiousness and diligence that governed HR proceedings were applied to cases with
acquiescence. Given these principles, the Court could provide timely justice and reduce
its caseload. For instance, the Court did halt some parts of the merits phase. Thus, the
duration of the judicial proceedings for acquiescence cases is 246 days, while in cases
without acquiescence it is 1275 days. 97
Inadmissibility tendency, since 2007, the Court recognized in its decisions that a
tendency to admissibility entails less information about violations and adopted a tendency
to inadmissibility. In fact, the Court admitted 4 of 9 requests submitted during this period,
thus, admission fell to 4 to 18. The Court progressively began not applying the
expeditiousness and diligence principles in cases with acquiescence. This change seems
to counteract a tactic on litigation (regarding the use of requests) by which the generation
of information (evidence of guilt, for instance against AUTHORITIES) is weakened. A
consequence of this weakening of the information is that there is no information about

95 Mariparán Massacre, Id., para. 37; Montero Aranguren, Id., paras. 21 and 26 (reduction in length of
the scheduled hearing)
96 Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 767-8 (2008).
97 The average duration was calculated based on the time elapsed between the dates the case was
submitted to the Court and the date the judgment on merits was issued.
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HR violators to be used for non-state actors (NGOs, civil society and advocates) in order
to pressure future compliance or follow-up judgment compliance. 98
According to the data, this change to inadmissibility resulted in an increase in the
factual analysis. During these analyzes, the Court establishes the inclusion of facts
recognized in the acquiescence. 99 In consequence, not every case in which the State
acquiesced for the alleged violation ended the controversy regarding this alleged
violation. In fact the Court “[...m]ay determine whether the [acquiescence] is sufficient to
provide grounds to proceed or not with the trial on the merits and with the determination
of any applicable reparations.” 100 To this end, the Court analyzes “each case
individually” 101 and when the Court has doubts about a particular acquiesced fact or
violation, the Court will declare that a controversy continues in this fact or violation. The
Court can also decide about the inclusion (or not) of full and partial factual records in
cases with acquiescence.
In particular, the data shows that the Court rejected all requests to restrict hearings
(4 of the 5 rejected requests were directed to restrict hearings). Instead, the Court
conducted hearings saying that they are needed to assess the context of the HR violation.

David P Fidler, Navigating the global health terrain: mapping global health diplomacy, 6 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT'L HEALTH L & POL'Y, 29-30 (2011). (The Importance of non-state actors lies in its potential
capability to affect the distribution of power in the international system. The preferences of nonState actor remain independent of formal structures and processes of government.) In my
understanding of the data, the actions of the Court can shape non-State actor preferences (such as
NGOs) by empowering them. In this case, the open-source anarchy theorized by Professor Fidler "as
a governance space, as accessible to, and shaped by, non-State actors, as well as States,” seems to
have the sense of the participation of NGOs in the interaction between States and the Court.
Particularly, since NGOs (and States) resist governance reforms that would restrict their freedom of
action.
99 Baldeón-García, supra 7, para. 56; Mariparán Massacre, supra 7, para. 69; Gutiérrez Soler, supra 7,
para. 26.
100 Huilca Tecse, supra 7 para. 42; García Asto and Ramírez Rojas, supra 7, para. 65; Acevedo
Jaramillo, supra 7, para. 173.
101 Huilca Tecse, Id, para. 42; García Asto and Ramírez Rojas, supra 7 para. 65; Acevedo Jaramillo, Id,
para. 173.
98
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The record of these oral testimonies served as evidence to the judgment issued during this
jurisprudential period. Consequently, cases with rejected requests continued to the
controversial consideration of merits. 102
This change (from admissibility to inadmissibility) changed the States response.
States did calculate this systematic change (toward the inadmissibility) in the Court’s
behavior. Since 2003 members of the Court stressed the necessity of changes (in the
Court practices regarding issues of acquiescence) in their dissenting opinions. 103 Thus,
the chances to control the information by request were progressively decreasing as the
disapplication of the expeditiousness and diligence principle was elaborated. This new
tendency toward the inadmissibility affected the State response. States expected that their
requests would be rejected. In fact, the number of requests fell to 9 to 24 (while that the
judgments issued increase). Consequently, this reduction can be explained in which
States would opt to file claims in cases in which significant evidence threatened
AUTHORITIES and not to file if they could forecast that scapegoats or agents of lowposition may assume culpability for AUTHORITIES.
3.

The Court changes and its restriction of information

The Court generally acknowledges that the scope and context within which
systematic violations occur need be established 104 and also an in-depth fact-finding is
required to avoid that acquiescence diverts attention from facts that are necessary to
Gutierrez Soler, supra 7, para. 26; Blake, supra 8, para. 27; Myrna Mack Chang, supra 7, paras. 75;
Chitay Nech, supra 7, para. 14; Servellon Garcia, supra 7, paras. 18 and 23; Cantuta, supra 7, para. 44;
Huilca Tecse, supra 7, para. 27 and 63.
103 Myrna Mack Chang, supra 7, paras. 21 and 25 (García Ramírez, J, sep. op.); Plan de Sánchez
Massacre, supra 7, paras. 14-15 (García Ramírez, J, sep. op.); Id, supra 7, para. 14 (García Ramírez, J,
sep. op.) (supplementing acquiescence with evidentiary analysis) Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 814 (2008).
104 Rochela Massacre, supra 7, paras. 77-91 (“the Court set forth the context within which the
massacre had occurred, which clearly indicated that Colombia’s internal laws and policies had helped
to fuel paramilitary violence.”)
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obtain accountability. 105 These changes in Court practices came from the frequent
interaction between the Court and the violating States 106 – especially Peru, Colombia,
and Guatemala. These three have a high number of cases under monitoring and various
acquiescence instances. Indeed, twenty-nine of the fifty-six statements of acquiescence
come from them: 107 Peru (10), Colombia (9), and Guatemala (10). 108 By determining that
access to justice in the case of HR violations formed part of jus cogens, 109 the Court
started to fight impunity. 110 However, it was through its litigation that the Court learned
that there is an accepted climate of impunity in Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala. 111 As
their cases reveal, all 3 did not comply with the obligation of prosecuting authorities.
Despite these changes in the Court’s factual analyzes, the Court members did not
think they went far enough. They asked for the complete rejection of these requests and
demanded (in their votes) more in-depth factual analysis of all the cases involving
acquiescence. 112 They asked for a complete rejection since the Court is still interested in
reducing its caseload. 113 The unilateral restriction of hearings and leaving testimonies of
witnesses by the Court (without requests) justifies that concern. The Court restricts

Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 815 (2008).
Id. at, 808-809.
107 20 States are under monitoring. The case distribution is as follows: South America (87 cases);
Central America (10 cases); North America (6 cases) and Caribe (8 cases).
108 See appendix A for further details.
109 Burgorgue-Larsen, “War” in the Jurisprudence of the Inter- American Court of HR, 2011
110 The Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits) ICHR 29 July 1988 Ser. C. No. 4 (July) (This case
was the first contentious case heard by the Court. It documents a record of numerous disappearances
(1981-84) perpetrated by State agents and sponsored or tolerated by the State. In this case the Court
applies the presumption of death regarding disappearances)
111 2015, Indice Global de Impunidad IGI, Centro de Estudios Sobre La Impunidad y Justicia (CESIJ),
Colombia (75.6) at 44.
112 Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez highlights that acquiescence must be complemented with evidentiary
analysis, avoiding cancellation of hearing automatically so that reparations are not dictated in a
vacuum, i.e. without understanding the facts of the case. Mack Chang, supra 7 paras. 21 and 25
(Garcia Ramirez, J, sep. op.); Plan de Sanchez Massacre, supra 7, paras. 14 and 15 (Garcia Ramirez, J,
sep. op.).
113 Servellon Garcia, supra 7, para. 3 (Cancado Trindade, J, sep. op.).
105
106

105

information in 9 cases in which States have not requested. 114 In such instances, requests
became unnecessary when the Court overlooked - after it accepted the acquiescence - the
merits considerations and ruled on reparations directly. The Court notes the use of the
streamlining when it declares that the factual controversy ceased, and States were ordered
to reach an agreement for damages with the Commission within six months (often).
Concerning the streamlining and terms of acquiescence, some members of the
Court in their dissenting opinion note that the Court makes a mistake in its brief
discussion of the process after admitted some requests of the States associated with the
acquiescence. A Court member said that the Court in an irrational urge to decide in
record time, deprives itself to: leverage the positive attitude of procedural collaboration
assumed by the State to make a better dossier and preliminary proceedings, apply the
principle of the presence of both parties and use the acquiescence as a means of
reparation for the victims’ next of kin. 115 Therefore, the previous dissenting votes
illustrate that part of the Court considers that less information about violations and
violators produces damage to the legal certainty, damage to procedural equity, and
damage in the quality of Court orders.
After all, at this stage, the restricted information is information about authorities’
(including scapegoats or agents of low-position) involvement in the case. Because of that
restriction, States have prevented – either entirely or to some extent – further damage to
their reputation that might otherwise come from being denounced in public hearings or
from the fact-finding of the Court. Then, AUTHORITIES remained free from the injurious

The Court restricted the proceedings once it has admitted the acquiescence in Trujillo Oroza,
supra 7, paras. 40 and 43; The Mapiripan Massacre, supra.7, para. 37; The Plan Sanchez, supra.7,
para. 46 (2).
115 Servellon Garcia, supra 7, paras. 2 and 3 (Cancado Trindade, J, sep. op.).
114
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consequences that the Court proceedings entailed regarding reputation and thereby
enjoyed a higher degree of legal impunity from responsibilities. The data shows that out
of 56 cases that have acquiescence, there are 25 with non-restricted information 116 and 31
with restricted information. 117

C.

Stage 3. Negotiation

States know that it is not enough to control the information about AUTHORITIES
on the proceedings because the Court retains the possibility to use less information or ask
for additional evidence before judging. States, in consequence, start a period of
negotiation to extend the control that they have acquired over the proceedings and to
persuade the Court not to include in its judgment information about AUTHORITIES.
States use negotiation to restrict the information in cases with authorities and without or
rejected requests or to reinforce the restriction in cases with accepted requests.
States use two types of actions to control the outcomes: statement and anticipatory
remedial actions (see below). This stage started with statements when requests were not
used or were rejected at Stage 2. States can skip the use of these declarations and propose
directly anticipatory remedial actions when the information that threatened
AUTHORITIES is altered by the admission of such requests.

Specifically, there are 7 cases in which States have opened the negotiation before requesting
(Garrido y Baigorria, supra 8, para. 28; Myrna Mack, supra 7, para. 10; Plan Sanchez Massacre, supra
7, para. 36-38; Molina Thiessen, supra 7, para. 7; Dos Erres Massacre, supra 7, para. 1; Radilla
Pacheco, supra 54, para. 57; Vargas Areco, supra 7, para. 10) since they expect the Court reduces the
proceedings. In 4 cases, States negotiate after request since the Court rejects their requests. In 3
cases, States negotiate without have requested and after the oral proceedings have closed (Gomez
Palominos, supra 7; Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, para. 44; Blanco Romero, supra 27) since the critical
information came to light against AUTHORITIES. In the 11 remaining, States negotiate since they
have not requested before.
117 The 31 cases are composed of 22 cases in which States have acquiesced and requested (the
restriction of information) with success and 9 additional cases in which the Court has restricted
information without requests.
116
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Actions of the States
There are two statements, statements of limited responsibility and nonintervention. In 38 cases, there are State statements, 21 of limited responsibility118 and 17
of non-intervention. 119 Moreover, there are two broad categories of anticipated
remediation those that consider individual and general obligations. Both described in
Chapter 2, Section B. There are in 48 cases, in which 14 anticipatory remedial actions are
individual, 12012 general, 121and 22 include both. 122 The judicial obligation is a general
obligation categorized as a promise since States are not working in correcting the
violation.

118 Albán Cornejo, supra 7, para. 10, 11; Baldeón-García, supra 7, para. 20; Blake, supra 8, para. 27;
Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz, supra 7, para. 5, 20; Escué Zapata v. Colombia
(Interpretation of Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 5 May 2008, Ser. C No. 178, para. 6; Kimel,
supra 7, para. 18; Maritza Urrutia, supra 43, paras. 6, 29; Ximenes-Lopes, supra 7, para. 36.
119 El Amparo, supra 8, para. 19; Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7, para. 54; Blanco Romero, supra 7,
paras. 27, 31; Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia (Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 29 January
1997, Ser. C No. 22, para. 23; Garrido y Baigorria, supra 8, para. 24; Gutiérrez Soler, supra 7, para. 26;
Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, para. 20; Molina-Theissen, supra 7, paras. 7, 22; Tiu Tojín, supra 7, para. 12;
Vargas-Areco, supra 7, para. 10.
120 Ticona Estrada, supra 7; Ibsen Cardenas, supra 7; Trujillo Orozca, supra 7; Valle Jaramillo, supra 7;
Tiu Tojin, supra 7; Juvenile Reeducation Institute, supra 7; Cantoral-Huamani, supra 7; La Cantura,
supra 7; Miguel Castro-Castro, supra 7; Cantoral Benavidez, supra 11; Montero Aranguren, supra 7;
Escue, supra 7; Kawas, supra 7; Servellon Garcia, supra 7.
121 Kimel, supra 7; Ximenes Lopes, supra 7; Palamara, supra 11; Almonacid Arellano v. Chile (Merits,
Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 September 2006, Ser. C No. 154; Las Palmeras, supra 7; Ticona,
supra 7; Zambrano Velez, supra 7; Chaparro Alvarez, supra 7; Carpio Nicolle, supra 7; Fernandez
Ortega, supra 7; Rosendo Cantu, supra 7; Velez Loor, supra 7; Goiburu, supra 7; Cantoral Huamani,
supra 7; La Cantuta, supra 7.
122 Gutierrez Soler, supra 7; Bulacio, supra 7; Garrido, supra 8; Rochela Massacre, supra 7; Ituango
Massacre, supra 7; Benavidez Cevallos, supra 7; Blake, supra 8; Bamaca, supra 27; Myrna Mack, supra
7; Plan Sanchez Massacre, supra 7; Molina Thiessen, supra 7; Dos Erres Massacre, supra 7; Chitay
Nech, supra 7; Campo Algodonero, supra 7; Radilla Pacheco, supra 54; Xakmok Kasek, supra 41;
Vargas Areco, supra 7; Barrios Altos, supra 7; Gomez Palominos, supra 7; Huilca Tecse, supra 7;
Amparo, supra 8; Blanco Romero, supra 47.
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a)

State statements

There are statements in 38 cases (21 on limited responsibility123 - and 17 nonintervention 124). The State statements include proclamations of limited responsibility and
assertions against Court intervention.
1) Statements of limited responsibility
Statements of limited responsibility are presented considering that the culpability
of AUTHORITIES can result from the act of acquiescence – and, even worse,
acquiescence can be used to extend their responsibility on broader issues or similar cases.
States avoid setting themselves up as a precedent for new claims, and they recall the
Court (after acquiescence and before the issuance of the judgment) that the merits of the
case require being limited to cover the effects of the admitted actions solely. The right of
the State to assure that the Court manages the information against AUTHORITIES with
limitations originated in that acquiescence is considered by the Court as a step toward the
progress of the case (see Stage 1 on praises of the Court) that legitimized all State actions
during the proceedings.
Regarding the reaction of the Court to these statements, the Court seems to
believe in a good faith discourse. In consequence, the Court mitigates the rigor of a future
obligation without fully realizing that an explicit declaration of responsibility is a tool

123 Albán Cornejo, supra 7 para. 10, 11; Baldeón-García, supra 7, para. 20; Blake, supra 8, para. 27;
Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz, supra 7 paras. 5, 20; Escué Zapata v. Colombia
(Interpretation of Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 5 May 2008, Ser. C No. 178, para. 6; Kimel,
supra 7, para. 18; Maritza Urrutia, supra 43, paras. 6, 29; Ximenes-Lopes, supra 7, para. 36.
124 El Amparo, supra 8, para. 19; Benavides-Cevallos, supra 7, para. 54; Blanco Romero, supra 7,
paras. 27, 31; Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia (Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 29 January
1997, Ser. C No. 22, para. 23; Garrido y Baigorria, supra 8 para. 24; Gutiérrez Soler, supra 7, para. 26;
Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, para. 20; Molina-Theissen, supra 7, paras. 7, 22; Tiu Tojín, supra 7, para. 12;
Vargas-Areco, supra 7, para. 10.

109

States employ to control outcomes. 125 Under this understanding, the Court will show
confidence in a clear statement that limits previous declarations of acquiescence, for
instance, noting that these acquiesced violations are not part of a pattern of HR
violations 126 or violence, 127 including paramilitary, promoted by State policies. 128

In 38 out of 56 cases, there is partial acquiescence. In the majority of these cases, States acquiesce
by justice’s violations i.e., by the violations of Articles 8 and/or 25 in connection with 1.1, of the
Convention. These justice’s violations relate to the order to prosecute authorities. The data shows
that out of 234 justice violations, 101 were acquiesced. In general, States’ failure to prosecute HR
violators and complied with only 4% of obligations that related with acquiesce of justice violations,
but this inaction is even more visible after States have made an explicit declaration of limitation
responsibility. Of the 514 violations categorized: as I noted 234 violations of justice violations, of
which 101 were accepted. The remaining is comprised by 196 violations of physical integrity, of
which 88 were accepted; 49 violations of political and civil rights, of which 18 were accepted; 35
violations of privacy and property, of which 10 were accepted. There is no trace of acquiescence for
social, economic or cultural violations.
I made a comparison between the complied obligations that registered partial acquiescence
and those that have registered total acquiescence. Of the sample, 32% of obligations with partial
acquiescence are complied, while 42% of obligations with full compliance are complied. The
difference could be explained since the average obligation for those accepted with partial is lesser
than those that registered total compliance (5 obligations v. 6) on average. Articles 8 and 25 in
relation to 1.1. are also the common violations accepted in cases with full acquiescence, however,
articles 4 and 7 of physical integrity category are additionally preferred.
126 Honduras rejects the existence of “systemic” abuses. Kawas-Fernández, supra 7, para. 19 (it
emphasized the absence of “broad pattern of violence against human rights defenders”) and LópezÁlvarez, supra 30, para. 57 (it denied that the role of community leader of the victim was the reason
for being murdered). The same in Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala (Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 4 September 2012. Ser. C No. 250, para. 18.
127 Honduras acquiesced in Servellón-García and Kawas cases, but it contends that State forces are
not or only liable for violence against street children in isolated incidents. Servellon Garcia, supra 7,
para. 3 (Cancado Trindade, J, sep. op.) (“the terms of the acknowledgment of the State’s responsibility
[…] expressly excludes “the existence of a context of alleged systematic violence of human rights,
both tolerated and consented” by the State (para. 16 and 54)”). Kawas-Fernández, supra 7, paras. 8,
18-9 (Honduras used a statement to leave clear that its early acquiescence cannot be extended
beyond its original terms. The statement denies that it had violated the deceased’s right to life, her
right to freedom of association, and her next of kin’s right to humane treatment. Honduras seeks to
avoid set its declarations on a precedent for at least five environmental activists murdered during the
decade that followed the death of Blanca Jeannette Kawas Fernandez (claims of other victims) by
rejecting “the impunity in the Kawas case generated a context of violence against
environmentalists.”) Similar it is visible in Escue Zapata, supra 7, paras. 11 and 12.
128 The Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 31 January 2006,
Ser. C No. 140, paras. 121 and 132 (Colombia asserted that the American Convention cannot be
unacceptable burden since for the State it is impossible to guarantee nonoccurrence of HR violations
since it needed to prioritizing public safety); Las Palmeras v. Colombia (Monitoring) ICHR, 4 August
2008, para. 20 and (Preliminary Objections) ICHR, 4 February 2000, Ser. C No. 67, para. 2 (Colombia
claimed its impossibility to fulfill the Court obligation to locate remains of victims since “entering [in]
the area became impossible due to severe disturbances of public order in the region.” It is a
declaration questionable since the proceedings demonstrated that the State attempted to cover State
forces implicated in the abuse (operation palermo) up by dressing the victims in uniforms so that the
125
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2) Nonintervention Statements
By nonintervention statements, States settled on language that includes justifying
the abuse, blaming and deflecting responsibility onto others and critiquing and impugning
victim or witnesses and the Court. States questioned the authority of the Court through a
rationalist discourse. States expect that the Court respect the nonintervention and
sovereignty principles avoiding the issuance of judgments that overreach their exclusive
right to prosecute AUTHORITIES. It is feasible that acquiescence along with
nonintervention statement is an overlapped way of stating that sovereignty allows States
to do, as they want and if they wish to protect their agents, they will. In this way, this
statement reminds the Court that its intrusiveness can justify noncompliance. This
statement is, of course, inconsistent with the sacrifice of sovereignty that States made by
ratifying the Convention and acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction (as explained in
Chapter 1). 129
Advancing in some illustrations, Panama’s executive asserted that the Court made
the obligations dependent on “non-existent and therefore inapplicable Panamanian
domestic law” and emphasized that the Court has no jurisdiction to intervene in its
domestic legal system nor to monitor competence. 130 Honduras declared that internal
procedures and rules prevail over the Court’s judgments. 131 Trinidad and Tobago
denounced the Court jurisdiction since the Court has no right to decide on the capital

event was viewed as a legitimate military operation against paramilitaries. The same pattern in
Rochela Massacre, supra 7, para. 70.
129 Kali Wright-Smith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (2011) PURDUE UNIVERSITY).
130 Baena, supra 9, para. 54 a); Baena (Competence) ICHR, 28 November 2003, Ser. C No. 104,
(November 28, 2003), para. 26.
131 Servellon, supra note 106; Kawas, supra note 107.
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punishment. 132 Barbados stated that the capital punishment is an affair unquestionable by
the Court given its reservation, moreover, capital punishment, as a rule, reflects the
decision of its people, and this is beyond question by the Court. 133
Peru and Venezuela accused the Court of violating the principle of nonintervention by alluding to judgments by its domestic Courts. These State statements
contributed to a strategy to retract acquiescence. In short, Peru claimed that the power to
sanction AUTHORITIES resided only in their national courts. 134 In Huilca Tecse case,
Peru informed that the agreement, signed for acquiescence, “[..i]mplied interference by
the Executive Power and violation of the independence and autonomy of autonomous
Constitutional bodies.” 135 In Castillo Petruzzi, Peru held that the Court’s order 136 usurps
the State's right to release criminals 137 and violates the State’s sovereignty to withdraw
recognition of the Court’s competency. 138 In the Loayza Tamayo, 139 Castillo Petruzzi
and the Tribunal Constitutional cases, the Peruvian Supreme Court of Military Justice

132 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, General Information of the Treaty: B-32, American
Convention, Trinidad and Tobago: Denunciation notified May 26, 1998. (Note that the original text of
the denouncement has been abridged “[t]he death penalty is the punishment for the crime of murder
in Trinidad and Tobago, [...] [Consequently] the State of Trinidad and Tobago hereby gives notice to
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States of the withdrawal of its ratification of
the American Convention on Human Rights.”)
133 Boyce v. Barbados (Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 20 November 2007, Ser. C No.
169, para. 166.
134 Constitutional Court v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), ICHR, 31 January 2001, Ser. C, No 71,
para. 47; Cantoral Benavides, supra 11, para. 46; La Cantuta, supra 7, para. 156.
135 Huilca-Tecse, supra 64, para. 30, 32
136 Castillo Petruzzi v Perú, Merits, Reparations and Cost, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, (May 30,
1999), at 67, Ratio Decidendi clause 14
137 Id., para. 216 (f)
138 Id., supra 26, at 24, par. 100 (a) (Sept. 4, 1998) (Peru's assertion that “the sovereign of the legal
organs of Peru cannot be modified much less rendered ineffective by any national, foreign, or
international authority”)
139 Loayza Tamayo v. Perú, Compliance with Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 60, (Nov. 17,
1999), at 3-4, par. 9. Loayza Tamayo v Perú, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33, (Sept. 17,
1997), at 2, par. 3 a) - f)
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said the ICHR’s decisions are unenforceable. 140 In Ivcher Bronstein and the Tribunal
Constitutional, withdrawing its acquiescence of the Court’s jurisdiction, the State
denounced the Convention on July 8, 1999. The ICHR ruled that States cannot withdraw
from its jurisdiction and remain a party to the Convention. Consequently, Peru revoked
its withdrawal on January 29, 2001.
Venezuela stated that the Court has no right to usurp the functions of domestic
Courts. 141 The nonintervention statements resulting from Venezuela are two. In Montero
Aranguren case, the State after an eloquent acquiecense, State’s refusal to acknowledge
the validity of the pre-existing friendly agreement producing a retraction of acquiescence
after the issuance of the 2006 judgment. 142 In Apitz, Barbera (Venezuela) case,
Venezuela claimed systematic persecution and violation of sovereignty by the ICHR’s
order to reinstate three disbarred national judges. The Constitutional Court of Venezuela
declares the judgment “unenforceable” 143 by citing the Castillo Petruzzi case (from
Peru). The Venezuela Court urged the Executive to denounce the Convention by the
“usurpation of functions”

144

(of the national assembly and electoral council) as if were a

colonial power, by trying to impose political judgments and ideologies on a sovereign
and independent nation incompatible with its constitutional system, and representing US
Castillo Petruzzi v Perú, Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 41, (Sept. 4, 1998), at 24, par.
100 (a)
141 Regarding the Case No. 08-1572, the Supreme Court of Justice, Constitutional Chamber, declared:
On December 4, 2008, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgment dated August 5, 2008,
which ordered reinstatement of former judges of the First Court of Administrative Disputes, among
other reparations, was submitted for interpretation. The Venezuelan Court declared the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights judgment “unenforceable” and requested that the “Executive
denounce the Convention in light of the obvious usurpation of powers committed by the Court […].”
142 Montero Aranguren , supra 78 para. 57-58. See Montero Aranguren v. Venezuela, No. 11.699,
Demanda, paras. 17, 23 (IACHR)
143 Case No. 08-1572, the Supreme Court of Justice, Constitutional Chamber, declared: the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights judgment “unenforceable.”
144 Case No. 08-1572, the Supreme Court of Justice, Constitutional Chamber, requested that the
“Executive denounce the Convention in light of the obvious usurpation of powers committed by the
Court […].”
140
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interests. 145 No material benefit from compliance exists for Venezuela. 146 Thus, after
openly questioning the needs of the ICHR, 147 the Convention was denounced on
September 10, 2012, and self-marginalized from the Inter-American HR System.
Examples of nonintervention statements came also from Argentina, 148 Colombia, 149 and
Brazil. 150
Regarding these statements, the Court could act consistently with the declared
State interests. However, usually, the ICHR continues the issuance of rulings that require
actions against AUTHORITIES. In this way, the Court seems (at first glance) to ignore
these statements since it refuses to settle for limited or soft judgments.
3) The use of statements
There is a tendency to use both statements after acquiescence and within the
monitoring of initial actions. In fact, 67% out of 56 cases with acquiescence contains one
of these two State statements. By using these statements States attempt to control the
proceedings and outcome under the logic of preserving areas of power they believe theirs.
Thus, it is not shocking that the discourse used on these two types of declarations points
poses a threat or a weak normative commitment that leaves the content of the given

Doug Cassel, will Chavez remove Venezuela from the Inter-American Commission? Opinio Juris
(blog), 11 may 2012, at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/11/chavez-removes-venezuela-from-iachr
(this is the latest move in the Bolivarian Republic’s long record of denouncing the Commission and
[the Court] as tools of US imperialism…)
146 Id.
147 In March 2013, the Venezuelan government was again campaigning to weaken the IACHR and
ICHR by threatening to pull out of the HRS if their modifications are not accepted. the CEJIL notes: [T]
he [Venezuelan] government has consistently taken an antagonistic position with regard to the InterAmerican System, has openly questioned the need to comply with the decisions of the Commission
and Court, and has failed to guarantee protection for human rights defenders, some of whom are
protected by precautionary and provisional measures, among others. Cejil, Activities Report 20032004, at 67, available at <http://www.cejil.org/labores.cfm>
148 Garrido and Baigorria, supra 66, para. 34
149 Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia (Merits) ICHR, 8 December 1995, Ser. C No. 22, para.
27
150 Ximenes Lopes, supra 31, para. 63 e)
145
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acquiescence without substance. Acquiescence becomes a concept devoid of meaning
since these statements obstruct the legal force of HR claims throughout the System 151
since States seem to assume the violation, but under the supposition that they will handle
the abuse internationally. Thereby, there is predictably a low rate of compliance. From
the start, a State can be perceived as illegitimate. In addition, the prior suggestion finds
support in the data in which the rate of compliance is 21%, thus, ostensibly lesser than the
remaining cases.
The previous discussion reiterates that a statement of the State is an option to
temper the rigor of a judicial obligation to the extent that it puts limitations on the
deliberations of the Court. States still retain the possibility to further action by repairing
before the issuance of a decision on merits. Thus, the process of negotiation can continue
or start with another action. Often, the next step for States is to propose anticipatory
remedial actions.
b)

Anticipatory remedial actions (hence ARA)

Anticipatory remedial actions are unilateral or bilateral, binding commitments of
the State given in advance of issuance of the judgment for controlling the intensity of
future obligations (see details in Chapter 2). On the one hand, these actions may serve to
counteract some reputational damage during the proceedings. On the other hand, they try
to mitigate the issuance of judicial obligations directed to investigate the responsibility of
AUTHORITIES. States hope the Court rewards their anticipated remediation by reducing
the cost for AUTHORITIES at the time, which will judge the case. The remediation may

Wright-Smith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 202. 2011.
151
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happen since the Court’s jurisprudence is consistent so as to allow the States to calculate,
more or less certainly, the type of demands that the Court pronounces. 152
There are variety of anticipatory remedial such as in Kimel (Argentina) case that
shows how the Court reacts before symbolic measure. The Court has “highly” valued that
the President led a public ceremony of acquiescence in the presence of more than six
ministers, the victim’s family and the press. 153 Court has not called for public hearings
like in other cases it did frequently to condemn that the State had not complied with the
judicial obligation to nullify the victim’s sentence. 154
Table 1 shows the number and compliance in cases in which there is an ARA. The
compliance of ARA obligations is compared with all of these instances. The table also
shows compliance of cases in which there was not an ARA. The table is confined to
illustrate those 56 cases with acquiescence in where States have proposed an ARA (see
table 1).
Table No. 2

56 cases with
acquiescence

44 with
authorities
12 without
authorities

# Of cases

% Of compliance
of ARA obligations

38 with ARA
6 without ARA
10 with ARA
2 without ARA

64.43%
60.3%
-

Overall compliance
in those cases
where there is an
ARA
29.3%
26.9%
-

Overall compliance
in those cases
where there is
NOT an ARA
12.8%
30%

Based on analyzed data, States are more enthusiastic to comply with obligations
that they have chosen for themselves or with which they agree to negotiate than those
imposed unilaterally by the Court. In fact, in the opposite direction of the presented
results that reveal that acquiescence does not increase compliance nor does it lead to a

Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 308. 2013.
Kimel v. Argentina (Monitoring), ICHR, 15 November 2010, considering paras. 14-17
154 Id., paras. 11-13.
152
153
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shorter and easier monitoring; anticipatory remedial actions always have a positive
impact on the compliance patterns.
The dissertation data suggests that when we restrict our attention only to cases
with acquiescence in which there are anticipatory remedial actions, the rate of
compliance increases eight points – to 29% (of the overall rate of 21%). Moreover, when
there is a restriction to observe anticipatory remedial actions solely and those obligations
ordered by the Court are discounted; 155 the compliance rate exceeds 64,43%.
Furthermore, States seem also highly predisposed to a prompt compliance with
their anticipatory remedial requirements. Indeed, States implement these remedies either
before the issuance of a judgment or within the 12 months on average from the issuance
date of the Judgment on Reparations. This finding is impressive since since States
generally implement Court obligations within 45 months (as shown in Part II). Thus, the
excessive time that each case is under monitoring came from those duties ordered by the
Court.
Regarding the reaction of the Court to these remedial actions, recall that the Court
takes on two roles that affect judgment compliance. 156 The judicial role based on the
Court’s issuance of decisions, and the political role based on the Court’s performance in
monitoring, as noted in Chapter 1. The Court considers the proposed remedy under its
judicial function. The analysis also suggests that since proposals of anticipated
remediation are submitted before the Court has issued its judgments, the Court is in an

I also discounting Peruvian anticipatory remedial actions since Peru systematically offers
anticipatory actions doing nothing then or withdraw them. Add Peru cases with remedial and
without compliance
156 Baena, supra 9, para. 68
155
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excellent position to incentivize these proposals. 157 At the time they were proposed, the
monitoring is still not opened. Moreover, the political role of the Court is also anticipated
since these proposals increase chances to negotiate forms of compliance. In this way, a
positive or negative reaction of the Court to face these proposals would be decisive to
determine the use of them. A positive appraisal would confirm the view that the Court
trusts that an anticipatory remedial action “is a sign of true advancement of HR.” 158 The
prior suggestion finds support in the data in which the Court adamantly praises those
(remedial) that are symbolic 159 like written, 160 oral or public 161 apologies presented in
hearings, moments of silence commemorating the victims, apologies for suffering,
condolences 162 and respect. 163
By reinforcing the previous actions (of Stages 1 and 2) with statements and
anticipatory remedial actions of this Stage, States makes the proceedings more
The Court can leverage that a high number of violated articles leads States to make concessions to
victims and comply with the anticipatory remedial action (%). And, that, according my results, lowrights context leads States to use the anticipatory remedial action as a means to avoid fully complying
with the judgment, thus, the use of anticipate remedial should be preferred in low-rights context;
however, some States prefer to negotiate even in high rights contexts since concession/remedial
provides a positive image to States. This support the idea that a concern by reputation is always
present in the State behavior and the role of the Court in manages the remedial can be fundamental.
158 Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 307. 2013.
159 There are 15 "symbolic" actions distributed among individual obligations. Also, symbolic actions
were included in 22 agreements on reparation El Amparo, supra 8, para. 19; Benavides-Cevallos,
supra 7, paras. 27, 35; Huilca-Tecse, supra 7, para. 44; Kimel, supra 7, para, 22; Molina-Theissen,
supra 7, paras. 7, 10, and 36; Tiu Tojín, supra 7, para. 5; Maritza Urrutia, supra 43, para.30; VargasAreco, supra 7, para. 10 and 46; Ximenes Lopes, supra 7, para. 76.
160 Trujillo Oroza, supra 7, para. 37 (Bolivia voluntarily accepted international responsibility for the
disappearance of the victim and informed the Court in the public hearing that it had sent a written
apologize to the victim’s family.)
161 Peru volunteered to publicly apologize to the victims in the Duran and Ugarte v. Peru
(Reparations and Costs), ICHR, 3 December 2001, Ser. C, No. 89, para 39 (b) and Barrios Altos v. Peru,
supra 7, para. 38.
162 In the public hearing before the Court, Guatemala expressed “its profound condolences for the
acts lived and suffered by the community of Plan de Sanchez [and asked] the pardon of the victims
[…] as a first sign of respect, reparation and the guarantee of non-repetition.” Plan Sanchez Masacre
at al. supra 7, para. 38
163 Colombia, during a public hearing before the Court, expressed “its deep respect and sympathy for
the victims of the acts that took place in Mariparan in July 1997, and it evoke[d] their memory to
States its regret and to apologize to their next of and to Colombian society.” Mapiripan Massacre,
supra 7, para. 314.
157
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predictable. In advance, we know that the central objective of States is to control the
outcome of the trial, to achieve it – States need influence the deliberations of the Court.
The way in which the Court reacts to different State actions carried out during the first
three stages suggests that State proposals are an opportunity to address and resolve HR
violations within a dialogic process of discussion in a good-faith context. Indeed, from
my analysis, it is possible to assert that the Court sets in relevant consideration all those
proposals by which States have voluntarily expressed some commitment, even more than
concrete actions. In fact, focusing on those 44 (out of 56) cases that have acquiescence
along with AUTHORITIES, 4 end without judicial obligation, 164 14 with judicial
obligation but without information about AUTHORITIES. The answer in these 18 cases is
positive due to the Court mitigating the rigor of its rulings. 165 However, the remaining 26
have judicial obligation and information on AUTHORITIES. These 26 cases imply that
the Court refuses to settle for soft judgments and has ignored State interests.

164

Dismissed Congressional Employees, supra. 39 and Ricardo Canese. v. Paraguay, supra. 30.

It is important to take into consideration that the Court in 6 additional cases
ordered to prosecute domestically the criminal responsibility, but not the
institutional, administrative, disciplinary or civil responsibilities. (see Myrna Mack v.
165

Guatemala, paras. 271-275 and considering 5; Dos Erres v. Guatemala, paras. 231-236 and
considering 8 and 9; Servellon v Honduras, paras. 192-196, considering 8; Radilla v. Mexico, paras.
329-334, considering 8; Goiburu v. Paraguay, paras. 123-132 and 164-166, considering 5; La Cantuta
v. Peru, paras. 224-228 and considering 9.) Thus, AUTHORITIES can retain their positions

without paid pecuniary for their responsibilities. In consequence, the rigor of the
judicial obligation increases when there is not acquiescence. For instance, in the
Garibaldi (Brazil) case, there is no acquiescence and the intensity applied by the
Court in its obligation to prosecute was extended to functional misconduct: “the
State must investigate [also] and, if appropriate, punish possible functional
misconduct committed by the public officials in charge of the investigation.” (See

Garibaldi v. Brazil, Judgment of September 23, 2009, (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs)
para. 169). Moreover, the Court emphasized concerning these public officials

“whether they be police agents, members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, judges or
general public officials.” (see Id., para. 169).
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D.

Stage 4. Monitoring

Stage 3 concludes the adjudication process, in stage 4 the monitoring process
begins (after the issuance of judgments). From the beginning States know that intense
monitoring may be costly for AUTHORITIES and that when they acquiesced, the Court
would reward them with later and less severe (in frequency and number) monitoring
actions than when they do not acquiesce, as it explained in Part II. The use of demands
for compliance is, for example, postponed within this diminished control.
States can leverage this diminished monitoring in the 26 acquiescence cases
where AUTHORITIES were not protected from Court-recognized culpability for HR
violations suffer a damaged reputation and are exposed to judicial prosecution. States, in
consequence, use two types of actions to bar the prosecution of their AUTHORITIES.
First, States take the (costless) step of complying, albeit slowly, with those obligations
that do not involve AUTHORITIES (or non-judicial obligations). Secondly, they attempt
to exonerate the authority of guilt and to block the prosecution.
1.

Court actions
a)

Diminished monitoring as reward

The Court could act pragmatically at the moment to decide to monitor compliance
and control intensely States that have acquiesced. However, the Court decides that only
States that have not acquiesced will be monitored intensely with early demands for
compliance. The Court undercuts the method of control when it favors States that exhibit
acquiescence. The data provides evidence that the Court rewards States that have
acquiesced with diminished monitoring. The issuance and frequency of the monitoring
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judgments differentiate from a diminished control. Table 2 notes the data on these actions
on cases without and with acquiescence.
Table No. 3

Criteria

Type of Cases

Time/Frequency/Number

1st Monitoring
Judgment

Nonacquiescence
Acquiescence

1 year and 9 months or less

# Of cases without
and with
acquiescence
38 of 62

3 years and 3 months or more than 3,3

37 of 56

Nonacquiescence
Acquiescence

Every 1 year and 6 months or less

38 of 62

Every 2 years and 6 months or more than
this
5 or more than 5 monitoring judgments

37 of 56

3 or less monitoring judgments

43 of 56

Frequency monitoring

Number of monitoring

Nonacquiescence
Acquiescence

40 of 62

A reason to diminish monitoring actions in acquiescence cases is that the Court
concludes that it cannot demand too much of States that, even in the absence of
enforcement mechanism, have voluntarily assumed a commitment to their statements of
acquiescence. The Court also believes that States that have acquiesced intend to monitor
their actions and obligations in good faith. Consequently, the Court expects that these
States translate their acquiescence into a “prompt and effective compliance” 166 with
Court obligations. Based on this presumption, the Court sees that acquiescence
economizes the costly processing volume of requests to enforce judgments. 167
A diminished monitoring would affect the amount of compliance, as was
discussed earlier, and is also corroborated by the fact that States move toward compliance
during the first eighteen months of monitoring. 168 Thus, if monitoring starts after three

Montero Aranguren, supra 6, para. 7
Supra, 71
168 When we compare compliance levels for States that began monitoring after 18 months with those
that began after 60 months, States move toward compliance on 60% of its obligations within the first
18 months. When monitoring begins belatedly, States achieved an equivalent percentage, but took
twice as long as those monitored within 18 months. It is important to harness the momentum that
follows the judgment on reparations and costs since compliance becomes slow and long when the
166
167
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years on average (see table 2) producing timely compliance is an almost impossible task.
Indeed, cases with acquiescence for which monitoring began between 63-74 months had
been open for 18 years as of 2010. 169
Thus, when the monitoring starts late, the Court actions to control compliance and
counteract noncompliance also applies late. In effect, the discourse of the Court is weak if
it is used in the process of diminished monitoring and after concrete actions - such as the
preparation of means to exonerate AUTHORITIES of guilt and obstacles of law to face
prosecution – uncovered the goal of the State to give protection to their high
AUTHORITIES.
b)

Demands for compliance as punishment

The Court uses demands for compliance as threats to convince and direct the State
to comply, particularly, with judicial obligation. The Court appeals to commitments,
values, and ideals of States toward the Inter-American HR System. The Court
idealistically again expects (as it showed in previous stages) that States that signal
commitments by acquiescence would be inclined to respond to reputational messages in
which their “underperform” is naming and shaming. Indeed, these demands mention the
use, meaning, and time elapsed between acquiescence and noncompliance. Accordingly,
Court allows the opportunity to pass. According to my compliance records for the 37 reported
obligations that were first monitored within 18 months and the 14 that were first monitored after 60
months the tendency is as follows: For obligations that were monitored before eighteen months, the
compliance rate is 19%, the noncompliance rate is 38% and the rate of unresolved issues of
compliance (that registered some steps toward compliance) is 43%. For those that were monitored
after 60 months, the compliance rate is 21%, the noncompliance rate is 37% and the rate of
unresolved issues of compliance is 42%. The cases and countries that were monitored within 18
months are: Huilca Tecse and Durand Ugarte, from Peru (18 and 11, respectively), Aptiz from
Venezuela (16 months), Hilarie from Trinidad (17 months), Serrano Sisters from El Salvador (18
months) and Baena from Panama (16 months). The cases and countries for which monitoring began
later are listed in the following footnote.
The cases and countries that were monitored after 60 months are: Neira Alegria from Peru (74
months), El Amparo from Venezuela (74 months), Caballero Delgado from Colombia (70 months),
Benavides Cevallos from Ecuador (65 months) and Garrido from Argentina (63 months)
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they seek to push States to comply by recalling, "State acknowledgment of international
responsibility must translate into a prompt and effective compliance." 170 Moreover, the
Court stresses that "the real symbolic value that the [acquiescence] has as a guarantee of
non-repetition of such serious facts in the future." 171 Further, the Court emphasizes the
value of acquiescence as “remedy” 172 that benefits the victims per se.
For example, in cases like Molina Theissen, Tiu Tojín, El Amparo and Montero
Aranguren, the Court said: “[…t]he initial reparative value that acknowledgment may
have for the victims and their next-of-kin fades as time goes by if the State authorities fail
to take action and do not repair the damage caused.” 173
Particularly for judicial obligations, in Vargas Areco, the Court states “become
apparent that more than 20 years after the extrajudicial execution of the child Vargas
Areco and four years after the notification of the Judgment under supervision, there has
been no progress with the implementation […].”174

Trujillo Oroza, supra 56 para.51; Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (Monitoring) ICHR, 08 July
2009, para. Considering 4; Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia (Monitoring) ICHR, 30 June 2009, considering
4; Theissen v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 16 November 2009, para. 18; Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala
(Monitoring) ICHR, 16 May 2011, para. 11; Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru
(Monitoring) ICHR, 28 April 2009, para. 7; et al, supra 6, para. 7; El Amparo, supra 44, paras.13-4;
Blanco Romero v. Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR, 22 November 2011, paras. 40 (1).
171 Case of Montero Aranguren, supra 6, Considering Clause 7; Case of Molina Theissen, Id.
Considering Clause 18; Case of Tiu Tojín, Id. Considering Clause 11; and Case of El Amparo, Id,
Considering Clause 4. In addition, see Gutiérrez Soler, supra 7, para. 26 No5 (5. Understands that this
acknowledgment of liability is in itself an act of satisfaction towards the victim and his next of kin.)
and para. 92 (b) ([…]The State requests that the acknowledgement of liability pronounced at the seat
of the Court be deemed an act of public apology […])
172 Case of Montero Aranguren, supra 6 Considering Clause 7; Case of Molina Theissen, Id,
Considering Clause 18; Case of Tiu Tojín, Id. Considering Clause 11; and Case of El Amparo, supra 8,
Considering Clause 4. In addition, see Gutiérrez Soler, supra 7, para. 26 No5 (5. Understands that this
acknowledgment of liability is in itself an act of satisfaction towards the victim and his next of kin.)
and para. 92 b) ([…]The State requests that the acknowledgement of liability pronounced at the seat
of the Court be deemed an act of public apology […])
173 Montero Aranguren, supra 142 Considering Clause 7; Molina Theissen, supra 163, Considering
Clause 18; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala (Monitoring) 16 May 2011, Considering Clause 11; and El
Amparo, supra 162 Considering Clause 4.
174 Vargas Areco v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 24 November 2010, para 9
170
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The analyzed data shows that there are no meaningful changes in the behavior of
States toward compliance, after the issuance of demands for compliance. Specifically,
77% of those cases with acquiescence - in which demand for compliance was used - are
stalled in unresolved issues of compliance. It is unnecessary to distinguish between cases
with or without acquiescence since in both types of cases the demands have registered
similar outcomes - around 20% of non-resolved issues of compliance (on average).
However, there are differences in the numbers of demands that the Court needs to issue
(see table 3).
The results demonstrate that demands are applied three times more in cases with
acquiescence (i.e. with diminished control) than those in which the Court monitors a case
intensely. The late application of these demands is severe; the data shows that the Court,
in instances in which the State acquiesced, issued demands more than four years on
average from the issuance date of the Judgment on Reparations and Costs, instead of two
years on average for States that have not acquiesced. By this tardiness, the Court does not
pay attention to the beginning of the process and does not control initial States inaction.
The Court loses, in consequence, its opportunity to issue effective demands since the data
suggests that States are less interested in the progress of the case, maybe because public
interest wanes as the years pass while the impunity sets firm roots.
Table 3 summed the number of demands on average and the time elapsed before
the Court uses them in the Court cases.

56 cases with
acquiescence

44 with authorities

4 without judicial
obligation
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2

Time before
demand

Demand on
average

Table No. 4

28

months
40 with judicial
obligation

12 without
authorities 175

62 cases without
acquiescence

15 with authorities

47 without authorities

2.

14 without
authorities
information
26 with authorities
identified

10
14

6 without judicial
obligation
6 with judicial
obligation

4

3 without judicial
obligation
12 with judicial
obligation
33 without judicial
obligation
14 with judicial
obligation

4

4

3
6
3

45
months
48
months
19
months
40months
26
months
17
months
38
months
19
months

States actions

The fact that States leverage diminished monitoring, however, is not enough to
control damage mainly because the Court retains the issuance of its demands for
compliance. States, in consequence, use two actions to block the prosecution of their
AUTHORITIES. First, States take the (costless) step of complying, albeit slowly, with
those obligations that do not involve AUTHORITIES (or non-judicial obligations), while
still protecting AUTHORITIES by deflecting the pressure from the duty to comply with
the judicial obligation. The other action is the interposition of means to exonerate the
authority of guilt and obstacles of law for blocking the prosecution. The use of these
actions is determined by how well the first strategies worked. For instance, from the
success of other strategies (like remedial actions), the Court can issue a judgment without
information regarding AUTHORITIES or eliminate pieces about their possible
incrimination. In these cases, States must not need means to exonerate guilt or obstacles

Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Monitoring) ICHR, 8 February 2008, para. 54;
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Monitoring) ICHR, 8 February 2008, para. 49, decides
1.
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of law. When the Court did not consider actions of the previous Stages, this stage starts
with non-judicial compliance.
The use of these actions is determined by how well the first strategies worked. For
instance, from the success of other prior strategies (like remedial actions), the Court
issues judgments without information regarding AUTHORITIES or eliminating pieces
about their possible incrimination. In these cases, States could not need means to
exonerate guilt or obstacles of law to protect AUTHORITIES. Accordingly, when the
Court did not deliberate based on actions of previous Stages; this stage starts with nonjudicial compliance.
a)

Compliance with non-judicial obligations

The existence of political concerns such as providing protection to
AUTHORITIES seems to determine the rate of compliance of non-judicial obligations,
like financial reparations and symbolic measures. 176 States will report high compliance
with non-judicial obligations to project a positive image that helps to clean up the
tarnished reputation of AUTHORITIES while deflecting attention from complying with
with judicial duty. The dynamic of State institutions facilitates compliance with nonjudicial obligations. In fact, States, more specifically, their executives, that are invoked to
comply with non-judicial obligations, are concerned about reputation and perform this
task since they are charged with foreign relations and the State’s international standing.
Thus, it is unsurprising that executives will be willing to compensate the victims for
damages caused and reduce domestic contingency with symbolic gestures.

Both are individual obligations and they often show high compliance. This was the reason to
consider them.

176

126

Indeed, the data seems to corroborate that when the AUTHORITY is identified in
the Court judgment, States are inclined to comply with non-judicial obligations to offset
the pressure to meet with another complex type of obligation such as judicial. States
calculate then, the cost of such decision based on protecting AUTHORITIES. In fact, in
those 26 cases in which their AUTHORITIES involved were identified the rate of
compliance reaches 61% of compliance to non-judicial obligations and only the 12% of
judicial obligations (see table 4). It also possible that States seek to restrict the
reputational damage of the State or its authorities when deflecting the attention from the
failure to comply with judicial obligation.
Concerning non-judicial obligations, there are 119 non-judicial (particularly,
financial reparations and symbolic measures) and 51 judicial obligations distributed in
the 40 of those 56 cases with acquiescence. Regarding those cases in which the ICHR
judgment contains information of high officials, the rate of compliance with non-judicial
obligations is 61%. This rate is better compared with the rate of cases in which the
information about leading AUTHORITIES implicated is missing. In fact, in those cases
in which there is no information in the judgment to incriminate AUTHORITIES, the rate
reaches to 46% (see table 4). States are inclined to comply with both judicial and notobligations when AUTHORITIES were not identified in narratives of the Court
judgment. This tendency is also corroborated by the very similar rate of compliance of
46% and 55% for judicial and not- obligations of cases in which the Court did not
identify the name of AUTHORITIES. Indeed, the data reveals a tendency by which once
the Court omitted information of the senior officials in its narratives, the rate of
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compliance decreases since States do not need exhibit a positive image to recover
reputation for high AUTHORITIES.
In general, these results corroborate that States retain the same goal, namely,
protect AUTHORITIES during the monitoring process. Table 4 presents the compliance
with non- and judicial obligations restricted to 40 out of 56 cases with acquiescence.
These 40 cases have judicial obligation only. These cases are separated between those
without/with authorities as well without/with judicial obligation.
Table No. 5
40 with judicial obligation of 56
cases with acquiescence

14 without
authorities
information

Non-judicial remedies

26 with authorities
identified

Non-judicial remedies

Judicial remedies

Judicial remedies

# Obligations
with compliance
22 of 47
obligations
5 of 19
obligations
46 of 76
obligations
4 of 32
obligations

% Of
compliance
46%
55%
61%
12%

FIGURE D.
70
60

61
55

50
40

46

30
20
10
0

12
% compliance of 14 cases without
authorities identified

% of compliance of 26 cases with
authorities identified

non-judicial remedies

46

61

judicial remedies

55

12

128

b)

The use of exculpatory means

The delay in starting the monitoring process facilitates the preparation of evidence
of innocence and interposition of means to exonerate AUTHORITIES of guilt. Means to
exonerate the guilt are a group of actions by which the domestic criminal processes have
not typically developed until its completion. These actions are: acquittals, shelving the
case, derisory punishments, pending resources, excessive delayed. Out of 56 cases with
acquiescence, 15 allegations were submitted amidst 40 cases in where there are
AUTHORITIES and judicial obligations. The remaining 16 cases do not contain these
types of allegations, as they do not have AUTHORITIES. Regarding those 62 cases
without acquiescence, States used 3 exonerates.
Elaborating on law obstacles, they are a justification for abuse and a deflection of
responsibility. Prescription, 177 non in bis in idem 178 and amnesty laws 179 are law
obstacles commonly used despite the Court reiterated to States that no mechanism for
precluding responsibility that may be used to fail to comply or delay compliance with the
judicial obligation. 180 Out of 56 cases with acquiescence, 22 law obstacles were used
amidst 40 cases in where there are AUTHORITIES and judicial obligations. Regarding
those 62 cases without acquiescence, States used 13 obstacles of law. These results
Trujillo Orozca v. Bolivia, supra 57 considering para. 4(e); Bueno Alves v. Argentina (Monitoring)
ICHR, 5 July 2011, considering paras. 21-23 (prescription or statute of limitations is invoked to avoid
criminally prosecuting those responsible for HR abuses, claiming that the deadline for doing so has
past)
178 La Cantuta, supra 7 para. 180; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 August 2010,
considering para. 14; Carpio Nicolle, supra 7, para. 132. (The principle of non in bis in idem (double
jeopardy or res judicata) is another commonly States argument for failing to uphold a judicial
obligation)
179 Vargas Areco v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 30 October 2008, para 20; Almonacid Arellano,
supra 98 para. 111, (domestic amnesty laws that attempt to bar the prosecution of certain crimes
occurred during a specific period of a State’s history is another common argument) (Crimes against
humanity give rise to the violation of a series of undeniable rights that are recognized by the
American Convention, which violation cannot remain unpunished)
180 Vargas Areco, supra 7, para. 156; Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra ,7 para. 156.
177
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corroborate that when there is acquiescence, there are AUTHORITIES and States make
major efforts to protect them that in cases without acquiescence (see table 5).
The data reveals that 46 cases of 56 cases with acquiescence have one of these
two actions (means to exonerate or law obstacles). The conclusion is that both constitute
a strategy to protect AUTHORITIES in cases with acquiescence. The data also serves to
confirm that the strategy did work perfectly since only eight (out of 155) leading
AUTHORITIES received condemnation. There are 55 condemnations (out of 1253) to
those implicated in their condition of non-AUTHORITIES (like civilian or agents,
paramilitaries, militaries and polices forces). Regarding those 62 cases without
authorities, there are five (out of 43) leading AUTHORITIES that received condemnation
(see table 5). There are 20 condemnations (out of 143) to those implicated in their
condition of non-AUTHORITIES. These results suggest that in the domestic dynamic of
protection there are often judges and officials who provide protection for themselves or
ensure a future protection for their own negligence, omissions or institutional
responsibility.
The Court recognized that the three branches of Government manipulate legal and
constitutional devices to impede (often) compliance with the judicial obligation by using
law obstacles. 181 The fact is that it is the State itself (through branches of the States,
military and police forces) who bars the justice to give protection to AUTHORITIES.
This fact leads the Court to point out that compliance with the judicial obligation must be
focused on the investigation, prosecution, arrest, trial, and conviction of those persons
that are responsible for the facts and the violation of the rights protected by the American

181

La Cantuta, supra 7, para. 143.
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Convention, 182 both as perpetrators and as instigators of the events. 183 The Court
indicates that such investigations and proceedings need to be directed at the then highestranking government officers, from the President to high military and intelligence ranks,
as well as current and former members of governments. 184
The data shows that in those 56 cases with acquiescence and 62 cases without it –
judiciary, police and military are who provide more protection rather the other branches.
Regarding the participation of the executive, in 62 cases without acquiescence they have
a reduced participation. The less participation of executives in cases without
acquiescence is precisely explainable in that these cases have fewer AUTHORITIES to
be protected.
Table 5 (below) details the use of exculpatory means and the AUTHORITIES and
implicates in Court cases along with information about institutions that performed the
protection.
Table No. 6

56 cases with
acquiescence

12 without

6 without

3

Legislative

3

Executive office

-

-

-

-

-

-

799

1

20

10

1

Police and
military forces

2

Non-authorities

0

21

12

14

131 186

433 187

31

16

16

1

0

0

-

-

-

-

-

-

Almonacid Arellano, supra 98, para. 111
Id, para. 111
184 La Cantuta, supra 7, para. 147
185 Including prosecutors.
186 Executive (21); Military (85); Judiciary (40) Prosecutor (4); Legislative (2)
187 Civil (352); Military (265); Police (615)
182
183
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Institution providing
protection
Judiciary 185

14 without
authorities
information
26 with
authorities
identified

High-ranking
authorities

4 without
judicial
obligation
40 with
judicial
obligation

Law obstacles

44 with
authorities

Authorities and
3th implicated

Exonerates

Defense

authorities 188

judicial
obligation
6 with
judicial
obligation
SUBTOTAL

15 with
authorities

62 cases
without
acquiescence

47 without
authorities

3 without
judicial
obligation
12 with
judicial
obligation
33 without
judicial
obligation
14 with
judicial
obligation
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL

0

3

3*

21 189

3

-

-

-

15
1

22
0

155
-

1253
-

35
-

46
-

26
-

2
-

2

8

34 190

108 191

9

5

5

0

0

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

0

3

9*

35 192

10

14

-

-

3
18

13
35

43
198

143
1396

19
54

19
65

5
31

0
2

N: 198 high-ranking authorities.
*They were not categorized under cases with AUTHORITIES since they seem with potential participation in the HR
abuse as high-ranking and their participation was dismissed at the beginning of the proceedings (or was uncertain).

The presented results (see figure below) support the view that, the presence of
AUTHORITIES in cases with acquiescence is markedly high and that fact coincides with
a major use of exculpatory means and major level of institutional protection in
comparison to cases without acquiescence and authorities.

Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Monitoring) ICHR, 8 February 2008, para. 54;
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Monitoring) ICHR, 8 February 2008, para. 49,
decidendi 1.
189 These cases registered two convictions
190 Executive (8); Military (22); Judiciary (3); Prosecutor (1)
191 Civil (10); Military-Paramilitary (98)
192 These cases registered 5 convictions
188
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FIGURE E.
56 ACQUIESCENCE CASES

62 NON-ACQUIESCENCE CASES

1253

155
15 3

22 13

43

143

35 19

46 19

26 5

2

0

The presented data shows that, because of a diminished monitoring, a late
application of demands and the fact that prosecutions are prevented by domestic ways
during the monitoring, the protection of AUTHORITIES prevails as a State goal that
makes ineffective to move States away from noncompliance. 193 Indeed, in the 26 cases
(out of 56) acquiescence cases, where AUTHORITIES continue to be exposed to judicial
prosecution, States use strategic compliance of non-judicial obligation and exculpatory
means in 14 cases. There are yet 12 cases where AUTHORITIES were not protected
from potential prosecutions. Meanwhile, the Court continues to defend its goal of
prosecuting by sanctioning the insufficiency to comply with judicial obligations.

Nevertheless, undeniable attempts at prosecution, though unsatisfactory, have been made in a
handful of cases. Castillo Paez v. Peru (Monitoring), ICHR, 3 April 2009, considering para. 8; Myrna
Mack Chang v. Guatemala (Monitoring), ICHR, 16 November 2009, considering para. 8; Las Dos Erres
Massacre v. Guatemala (Monitoring), ICHR, 6 July 2011, para. 14

193

133

E.

Stage 5. Sanctioning

At this stage, the AUTHORITIES in the 12 remaining acquiescence cases are at
risk since after the application of demands for compliance the Court continues to defend
its goal of prosecuting by sanctioning the State insufficiency to comply with judicial
obligations by two measures. The Court overreaches its quasi-judicial review function
and reports the noncompliance case to another body to move States away from
noncompliance. The Court enforces lately these cases in comparison with those cases
without acquiescence.
Before starting with the Court strategy it is worth nothing that, in general, there
are not striking differences in the numbers of enforcement measures used incases with
and without acquiescence. However, they differ in their results because States that have
acquiesced (in these 12 cases) do nothing toward compliance (see Table 7 below).
1.

The Court enforcement strategy

States have complied with non-judicial obligations, as was reported during Stage
4. However, States have ignored most of the demands for compliance that the Court has
issued in the past Stage 4, especially regarding judicial obligations, registering few steps
towards compliance. The Court performs, then, a strategy of sanctioning to force States to
rearrange priorities and meet the Court expectations regarding compliance. The Court
focuses on managing consequences by overreaching and reporting.
The measures of enforcement are virtually ineffective sanctions to take on severe
obstacles to compliance. They are ineffective method since the Court resolves to apply a
diminished follow-up process to the acquiescence and since these measures are used very
late in the monitoring process. These measures also lack the necessary legitimacy since
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they appear to be applied arbitrarily. The situation of these measures is further worsened
due to lack of endorsement from the system’s political bodies. In this way, they are
toothless measures.
The use of these measures (at least initially) seems unnecessary for the Court.
States were rewarded with the control over their actions (i.e., a diminished monitoring)
considering their strong normative commitment, as Stage 4 demonstrated. A diminished
monitoring entails that the Court resettles part of its control faculties on States. In this
way, the Court appears to view the utilization of a procedure of "reporting" the case to
another body if the State does not comply with the judgment, as something distant.
Although the Court refrains from using these measures in an original way, an
interesting result is that the Court ended reporting seven instances with acquiescence to
the GA of the OAS – regarding those 12 cases in which State strategies to protect their
authorities had not been successful. Specifically, in all of them, States have used means
to exonerate the guilty. However, States have not used law obstacles to block
prosecutions yet. These law obstacles prevent AUTHORITIES from being subject to
domestic sanctions in a permanent way. This practice of reporting to OAS is also used
with cases without acquiescence (in 15 cases out of these 62 cases). Table 6 below
compiles information of enforcement measures regarding all cases.
Reporting to OAS is, however, a very late measure. They are late since before
reporting the case to the OAS, the Court applies measures of overreach that alters the
obligation judicial to include new intrusive actions. 194 The Court used these kind of
enforcements in more than one time in each case.

194

See details in methodology and illustrations in the next chapter
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For instance, in Molina-Theissen (Guatemala) case, the Court issued on July 3,
2004 a judgment on reparations and costs ordered Guatemala to locate the mortal remains
of Marco Molina-Theissen and to prosecute the responsible parties of its death. Five
years later, the Court expanded these two obligations through a monitoring judgment:
submit a schedule listing the steps to be taken, potential dates, institutions or persons in
charge, the administrative and budgetary actions. In addition, the Court called for
cooperation between various State institutions, ordering the State incorporate the case, as
soon as possible, into the studies and actions carried out by two State institutions. 195
States that have acquiesced seem disinclined to enforce these new measures since
they risk their AUTHORITIES. Acquiescence States exhibit major noncompliance with
the judicial obligation; thus, the Court uses these measures of overreaching considerably.
The data that shows that 80% of these overreaching measures are applied to cases with
acquiescence (16 out of 20 cases in which they were implemented) supports the previous
suggestions. In the 62 cases without acquiescence, there are only four cases with
overreaching (see table 6). States would also be disinclined since the Court affirms that
during the monitoring it only can verify compliance and no facts. 196 The reason is that
the Court can only determine States liability without punishing perpetrators 197 since
individual criminal liability is reserved for domestic courts. 198
For example, in Carpio Nicolle (Guatemala) case, the Court enlisted five extra
duties destined to reinforce the original judicial obligation when the State needs to
conduct investigation into an extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary execution must a)
Molina Theissen, supra 163, paras. 25-33, decidendi 2-3
Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (Monitoring), ICHR, 9 July 2009, para. 10
197 Constitutional Court v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), ICHR, 31 January 2001, Ser. C, No 71,
para. 47; Cantoral Benavides, supra 11, para. 46.
198 La Cantuta, supra 7, para. 156.
195
196
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identify the victim; b) recover and preserve evidentiary material related to the death; c)
identify possible witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death under
investigation; d) determine the cause, manner, location and time of death, as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death, and e) distinguish between
natural death, accidental death, suicide and homicide. In addition, it is essential that a
thorough investigation of the crime scene be conducted and rigorous autopsies and
analyses of human remains be performed by competent professionals and using the most
appropriate procedures. 199
Given the prior application of overreaching actions, when the Court decides to
report the OAS, these enforcement measures took 5 years on average from the issuance
date of the Judgment of Reparations and Costs (see details in table below). The tardiness
on the use of the measure of reporting makes it lose strength to run adequately. In fact,
the Court members of the ICHR have warned that the method of reporting to the OAS
can be ineffective. These members believe that "the Court, must make [the cases] known
to the GA of the OAS," 200 more frequently. They use their dissidence in the monitoring
judgments to put pressure on the use of reporting by appealing to the rest of ICHR
members and others at higher levels in the Inter-American HR System organization to
report to the GA and political bodies the instances of noncompliance. 201 There are nine
appellations; five came from acquiescence cases, 202 however, regardless of their good

Carpio Nicolle v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 1 July 2009, para. 18
Servellon Garcia, (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 November 2011, paras. 18 and 23 (Vio Grossi, J, sep. op)
201 Case with acquiescence: Amparo, supra 150 (48 months); Caballero, supra 148 (48 months). Case
without acquiescence: Aptiz, supra 150 (3 months); Hilaire, supra 150 (3 months).
202 Vio Grossi Eduardo, J, sep. op. in the following cases: El Amparo (Monitoring) ICHR, 20 February
2012, para. 1 and 20 November 2015, para. 14; Blanco Romero, supra 143, para. 1 and (Monitoring),
ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Caballero Delgado (Monitoring) ICHR, 27
February 2012, para.1; Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra 149, para.1; Saramaka People, supra 149,
199
200
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faith, these petitions did not translate into measures of enforcement yet since ICHR
members remain without consensus. 203
The table 6 below exhibits the measures of enforcement applied to all 118 cases
along with the average time in which were used by the Court.
2.

State reactions: producing Noncompliance

As it was mentioned above, the Court applies these measures of enforcement on a
case-by-case basis. By doing so, the Court may single out specific targets. However, it
risks being perceived or accused of arbitrarily singling out weak States to do it arbitrarily
or “unfairly” 204 or be accused of that. Not all States view the Court as a legitimate,
unbiased arbiter of justice. In fact, a mass of weak States believes the Court judgment
attacks their autonomy to prosecute their AUTHORITIES. These States hold that the
ICHR is usurping the functions as if were a colonial power. 205 States also assume that
the Court represents the interests of powerful States, saying that its judgments are
threatening States’ sovereignty and serving U.S. ‘imperialist’ interests. 206

para. 1 and (Monitoring) 23 November 2011, decidendi 2; Servellón García (Monitoring) ICHR, 22
November 2011, paras. 1 and 2.
203 Compare Servellon Garcia, (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 November 2011, para. 7 (Garcia-Sayan, J, sep.
op., against sending report) with paras. 18 and 23 (Vio Grossi, J, sep. op, favoring sending report)
204 Oded Löwenheim, Examining the State: a Foucauldian perspective on international ‘governance
indicators’, 29 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY (2008) cited in Kelley & Simmons, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, 57 (2015).
205 Doug Cassel, Will Chavez remove Venezuela from the Inter-American Commission? Opinio Juris
(blog), 11 may 2012, at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/11/chavez-removes-venezuela-from-iachr
(this is the latest move in the Bolivarian Republic’s long record of denouncing the Commission and
[the Court] as tools of US imperialism…) Corte IDH Blog: Tribunal Supremo Venezolano declara
“Inejecutable” la sentencia de la Corte IDH dictada en caso Lopez Mendoza. Available at
http:/corteidhblog.blogspot.com/
206 Id.
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Table No. 7

12 without
authorities
210

56 cases
with
acquiescence

62 cases
without

Overreaches

Appealing

Reporting

207

208

209

6 without judicial
obligation
6 with judicial
obligation

0

0

0

Months
to
enforce
-

4

1

1

70

0

0

0

-

4

1

3

105

8

4

3

95

0

1

10

94

4 without judicial
obligation
44 with
authorities

47 without
authorities

14 without
authorities
40 with
information
judicial
26 with
obligation
authorities
identified
33 without judicial
obligation

Ibsen v. Peru (Monitoring), ICHR, 14 May 2013, considering (a) (b); Caballero v. Colombia
(Monitoring), ICHR, 27 November 2002, considering 8; Blake v. Guatemala (Monitoring), ICHR, 27
November 2003, para. 7; Bamaca v. Guatemala (Court notes) 18 and 27 february 2015; Molina
Thiessen v. Guatemala (Monitoring), ICHR 17 August 2009, considering 9; Carpio Nicolle v.
Guatemala (Monitoring), ICHR, 01 July 2009, paras. 18 and 22; Tiu Tojin, supra. 143, paras. 10, 16
and 17; The Street Children Institute v. Paraguay (Monitoring) ICHR, 19 November 2009, para. 37;
Campo Algodonero v. Mexico (Monitoring), ICHR 21 May 2013, considering 2; Velez Loor v. Honduras
(Monitoring), ICHR 13 February 2103, para. 17; Vargas Areco v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 30
October 2008, para. 16; Cantoral Benavidez v. Peru (Monitoring), ICHR 17 November 2004,
considering 17 and 18; Durand v. Peru (Monitoring), ICHR 27 November 2002, para. 4; Moiwana v.
Suriname (Monitoring), ICHR, 21 November 2007, considering 13 and para. 6(d); Montero
Aranguren (Monitoring) ICHR, 17 November 2009, paras. 22, 28, 74; Amparo v. Venezuela, supra 44;
Blanco Romero, supra 143.
208 Supra 159, Bueno Alvez v. Argentina (Monitoring), ICHR 5 July 2004, para. 47; The Street Children
Institute v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 27 January 2009, para. 37-8.
209 Benavidez Cevallos v. Ecuador (Monitoring), ICHR, 27 November 2003, para. 12; Ivon Neptune v.
Haiti (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 9; Yatama v. Nicaragua (Monitoring), ICHR, 20
November 2015, para. 12 and decision 5; Loayza Tamayo, Castillo Paez and Castillo Petruzzi by
information recorded in the Report of Antonio A. Cancado Trindade in the Annual Report at 8, dated
Abril 13, 2000; Saramanka v. Suriname (Monitoring), ICHR, 23 November 2011, at, 1 para. 1 (Vio
Grossi Eduardo. J, sep op.); Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago (Monitoring), ICHR, 27 November 2015,
resolving 5; Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago (Monitoring), ICHR, 27 November 2015, resolving 5;
Montero Aranguren v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5;
Caracazo v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Amparo v.
Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Blanco Romero v.
Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Barreto Leiva v.
Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Aptiz v. Venezuela
(Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, resolving 5; Reveron v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20
November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Uson Ramirez v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20
November 2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Rios v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November
2015, para. 14 and considering 5; Perozo v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 November 2015, para.
14 and considering 5.
210 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, supra 9, para. 54 and Yakye Axa Indigenous Community,
supra 122, para. 49, decides 1.
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acquiescence
15 with
authorities

14 with judicial
obligation
3 without judicial
obligation
12 with judicial
obligation

3

1

5

36

0

0

0

-

1

1

0

50

20

9

22

For instance, Peru and Venezuela accused the Court of violating the principle of
non-intervention by alluding to judgments by its domestic Courts. These statements
against the Court serve as the basis for noncompliance and also made the enforcement
actions ineffective since they produce self-marginalization of the States of the InterAmerican HR System by denouncing the Convention under the article 78. 211 The Court’s
ability to monitor its case population as of 2010 was affected in almost 35% by the action
of denouncements. 212 There are additional instances in which the State threatened to
withdraw its acquiescence of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. 213
Thus, the way in which States react to enforcement measures can also weaken the
Court’s legitimacy and additionally undermines the influence of these measures. Since
the data shows that States react moving away from compliance after the Court applied
these measures of enforcement rather than toward compliance. The data demonstrate that

Article 78 of the Convention provides the States Parties the right to denounce the Convention. By
denouncing the State is not immediately freeing itself of its international HR obligations. The
effective date of the denunciation is then one year from the date of the notice of denunciation. This is
consistent with accepted international principles and article 56 of the Vienna Convention. Further,
States remain subject to the authority of the Court for started and monitored cases. Ivcher Bronstein
v. Peru (Competence) ICHR, 24 September 1999, Ser. C No. 54, paras. 40 and 46.
212 Three States denounced the Convention: Trinidad, with 2 cases; Peru, with 25 cases; and
Venezuela, with 10 cases.
213 Honduras threatened to withdraw its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by the intent of
the Court to force Honduras to comply with judgments of Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz
cases by reporting to the GA. Honduras lobbied to block that situation (See JO M PASQUALUCCI, THE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 288-9 (Cambridge University
Press. 2003). Ecuador also (by lobbying) prevents the discussion by the GA of its noncompliance that
was
reported
by
the
Court
(Annual
Report
2003
–
Chapter
III
<www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/chap.3k.htm>) On November 4, 2014, the Constitutional Court
of the Dominican Republic claims that the instrument for accepting the competence of the ICHR
unconstitutional, which could serve as a basis for denouncement in the future and supports the trend
to be exhibited here.
211
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in 67.8% of those 56 cases with acquiescence among which these rules of enforcement
were used, States engaged in actions and inactions that entail a move away from
compliance. This percentage is inferior on those 62 cases without acquiescence (48%
away). In other words, measures of enforcement have a better expectation of moving
States to compliance in cases without acquiescence (see Table 7).
Indeed, there are some reasons that the data suggests why States disobey the
Court enforcement. States could be ignoring the enforcement because they have
submitted (during the monitoring) diverse evidence to exonerate the guilt or law obstacles
for their AUTHORITIES in 14 cases. Thus, their AUTHORITIES (at least, in
accumulative 44 cases) are not under relevant risk. Moreover, those cases in which
AUTHORITIES are involved - have lost all renowned or public attention given that
several years passed before the enforcement is applied (see last column of Table 7).
Table 8 shows State reactions to measures of enforcement to compare the
different reactions that States that have acquiesced have in relation with those that have
not.
Table No. 8

Steps toward
compliance 214

12 without
authorities
56 with
acquiescence

2
4 without
judicial
obligation

44 with
authorities

40 with
judicial
obligation

14 without
authorities
information
26 with
authorities

Steps away
from
compliance 215
7

Unresolved
issued of
compliance 216
3

0

1

3

2

10

2

1

20

4

Steps toward compliance entail actions such as persecution authorities or non-authorities.
Steps away from compliance entail actions like keep law obstacles or established new
obstacles/exonerates and non-reporting.
216 Unresolved issues of compliance entails actions: moving process, ending law obstacles, remaining
unresolved and removing exonerates.
214
215
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identified
SUBTOTAL

47 without
authorities
62 without
acquiescence
15 with
authorities

33
without
judicial
obligation
14 with
judicial
obligation
3 without
judicial
obligation
12 with
judicial
obligation
SUBTOTAL

5
17

38
12

12
4

0

10

4

1

1

1

2

7

3

20

30

12

26

68

24

The State reaction to these measures also relates to the lack of endorsement from
the system’s political bodies. Neither the Commission, a watchdog intended to be the
Court’s equal, nor the OAS GA, have endorsed the authority to the Court, further
weakening the Court's ability to command enforcement of its judgments. 217 This lack of
endorsement is evident in the fact that the OAS GA has never discussed the reported
noncompliance. 218 Few cases reach this height of importance for other countries to
consider the HR situation. There is no interest among States to apply material
consequences for noncompliance, 219 or at least, to comment on another State’s Court
cases. 220 Even worse, regional publicity of cases rarely translates into interstate pressure
to comply. 221 As we can see, not all States view the Court as a legitimate, unbiased

Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 7, 28. 2013.
Supra, Chapter 1, footnote 73
219 Wright-Smith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 251. 2011. (Rather than condemn another country’s HR practices, States reserve their
criticism for attempted coups or interstate conflicts.)
220 KECK & SIKKINK, Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics 113. 1998.
221 It is no doubt that the publicity is a potential factor to enhance State's willingness to acquiesce.
For instance, in 2004, former President of Guatemala, Oscar Berger, acquiesce in three cases: Plan de
Sánchez (Merit) 29 April 2004, para. 38, Molina-Theissen (Merit) 04 May 2004, para. 36, and CarpioNicolle (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 22 November 2004, para. 39. The President also publically
apologized to all HR victims. The most practical reason for these declarations may be the government
desired to improve its tarnished international image and projects a positive public image to attract
foreign capital. However, a State can reject full responsibility when there is not indisputably linked to
217
218
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arbiter of justice. Only in the case that all States would see the Court as a legitimate,
impartial arbiter of justice, its interactions would be stronger and have more influence
over the “States material power” such that judgment compliance would contribute to a
State’s reputational strength while noncompliance would weaken its reputational
strength.
Cases with acquiescence differ at this stage as to how well the strategies in
previous stages worked. Thus, as these cases were separated to track the strategy and its
effects on compliance (see Table 8), the data shows the following. There are 56 cases
with acquiescence that have an overall rate of 21%. This overall rate is disaggregated in
40% of compliance when the strategies used to protect authorities are entirely successful,
10% when the strategies are partially satisfied and 1% of compliance when the strategies
are entirely unsuccessful.
40% regarding 30 cases where the State strategies from stages 1 to 3 have
reached the objective to protect the AUTHORITIES from prosecutions. Thus, when State
strategies are successful, the rate of compliance of cases with acquiescence is similar to
the rate of compliance of those 62 cases without acquiescence (50%). However, the rate
of cases with acquiescence decreases to 10% in 14 cases where the strategies of stage 1-3
were unsuccessful, even when exculpatory means were used on stage 4. At this stage, the
data also made consistent that cases with acquiescence were controlled in a muchdiminished way by the Court in comparison with those 62 intensely monitored. At the
government agents (as explained in Stage 1). Thus, States would be less willing to acquiesce. This is
the context in which Guatemala rejects responsibility in Carpio Nicolle alluding that the crime was
not political (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 22 November 2004, para. 38 (7)) and in BámacaVelásquez alluding fear to affect the domestic reconciliation (SUSAN BURGERMAN, MORAL VICTORIES: HOW
ACTIVISTS PROVOKE MULTILATERAL ACTION 109 (Cornell University Press. 2001).) Both cases were public
because involving the assassination of a presidential candidate and an international public campaign
for an investigation into the disappearance of a former guerrilla leader with the U.S. support.
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stage 5, the rate of compliance is even worse, 1% of compliance in the 12 remaining
cases where the strategies of stage 1-4 were unsuccessful and then noncompliance is the
last resort that State used to protect AUTHORITIES.

56 acquiescence

62 nonacquiescence

Type of control

Diminished control

Number of cases

Table No. 9

Strategies of 1-3
stages
30 cases with
successful
strategies
26 cases with
unsuccessful
strategies

Strategies of 4-5
stages
14 cases with
successful use of
exculpatory means
12 without
exculpatory

Compliance rate

40%
10%
1%

Intense control
50%

In effect, many of the relevant compliance data are not consistent with
expressions used to acquiesce. States have not complied with the prosecutions that related
with the accepted justice violations. None of these obligations, in which States have
promised to comply with Court orders, have ended in compliance. A picture that emerges
from State’s failure to report or report only initial steps toward an investigation of the
violation and prosecution of alleged HR violators, but, without full progress to
investigating or prosecuting all the perpetrators. Victims, in effect, remarked that
acquiescence has no real content and constitutes only a legal formula that not only
attempts to hide the gravity of the State crime committed and is a mechanism to present
itself as respectful of the international HR obligations and assumed commitments. 222
These results support the view that, neither acquiescence nor associated behaviors
involve a meaningful commitment by the State to prosecute authorities, questioning the

Valle-Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 27 November 2008, Ser. C
No. 192, para. 27.
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authenticity of States’ acquiescence, legal commitments and promises and scuppering
one of the most pressing and elusive goals of the Court: the prosecution of HR violators.
Conclusion
The purpose of this Chapter was to present the results and analysis of patterns of
interaction uncovered in 118 politically complex cases involving many petitioners,
complicated policies, and various government institutions. A general level, it was made
by asking how do States move toward or away from compliance in their interaction with
the Court and its judgments, the analyzed data are steps toward an understanding of the
role of interaction in international politics and on the dynamics of compliance with
international judgments.
In effect, the analyzed data offers strong support for my argument that the
interaction between States and the Court provides the missing key to explaining the
complex and unexpected relationship between acquiescence, compliance, and other
factors. In this way, compliance is not an all-or-nothing case; rather, it results from a
story that unpacks contributions from States and Courts. If my conclusions are correct,
the interaction affects the amount of compliance that States will be willing to supply; then
I have demonstrated and described the judgment compliance as a process constituted by
five successive stages and the interaction between States and the Court is the causal
mechanism for the judgment compliance.
Both the process and mechanism causal arise to light from a surprising outcome:
acquiescence leads to lower compliance rates when there are high-ranking authorities
implicated in a Court case. I proposed that this surprising finding is understandable by
analyzing acquiescence as the antechamber (“tip of the iceberg”) of a series of actions
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that constitute a predetermined process to minimize consequences for AUTHORITIES of
being damaged by an international judgment. The interaction between States and the
Court is, thus, partially the result of incompatible State and Court goals for the resolution
of the case. The Court decides by law and morality principles, rejecting some of these
series of instrumental State actions by issuing judgments that command to States to
proceed against their AUTHORITIES. States fail to comply or enter long enforcement
monitoring processes given their goals of protecting AUTHORITIES. Compliance and
noncompliance are in consequence understandable from a combination of normative
concerns and instrumental calculations coupled with practical realities/considerations that
come from (or depend on) the interaction.
These strategic actions employed by the States during the Court proceedings and
monitoring have led to a negative variation in compliance. I suggest (as my evidence
reveals) that the reason for this result is that when State strategies to protect their
AUTHORITIES do not work, and the Court issues an order to prosecute that threatens
the protection of AUTHORITIES, the extensive noncompliance emerges understandable
like the last resort that States have to use to protect AUTHORITIES. The data also
reveals that from these State strategies compliance and noncompliance are achievable
differently. The analysis is, in fact, compatible with the observation that the interaction
between States and Courts affect compliance in predictable ways, and it would predict
that compliance is strongest where States propose anticipatory remedial actions and these
remedies link between cooperation and procedural progress – even if State interests point
in the opposite direction. Also, compliance is higher with non-judicial obligations and
when authorities are protected from prosecutions.
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The stages identified in the emergence of judgment compliance are not
explanations but rather observations in their context, in other words, they form the
structure of the relationship; actions/interactions and their outcomes and the Court and
States’ usual or strategic responses. They are signaling, exchange, negotiation,
monitoring and sanctioning.
The first three stages happened during the judicial proceedings (adjudicative
process). In the first phase, the groundwork for judgment compliance is laid by building
legitimacy to act during the court proceedings. In this stage, States start to restrict the
facts of state repression to keep abuses secret by acquiescing. The visibility and potential
discussion of the facts that involve AUTHORITIES comprise the second stage of
building a consensual restriction of the events between States and the Court. The process
may continue with the construction of compliance by expressing sovereignty and power,
which is the third stage. There is systematic evidence to suggest that States that have
acquiesced often make commitments and engage in behaviors (as shown stage 1 to 3:
such as promising, requesting, proclamation limited responsibility and sovereignty and
remedying by complying with non-judicial obligations) that anticipate that they will
comply with the ordered obligations. Notwithstanding, it was demonstrated that these
actions were used to protect AUTHORITIES. Recall that at the end of phase 3; state
strategies met success in 30 cases out of 56 acquiescence cases, and AUTHORITIES
remain identified in only 26.
The beginning of the stage fourth entails unsuccessful prior State strategies since
the presented analysis is consistent with the observation that the Court shapes its
interaction with States during the monitoring by the issuance of HR judgments that can
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potentially affect international law and politics by shaping the State’s sovereign power. It
does so by providing legal resources that translate into the power to name violations and
violators in particular intrusive law remedies. Put plainly, the issuance of an obligation
destined to domestic prosecute AUTHORITIES responsible for the HR violations.
However, my results corroborate that States know from the beginning that they can
leverage - the Court rewards expressed in a diminished monitoring and enforcement – in
the use of political factors often limit the Courts and its nuanced, complex interaction
with the State in this fourth phase. The mentioned is visible in 14 of these 26 cases in
which States rescue AUTHORITIES of further responsibility at domestic level by
blocking prosecution. Thus, these political factors are practices of jealous States of their
sovereign that ignore the HR abuses committed by AUTHORITIES. The entrenched
impunity institutionalized on State structures counteracts the Court's desire to change
substantively on State levels. In where (also) domestic institutions allow the stabilization
and distribution of noncompliance idea throughout the government. The Court responds
by the implementation of soft measures to counteract adverse effects of these actions;
however, noncompliance with judicial obligations that orders domestic prosecutions
persists.
In stage 5, States would be worried then for actions of the Court regarding the 12
remaining cases. AUTHORITIES of these cases are at risk since, after the application of
demands for compliance at stage 4, the Court performs a strategy of overreaching the
original obligations and reporting to a political body to move States away from
noncompliance. However, neither of two extreme measures translates into full
compliance with the judicial obligations. On the contrary, after application of these Court
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measures – States instead of act consistently with the Court interests and take steps
toward compliance, react in opposite direction by doing nothing toward compliance and
stopping to report with the Court. Moreover, the inaction of intergovernmental
institutions weakened the Court's strategic ability to command enforcement of its
judgments.
Although the analyzed data focus on the emergence of judgment compliance and
noncompliance, these cases are aimed at investigating the far-reaching impact and
operation of the interaction on international action, and could apply to other topical
domains. For example, no evidence in the data contradicting that the Court can leverage
the nature of the relationship and aspects of its frequent interaction with States to remove
(to some extent, at least) the current unprogressive HR situation. However, it brings to
the conclusion that to change an unprogressive HR situation it is both appropriate and
necessary for Courts be convinced that States can change their behavior in light of the
nature of the relationship and aspects of their frequent interaction. To do so, the Court
needs to crystallize its goals toward interconnections that relegate the idealism by a
discourse that needs to be also progressist, pragmatic and even strategic. Therefore, there
is a need to implement behavioral changes they will be addressed in Chapter 5.
Summary. Chapter 2 was an overview of my methodology. This Chapter reported
data for revealing patterns of the interaction between States and the Court. In decisions
about acquiescence and judgment compliance, the qualitative data analysis conveys ways
in which these patterns are expressed – Chapter 4 includes illustrations to do this task.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
ILLUSTRATING A STRATEGY TO PROTECT
AUTHORITIES
I.

INTRODUCTION
The qualitative analysis reported in Chapter 3 deserves to be illustrated. So far,

this dissertation distinguishes five different Stages in which the relationship between
(non) acquiescence and (non) compliance is associated with a strategy to protect
AUTHORITIES. Recall that the five Stages are: signaling, exchange, negotiation,
Monitoring, and sanctioning. This Chapter sets out a narrative for each phase. This
narrative gradually reveals a framework of patterns in – the interaction between the States
and the Court during the judicial proceedings and the monitoring process. The rest of this
Chapter consists of two sections. Part II offers illustrative cases that support the
qualitative analysis. It first points to the appearance of acquiescence in which key
patterns from Stages 1 to 3 are illustrated and then proceeds to illustrate the shape of
compliance in which key patterns from Stage 4 and 5 are exhibited. Then, the Chapter
turns in Part III to deviations from the fundamental patterns presented.
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II.

ILLUSTRATING THE STRATEGY
Blake v. Guatemala is a useful case in which the State’s interaction with the Court

serves as a prototypical illustration of the use of the strategy presented, 1 with other cases
serving as supplementary examples.

A.

The appearance of acquiescence
The relationship between the Guatemala government and the Court allows

Guatemala to expect that the Court reactions will be positive to its acquiescence.
Guatemala acquires such knowledge by the number of acquiescences presented. In fact,
nine of those 56 cases of acquiescence that is under the System (18%) originate from
Guatemala. 2 Guatemala can use this knowledge to accommodate its interests to the extent
that it predicts the reactions of the Court. An interest of the State is protecting its
AUTHORITIES and it grants them cover. The protection of AUTHORITIES is one of the
factors that contribute to the phenomenon theorized, as was shown in Figure 1 of Chapter
3, Section I. This section initially displays the implication of AUTHORITIES in the

Blake v. Guatemala (Objections) ICHR, 2 July 1996, Ser. C No. 27; Blake v. Guatemala (Merits) ICHR,
24 January 1998, Ser. C No. 36; Blake v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 January 1999,
Ser. C No. 48; Blake v. Guatemala (Interpretation of the Judgment of Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 1
October 1999, Ser. C No. 57; Blake v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 November 2002; Blake v.
Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 November 2003; Blake v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 27
November 2007; Blake v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 22 January 2009 ; 11 cases v. Guatemala
(Monitoring) ICHR, 21 August 2014; 12 Guatemalan's Cases v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 24
November 2015.
2 Blake, id; Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 February 2002, Ser. C
No. 91; Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR 25 November 2003,
Ser. C No. 101; The Plan Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Merits) ICHR, 29 April 2004, Ser. C No. 105;
Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala (Merits) ICHR, 4 May 2004, Ser. C No. 106; Carpio Nicolle v. Guatemala
(Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 November 2004, Ser. C No. 117; Maritza Urrutia v.
Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 27 November 2003, Ser. C No. 103; Tiu Tojín v.
Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 November 2008, Ser. C No. 190; “Las Dos Erres”
Massacre v. Guatemala (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 24 November
2009, Ser. C No. 211; Chitay Nech v. Guatemala (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs) ICHR, 25 May 2010, Ser. C No. 212.
1
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Blake case and a tactic of cover-up developed by the State. After that, key patterns from
1st to 3rd Stages are presented.
1.

AUTHORITIES and cover-up

a)

States acquiesce when there are AUTHORITIES involved. This pattern was

incarnated in 44 of the 56 cases with acquiescence.
The Blake (Guatemala) case illustrates the implication of AUTHORITIES in a
process before the ICHR with acquiescence. These AUTHORITIES were implicated by
their participation in decisions and acts that constitute HR violation.
The Court in its Judgment on Merits stated that according to statements not
refuted by the State during the proceedings: A Commander of the El Llano Civil SelfDefense Patrol (Mr. Mario Cano) ordered the members of the El Llano Civil Patrol to
detain and execute Mr. Nicholas Blake, a 27-year-old American independent journalist,
on March 28, 1985. The detention results from his participation in a guerrilla
investigation that compromised State interests. Subsequently, an Army Commandant and
Chief of the Civil Patrols (Mr. Felipe Alva) ordered the body of Mr. Nicholas Blake to be
burned and buried. 3
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the Blake proceedings, the State emphasizes that
only there is a “direct and individual” responsibility of the PACs for the death of the
American journalist Blake. 4 Since 1982, Guatemala instituted a Civil Patrol System,
called PACs, that employs civilians to patrol and attack other civilians. 5 This system

Id., para. 52(a) (e); Id. 31, 52 (a), 52(e); Blake, supra 1 para. 12
Id., para. 25.
5 PATRICK DONNELL BALL, et al., STATE VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA, 1960-1996: A QUANTITATIVE REFLECTION 19
(Advancement of Science. 1999).
3
4
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seeks to stop the guerrilla extension in Guatemala by pro-government citizen militias. 6
Guatemala claimed that members of the Civilian Defense Patrol (PACs) were not
technically State agents. The evidence of the case, however, determined government ties
to PACs “[…] Civil Defense Patrols (PACs) had an institutional relationship with the
Army, were assisted and coordinated by the Ministry of National Defense, received direct
orders from the Army regarding their actions, and operated under its supervision.” 7 The
Court stressed that the PACs received direct orders from the State army but also funding,
weapons, training. 8
These militias created for self-defense against the guerrillas promptly moved to be
used as an offensive force working 9 in collaboration with army personnel in committing
killings and disappearances of people in communities who were not under army
control. 10 The State seems to deny responsibility to avoid the creation of precedents for
future proceedings. Especially since those events of the Blake case were committed
during the internal armed conflict and carried out by military agents and members of the
PACs in a context of paramilitary violence ordered, supported and promoted by the State.
Consequently, any precedents would lead to judicial persecutions against military and
political AUTHORITIES implicated either connected with the PACs or authorities of the
PACs. The Blake case illustrates that Mr. Felipe Alva, a high-ranking authority
responsible for State-sponsored violation against Mr. Nicholas Blake, possessed an
influential position as a member of the military party (PACs) that helped him to remain

Id.
Blake, supra 1, para.52 (p)
8 Id., para. 52 (p).
9 Id.
10 Id.
6
7
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free of any responsibility. 11 After, he continued to hold an influential political position in
the Guatemala government to maintain his impunity (including the 2014 monitoring). 12
The Blake case can be supplemented with various cases, however, it is worth mention a
case that brought to light how hundreds of AUTHORITIES were involved in an “alliance
of security forces and intelligence services” to commit transborder HR violations - see
further details about the Goiburu (Paraguay) case. 13
b)

The presence of AUTHORITIES often leads to a tactic of cover-up.
By the merits of the Blake case, it was established that only after seven-years of

systematic State cover-up of the crimes related to Mr. Blake illegal detention, forced
disappearance, and death, his fate was revealed on June 14, 1992. 14
Statements of the Blake proceedings make clear that the Guatemalan government,
including its top AUTHORITIES in office, does indeed not want to expose those
responsible to the public scorn of criminal prosecutions. For instance, the former
Guatemalan President Ramiro de Leon-Carpio at the U.S. Embassy corroborated the
cover-up. He asserts, “it was true that the Civil Patrol had killed [Mr. Nicholas Chapman]
that the Army had known this all along and had covered it up […].” 15 Likewise, Colonel
Francisco Ortega, Chief of Military Intelligence corroborated the cover-up performed by
Guatemalan Military Intelligence “[he was] agreed that no progress had been made in the
Blake case and that Guatemalan Military Intelligence had known almost immediately
what had happened to [Mr. Nicholas Chapman], [however] had never sent investigators

Blake, supra 1, para. 52 (e) (h) (j)
Id., considering 2
13 Goiburú v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 September 2006, Ser. C No. 153,
paras. 84 and 89.
14 Blake, supra 1, para. 1 and 52 (o)
15 Id., para. 31c)
11
12
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to the area to arrest the suspects.” 16 The failure of General Gramajo, Minister of Defense,
and General Mata-Gálvez to release incriminating information of alleged perpetrators
was evident in the proceedings when they informed to U.S. ambassador that, “they had
no information about the Blake investigation or its results, although […] they had been
specifically told who the suspects were.” 17
Guatemalan AUTHORITIES seem to act in complicity with those responsible or
their networks of protection under the belief that the cover-up is justified by firmly
entrenched practices that aim to protect the State reputation from scandal. Despite this,
the Court ended up by ordering a judicial obligation in the Judgment on Merits dated on
January 24, 1998, by which “the Guatemalan State shall investigate the facts leading to
the disappearance and death of Nicholas Blake, identify and punish those responsible.” 18
This pattern is not restricted to Guatemalan cases; it applied, for instance, to Colombian
authorities that also act in complicity with active networks of protection to cover-up HR
abuses. In these violations, the perpetrators are commonly paramilitaries groups. 19
2.

Key patterns of Stages 1 to 3

Illustrating the patterns by which States and the Court proceed to this point
requires breaking each Stage into its component parts.

Id.
Id.
18 Id., considering 35
19 Rochela Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 11 May 2007, Ser. C No. 163,
para. 90-1
16
17
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a)

Stage 1. Signaling and its key patterns — acquiescence, commitments,

promises of States and the praises of the Court
(1)

States which acquiesce (early) when doing nothing is costlier since there is proof

against AUTHORITIES and preliminary objections have been used or failed. This pattern
was visible in 30 cases.
In the Blake case, the above revised declarations of leading AUTHORITIES have
confirmed the presence of implicated AUTHORITIES. 20 The presence of
AUTHORITIES made costly ‘doing nothing’ at the beginning of the ICHR proceedings,
as discussed in the prior Chapter . Moreover, there is proof against foremost
AUTHORITIES. However, this evidence becomes disputable since, throughout 1985-92,
members of the Civil Patrols purposely presented contradicting information, further
obstructing the investigation. 21 Likewise, the State conceals the whereabouts of Mr.
Blake’s body and makes the investigation difficult. 22 In the process before the ICHR, the
presence of AUTHORITIES leads the State to object initially the admissibility of the
application and the Court jurisdiction.
The State interposes three preliminary objections to avoid the criminal analysis of
the case, 23 claiming that the Court is not competent to hear the case based on the time, 24
on the subject matter, 25 and finally, because of there was an invalid interpretation of the
Convention. 26 On July 2, 1996, the Court issues its Judgment on Preliminary

Blake, supra 1, para. 31 (c) (d)
Id., 52 (o).
22 Id.
23 Id., para. 23
24 Id.
25 Id., paras. 25 and 41
26 Id., para. 27
20
21
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Objections. 27 The Court rules that there is some merit in the first objection, and dismisses
the second and third objections on inadmissibility grounds. 28 The Court kept its
jurisdiction to analyze the forced disappearance as a continuing violation that began
before the acceptance of its jurisdiction but continued after the acceptance, the Court
limited its analysis to the effects of the crime. 29
Only after the Court partially rejected objections submitted by Guatemala, 30 it
became evident that the Court would hear witnesses. 31 Guatemala withdrew its initial
deflections of liability and accepted partial responsibility, 32 as strategy to bring protection
to its AUTHORITIES. Although the State denies its intervention in the extrajudicial or
the unsolved killing of the victims, it admits responsibility on the question of the delay of
justice. The Court took note of Guatemala’s acquiescence. 33 This pattern is also depicted
in 26 cases as the Ximenes Lopez (Brazil) case showed (see footnotes for additional
details). 34
(2)

When States acquiesce, they commit to controlling the Court proceedings

and restore reputation damage.
By using a positive discourse, States suggest high normative commitment to
persuade the Court to accept their acquiescence. Guatemala satisfies the Court to accept
its partial acquiescence in the Blake case affirming its responsibility for the delay of

Id., para. 23.
Id., paras. 33, 43, 45 and 55.
29 Id., paras. 39-40. Judge Cancado disapproves a restrictive view in his Separate Opinion, para.15.
30 Id., para 33
31 Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 04 July 2006, Ser. C No. 149, para.
26
32 Id., para. 27
33 Id.
34 Ximenes-Lopes, supra 31, paras. 34-6
27
28
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justice. 35 This discourse looks positive before the Court since the State had previously
objected and it changed its position by renouncing to dispute the proceedings.
In other cases, the discourse came directly from the highest AUTHORITIES.
Even when the commitments cannot be ascribed to a particular administration, it is
possible to compare the commitments that the State assumed during the Court
proceedings with the concrete actions performed then with the judicial obligation. In the
case of Guatemala, it is possible to compare it to a Guatemalan case from the second half
of the 2000s when President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) started to commit to
compliance reiteratively throughout acquiescence. In effect, he acknowledged the State’s
“international responsibility” in the Molina-Theissen case and various cases processed
before the Commission. 36 He started to commit to compliance reiteratively throughout
acquiescence. In the Tiu Tojín (Guatemala) case, the Vice-President of the Republic
presided over a voluntary apology automatically after acquiescence. 37 President Portillo
and his commitments were qualified as “a cynical course of manipulation” given his links
to high AUTHORITIES of the civil war (1960 to 1996). These authorities were
responsible for many massacres. 38
On the contrary, the President Oscar Berger (2004-2008) was praised by his “open
and proactive attitude” to work with HR victims and NGOs. 39 His commitments before
the Court produced tangible results. These commitments were restricted to obligations
(symbolic and reparations) in which the Court invoked the executive to comply with
Blake, supra 1, para. 27
Molina-Theissen, supra 2, para. 7 and 10
37 Tiu Tojín, supra 2, para. 5
38 US Department. 2003. Country Report on HR Practices. Bureau of Democracy, HR, and Labor.
February 25, 2004. http://www.state.gov. (April 28, 2009).
39 Inter-American Dialogue. 2008. “National Dialogues on Democracy in Latin America. A Project of
the Inter-American Dialogue and the Organization of American States.” www.thedialogue.org.
(November 13, 2009). Archive.thedialgue.org/…/NationalDialoguesGuatemalaEnglish.pdf
35
36
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policy obligations. In fact, this administration was unpopular by the desire to prosecute
corrupt politicians and AUTHORITIES. 40 President Álvaro Colom (2008-2012)
continued making commitments but, AUTHORITIES and their protective networks
prevented the implementation. 41 Finally, the president Otto Pérez Molina assumed office
on January 14, 2012, to September 3, 2015; his administration limited the acquiescence
since retired General head in the civil war, 42 can be found responsible for the Court
judgments. 43
These illustrations of the Guatemalan experience suggest the political leaders sign
commitments due to their attempt to set domestic and international expectations of
governmental responsibility and from a reputational standpoint, to increase it, due to the
attention that particular Court cases have. Expectations and reputation are a source to
attract support or criticism from other States. Indeed, regarding economic development,
expectations and reputation would prevent capital flight and foreign investment.
Commitments are, regardless that they fall into the emptiness, more feasible to generate
expectations and reputation than compliance.
(3)

When States acquiesce, they reinforce their commitments with promises of

compliance. This pattern is in 39 cases.
Guatemala exhibited a conciliatory position at the end of the Blake proceedings.
In this context, Guatemala reinforced its acquiescence with the following public

In “From Turmoil to Stability in Central America” LARRY JAY DIAMOND, et al., LATIN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
(Johns Hopkins Univ Pr. 2008).
41 In fact, the Court needs to order provisional measures to the protection of victims and witnesses in
Chang v. Guatemala case. Helen Mack Chang v. Guatemala (Provisional measures) ICHR, 26 August
2002.
42 ALLAN D COOPER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE 171 (University Press of America. 2009).
43 Conclusions: HR violations, acts of violence and assignment of responsibility". Guatemala: Memory
of Silence. Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification. Retrieved December 26, 2006.
40
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declaration: “the government will try to heal the wounds of the past and will comply with
the Court's ruling.” 44 In fact, during the reparation stage, the state indicated that
acceptance for the unjustified delay in the administration of justice should be considered
part of the non-pecuniary reparations. This promise seemed compatible with an additional
statement in which the State reiterated its acquiescence and indicated, “efforts are being
made to comply with two judicial arrest warrants and an accused has been captured.” 45
This reiteration occurred during the reparation stage and then during the first compliance
report of Guatemala. Later, however, the State submitted statements of limited
responsibility incompatible with its prior promises.
There are several examples that came from a variety of States, in which they
make promises regarding the judicial obligation, particularly, prosecution and
punishment (see footnotes for further details). 46 The consequence of persuasive discourse
-including commitments and promises of compliance- is that the Court ends up by feeling
less comfortable in rejecting acquiescence from States that are more likely, as they
express in their promises, to offer to concede or appear compelled with their HR
obligations. This seems be the case of Guatemala, accordingly, the Court confers
simultaneously legitimacy to the State actions and praises the expressions used in the
acquiescence.

44 Wright-Smith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 149 2011.
45 Blake, supra 1, para. 60
46 Tiu Tojín, supra 2, paras. 5 and 15); Gutiérrez v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 12
September 2005, Ser. C No. 132, para. 92; Huilca-Tecse v. Perú (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 3
March 2005, Ser. C No. 121, para. 20; Benavides-Cevallos v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and
Costs) ICHR, 19 June 1998, Ser. C No. 38, para. 35; Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Merits) ICHR,
2 February 1996, Ser. C No. 25, para. 24; Bueno Alves v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and
Costs) ICHR, 11 May 2007, Ser. C No. 164 para. 210; Vargas v. Paraguay.
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(4)

The Court praises States for statements of responsibility rather than

withholding praise until the State has complied, thus—incentivizing the use of
acquiescence in a strategy. This pattern is part of 42 cases.
On April 16, 1997, the State declared that “it accept[ed] international
responsibility on the question of HR stemming from the delay of justice until the year
nineteen hundred and ninety-five (1995) (originally in capitals) […].” 47 The Court issued
an order in which it takes note of the partial recognition of responsibility on the part of
the State of Guatemala in this case. 48
The Court offers praises in 75% of the cases, as Section A.1. However, among
those instances in which the Court does not praise States we can find 5 demonstrated out
of the 10 acquiescence cases in which Guatemala did not receive an appraisal. 49
In the Blake case, the Court did not emphasize appraisals, perhaps since the State
makes an extra declaration (after the acquiescence) saying, “[t]his acknowledgment was
independent of the outcome of the proceeding in the domestic courts, […].” 50 Despite
there being a marked tendency to praise, the Court can limit such praises based on
frequency of interaction and nature of relationship between the government and the
Court. For instance, the Court can put attention before praising on the amount of
government litigation pending before it. Accordingly, the withholding of praises could be
explained in the high number of cases before the System of Guatemala (10 out of 56
cases - equivalent to an 18%).

Blake, supra 1, paras. 27-8
Id., para. 29
49 Guatemala did not receive praises in Blake, Maritza Urrutia, Bamaca Fernandez, Myrna Mack, and
Chitay Nech cases. See as examples: Blake, supra 1, para. 89 and Maritza Urrutia, supra 2, para. 42
50 Blake, supra 1, paras. 27-8
47
48
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The withholding also could be explained in the poor overall compliance of
Guatemala (36%). Thus, the Court could doubt the State’s capacity to respond effectively
with the judgment. In addition, nature of relationship could count for the Court; for
example, history of relations with Guatemala can be taking into account. Given the civil
war that marked 34 years of the Guatemala history, 51 commitment to HR could not be
one of the State priorities; rather, it was economic growth. Thus, it appears rational that
the Court withheld praise from States seeking to improve their reputation in order to
encourage more serious, long-term HR commitments.
The withholding of praise also was applied to Colombia in 3 out of its 9
acquiescence cases and to Paraguay in 3 of 5. Recall, however, that the Court acts
idealistically according to my results, thus, praising is the generalizable practice. For
example, in the Escue Zapata (Colombia) case, the Court stated in its Judgment on
Merits, Reparations and Costs “acquiesce is a positive contribution toward the proper
fulfillment of the Inter-American HR jurisdictional function and, in general, the
enforcement and the effectiveness of the principles enshrined by the American
Convention.” 52 Likewise, in the Zambrano-Velez (Ecuador) case the Court in its
Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs remarks the value of acquiesces, particularly,
“[…as a] positive step toward the vindication of the victims’ memory and dignity.” 53

51 Martínez, Francisco Mauricio (2010). Medio siglo de la rebelión. Prensa Libre (Guatemala).
Alternativalatinomaericana.blogspot.com. Archivado desde el original el 3 de diciembre de 2015.
52 Escue Zapata v. Colombia, (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2007, Ser. C, No. 165, par.
20.
53 Zambrano Velez v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2007, Ser. C No. 166, para.
10.
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Other useful illustrations came from those States received recurrently praises such
as those that I called powerful (Brazil) and rogue 54 (Venezuela). For example, in the
Ximenes Lopes (Brazil) case the Court stated in its Judgment on Merits
“acknowledgment of international responsibility is a positive contribution to the outcome
of the […] case and to the effectiveness of the principles which have inspired the
American Convention […]." 55 In the Montero-Aranguren (Venezuela) case the Court
stated “acknowledgment of international responsibility made by the State during the
proceeding before this Court constitutes an important step towards the development of
this process.” 56 The Court adds concerning Venezuela that its acquiescence is
“undoubtedly one of the most complete that this Inter-American Court has notice
have.” 57
b)

Stage 2. Exchange —requests

(1)

When States acquiesce, they request to control the proceedings and preempt

future reputation damage. This pattern is in 30 cases.
In the Blake proceedings, Guatemala tried to suspend the oral proceedings to avoid
incriminating and accusatory information against those AUTHORITIES responsible of
the crimes that came to the public light and tried to gain six months to reach an
agreement in order to close the case prematurely. 58 It was likely that through these
requests the State of Guatemala would be preserving impunity for responsible
Rogue States are those that are seeking to threaten global stability. These states generally have
authoritarian governments guilty of HR abuses, sponsor terrorism, and are seeking to acquire
weapons of mass destruction. The term is controversial.
55 Ximenes Lopez, supra 31, para. 80
56 Montero-Aranguren (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, (Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs) ICHR, 4 July 2006, Ser. C, No. 15o, para. 57
57 Id., para. 58
58 Blake, supra 1, para. 27 number 4 "It respectfully request[ed] the Honorable Court to suspend the
oral proceedings and grant it a term of six months to reach an agreement on reparations with the
victims' next of kin and/or the Commission"
54
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AUTHORITIES. The Court decided to continue with hearings 59 and officially recorded
evidence that includes the responsibility of AUTHORITIES as perpetrators of the crime
and the existence of a systematic cover-up for them. Then, the Court can order a judicial
obligation based on narratives that include information provided by oral proceedings. 60
These requests, as anticipated in the previous section, are destined to frame the
litigation by closing the merits phase of the case, 61 restricting the Court hearings, 62 or
ceasing the controversy of the facts. 63 Moreover, the Court can also decide to adopt any
of these three actions without requests. 64 In other cases, States managed agreements to
restrict the controversy and control outcomes. 65

Id., para. 29
Id., considering 35
61 Aloeboete v. Suriname, (Merits) ICHR, 4 December 1991, Ser. C No. 11, para. 22 (In Aloeboete after
two declarations of acquiescence by Suriname, the State Agent declared during the Court
proceedings as appears in the Judgment on Merits "I believe my statement was clear: it accepts
responsibility. Consequently, the Court has the right to close the case, file it […]”.
62 Acosta-Calderón v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR 24 June 2005, paras 24, 25;
Carpio Nicolle, supra 2, para. 36(b); Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (Merits) ICHR, 26 January 2000, Ser. C
No. 64, para. 40; Bulacio v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 18 September 2003, Ser.
C No. 100, para. 21, 27; and Mariparán Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR,
15 September 2005, para. 33 (4) (In these cases, States asked the Court, to obviate or suspend the
hearing (often - in application of the procedural economy principle) and continue on to establish the
corresponding measures of reparation).
63 Huilca Tecse, supra 47, para. 20; Barrios Altos v. Peru (Merits) ICHR, 14 March 2001, Ser. C No. 75
para. 38; Trujillo Oroza id., para. 40; Garrido, supra 47, paras. 22, 27 (the parties given their
statements at the public hearing and their acquiescence consider that it is possible to assert that the
dispute concerning the facts ceased. That the controversy between the State and the parties ceased,
makes feasible to open the reparations stage. In this way, these processes were reduced)
64 Gómez Palomino v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR 22 November 2005, Ser. C No. 136
para. 16; Baldeón García v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 6 April 2006, Ser. C No. 147,
paras. 26, 45 (In these cases, the Court indicated that it was not necessary to convene a public
hearing); El Amparo v. Venezuela (Merits) ICHR, 18 January 1995, Ser. C No 19, para. 19 (the Court
took note of the acquiescence […] and decided that the controversy concerning the facts that
originated the case has ceased).
65 Id., (amparo) paras. 1 and 3 (the State accepted responsibility and asked the Court’s permission to
negotiate reparations directly with the Commission.) Consequently, by judgment dated January 18,
1995, (the Court took note of the acquiescence of responsibility […] and decided that the controversy
concerning the facts that originated the case has ceased). (Additionally, it granted the parties a
period of six months to reach an agreement on reparations). See the same in the following cases:
Benavides-Cevallos, supra 47, para. 35; Blanco Romero v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
ICHR, 28 November 2005, Ser. C No. 138, para. 27; Garrido and Baigorria, supra 47, para. 28; Huilca59
60
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c)

Stage 3. Negotiation—statements of limited responsibility and

nonintervention and anticipatory remedial actions.
(1)

When States acquiesce, they make statements in order to limit their

responsibility and to avoid the Court intrusiveness by nonintervention statements.
This pattern was incarnated in 49 of the 56 cases with acquiescence.
In the Blake case, the State acquiesced and then declared that its acquiescence is
“independent of the outcome of the proceeding in the domestic court[s].” 66 This
statement could eventually be considered as a kind of anticipatory statement of limited
responsibility. In fact, it was, since the State submitted a statement of limited
responsibility during the stage of reparations. By which the State stated, “the time that
passed since the crime occurred, finding responsible or the remains of the victim would
be challenging and expensive.” 67 This especially happens when the whereabouts of the
suspects were unknown. 68 Even later, the State adduced that its lack of capacity makes
that noncompliance occurs by a series of “structural problems.” 69 To limit, even more, its
responsibility, Guatemala affirms that the Court has observed on the State without taking
into account the political, economic and social reality of Guatemala and its process of
building a democratic State of law comes from 1985. 70 The Blake case regarding
statements of limited responsibility is supplemented by the Kawas Fernández (Honduras)
case. 71

Tecse, supra 47, para. 44; Molina-Theissen, supra 2, para. 7 and 10; Tiu Tojín, supra 2, para. 5;
Vargas-Areco, supra 47, para. 10.
66 Blake, supra 1, para. 27
67 Id., para. 8 and 11
68 Id., para. 15
69 Id., para. 32
70 Id.
71 Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 3 April 2009, para. 60.
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Regarding the statement of nonintervention, Guatemala used them in the Blake
case. In such, the State questioned the Court authority. In addition, regarding its
obligation to investigate the responsibility committed by its agents, 72 the State remarked
that there is no negligence in the exercise of the public functions. This statement
validated actions and omissions of judges. The Court considered that this new position of
the State emptied the content of its acquiescence. 73 The State identifies the behavior of
judges as a structural obstacle 74 that serves to protect AUTHORITIES from ordered
prosecutions. In response, the Court established the responsibility of judicial
AUTHORITIES. The Court stated that these AUTHORITIES are a factor for impunity
since they tolerate, without adopted provisions against, the abuse of means to delay and
obstruct the proceedings. 75
Chapter 3 established that judiciaries play one of the most influential roles to
protect leading AUTHORITIES in two ways. Judges receive pressure from their
executives to require noncompliance with the ICHR judgment or obstruct the
implementation since the ICHR order threatens them. Peru and Venezuela accused the
Court of violating the principle of non-intervention by alluding to judgments by its
domestic Courts. These statements contributed to a strategy to retract the given
acquiescence in Peruvian and Venezuelan cases (see references for illustrations). 76

Blake v. Guatemala, supra 1 para. 2
Id., para. 14
74 Blake, supra 1, para. 32
75 Id., para. 40
76 Huilca-Tecse, supra 47, para. 30, 32; Loayza Tamayo v. Perú (Monitoring) ICHR, 17 November
1999, Ser. C No. 60, para. 9; Castillo Petruzzi v. Perú (Objections) ICHR, 4 Sept 1998, Ser. C No. 41,
para. 100 (a); Castillo Petruzzi v. Perú, (Merits) ICHR, 30 May 1999, Ser. C No. 52, at 67, Ratio
Decidendi clause 14, and para. 216 (f); Id., supra 26, at 24, par. 100 (a) (Sept. 4, 1998). Montero
Aranguren, supra 57 paras. 57-8; Apitz v. Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR, 23 November 2012, para 13
(IX). Another examples came from Garrido and Baigorria, supra 47, para. 34; Caballero Delgado and
Santana v. Colombia (Merits) ICHR, 8 December 1995, Ser. C No. 22, para. 27; Ximenes Lopes, supra
72
73
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(2)

When States acquiesce, they remedy anticipatorily in order to control the

outcome or intense obligations
In the Blake case, Guatemala “respectfully request[ed] the Honorable Court to
[…] reach an agreement on reparations […].”[…].” 77 There are variety of anticipatory
remedial actions such as in the Ximenes Lopes (Brazil) case; the State undertook
measures to improve conditions in certain mental health centers well before the judgment
demanded it to do so. 78 The Benavides Cevallos (Ecuador) case, the State ratified the
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons voluntarily. 79 In the
Barrios Altos (Peru) case, the State reached an agreement with victims to promote
ratification of the International Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. 80
An illustration of symbolic remedial is Mariparan massacre (Colombia) case.
During its public proceedings, Colombia reasserts its State policy is that of promoting
and protecting HR and it expresses its deep respect and sympathy for the victims of the
facts that took place in Mapiripán in July 1997 and remembering them it expresses its
regret and apologizes to their next of kin and Colombian society. 81 In the Montero
Aranguren (Venezuela) case, at the public hearing for the Case, after acquiescing full
responsibility, Venezuela asked for a moment of silence in memory of the victims and
31, para. 63 e)
77 Blake, supra 1, para. 27 (4). See as supplementary cases El Amparo, supra 65, para. 19; considering
1 and 3 (Acquiescence is presented with remedial actions, by unilaterally committing or managing
relationships/agreements either with other parties in or outside the process. In Venezuela’s Amparo
case, the State acquiesced and asked the Court’s permission to negotiate reparations directly with the
Commission. The Court granted the parties a period of six months to reach an agreement on
reparations; see footnote concerning other cases in which the States managed agreements to control
financial reparations Id., supra 66
78 Ximenes Lopes , supra 31
79 Benavides Cevallos, supra 47, para. 52
80 Barrios Altos, supra 64, para. 44c)
81 Mariparán, supra 63, para. 33 (3)
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expressed its deepest regrets for all pain they had endured. 82 The Court has highly valued
the State action as one of the most ample acquiescence made in the system. 83

B.

The shape of compliance
Cases with acquiescence differ as to how well the strategies in the three previous

Stages have worked. Therefore, it is possible to track the strategy and its effects on
compliance. This section exhibits illustrations about the rigor of the judicial obligation
and the type of monitoring that shaped the compliance along with examples of State and
Court actions during the monitoring as key patterns of Stage 4 and 5. There are five key
patterns on Stage 4 and 5 that are presented separately.
1.

Stage 4: Monitoring and its key patterns — restrictions and limitations on

investigations and prosecutions and demands for compliance
a)

When States acquiesce — the Court diminishes both judicial obligation and

monitoring
When there is acquiescence, the rigor of the judicial obligation is diminished. In
the Blake case, the Court ordered a diminished obligation to the State when it stated, “it
must adequately investigate, prosecute, try and convict those that committed these HR
violations and took measures to prevent future violations.” 84 Once presented, this pattern
is visible in comparison with a case in which there is no acquiescence. For instance, in
the Garibaldi (Brazil) case, there is no acquiescence and the intensity applied by the
Court in its obligation to prosecute was extended to functional misconduct. 85

Montero Aranguren, supra 57, para. 42.
Id., paras. 57 and 150
84 Blake, supra 1, para. 64
85 Garibaldi v. Brazil, Judgment of September 23, 2009, (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs)
para. 169
82
83
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Chapter 3 notes that the Court rewards the States with a diminished monitoring. A
diminished monitoring translates in that the Court gives States that acquiesce more time
to act without intervention, delaying control processes and monitoring less frequently.
The above is illustrated with the El Amparo (Venezuela) case in which the State
acquiesced; the first monitoring judgment was issued six years after the issuance date for
the Judgment on Reparations and Costs. In contrast, in the Duran Ugarte (Peru) case and
the Sawhoyamaxa Community (Paraguay) case in which the States did not acquiesce
their first monitoring judgments were issued within a year. 86 For instance, monitoring
judgments were issued every four years in the Blake (Guatemala) case in which State
acquiesced. Conversely, the monitoring judgments were issued every two months in the
Sawhoyamaxa (Paraguay). 87 These differences in the number of the monitoring judgment
occurrences can be seen in comparing the 1 monitoring judgment in the Benavides
Cevallos (Ecuador) case with acquiescence with the nine monitoring judgments in the
Baena (Panama) case without it. 88
b)

When States acquiesce, they try to release their AUTHORITIES from

prosecutions by complying with non-judicial obligations and by means to exonerate
the authority of guilt and obstacles of law.
Delving into how Guatemala has shaped its compliance in the Blake case the
Guatemala State reported full compliance with non-judicial obligations on March 30,

86 Amparo v. Venezuela (Monitoring), ICHR, 28 November 2002; Duran Ugarte v. Peru (Monitoring),
ICHR, 27 November 2002; Sawhoyamaxa Community v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 2 February
2007
87 Id; Sawhoyamaxa Community v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 14 December 2007; Sawhoyamaxa
(Monitoring), ICHR, 8 February 2008; Sawhoyamaxa (Monitoring), ICHR, 20 May 2009;
Sawhoyamaxa (Monitoring), ICHR, 24 June 2015.
88 Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador (Monitoring), ICHR, 27 November 2003; Baena v. Panama
(Monitoring), ICHR, nine monitoring orders from 21 June 2002 to 28 May 2010
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2000. 89 This positive behavior regarding compliance with the ordered reparation could
deflect attention from its lack of complying with the judicial duty.
On May 7, 2004, and on August 17, 2005, after the State highlighted the Cifuentes
Lopez conviction - one of the ten that received superior orders for perpetrating the
execution in the Blake case - the State emphasized its incapacity to establish the
whereabouts of the remaining perpetrators since they fled away from the country. 90 In
consequence, the AUTHORITIES that directed the crime as masterminds hold the power
to ensure their impunities. The impunity is not surprising given that a comparable
situation exists in another case led by the Court. 91
Indeed, ten years later, on May 16, 2014, the State objected to the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court and noted that the facts of the Blake case fell on the
Reconciliation Law. By this action, AUTHORITIES remain exonerated from guilt at the
domestic level. 92 On May 5, 2015, the State actions also considered the use of law
obstacles, especially amnesties (based on the National Reconciliation Act), secrecy
(military reluctance to give information about perpetrators) and delaying procedural
tactics. All of them remain being used to conserve a structural impunity as a report of the
Public Prosecutor Office noted. 93 This report also emphasized others "structural
problems" in Guatemala. These problems impede the investigation of the Court cases
such as limitations on hiring public officials, lack of support from the National Civil
Police 94 and arbitrary suspension of judges. 95

Blake, supra 1, para considering 6)
Id.
91 Myrna Mack, supra 2, para. 216
92 12 Guatemalan’s Cases, supra 1, para. 2
93 Id., para. 32
94 Id., para. 32
89
90
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The current arbitrary suspension of magistrates is neither an unexpected nor an
astonishing event since AUTHORITIES and their network of protection tend to thwart
the work of domestic institutions. It happened when executives, judiciaries, and
prosecutors were required to coordinate their works to comply with the Court mandates
and often these actions go against AUTHORITIES. Therefore, even when some judges
and prosecutors wish for an end to impunity, the continued military influence, the
corruption, and clandestine organizations pose considerable impediments to judges and
prosecutors. In fact, the Court has issued protective measures by threats to judges and
prosecutors and witnesses (more than 15 to Guatemala). 96 On August 16, 1995, the Court
ordered Guatemala to adopt measures of protection in the Blake case. 97 On April 18,
1997, it called to extend the provisional measures. 98 Paradoxically, despite at it all, on
October 2015, the State requested the Court that its efforts destined to comply its judicial
obligations be evaluated in a positive way. 99
c)

When States acquiesce — the Court increases its demands for compliance.

This pattern is noted in 22 cases with demands.
In the Blake case, the Court uses one of its most typical time reminders “[t]hat
approximately twenty-three years have gone by since the occurrence of the facts of the
instant case, and more than nine since the rendering of the Judgments on the merits,
reparations and costs by the Court [...] Consequently, the Court notices with concern that,
from the information contributed by Guatemala, it cannot be concluded that the State has

Id., para. 32
Carpio, supra 2; Myrna Mack-Chang, supra 2; Bámaca-Velásquez, supra 2.
97 Blake v. Guatemala (Provisional Measures) ICHR, 16 August 1995, Ser. E, “Whereas” 3, Decides 1
and 3; Blake v. Guatemala (Provisional Measures) ICHR, 2 Sept. 1995, Ser. E, decidendi 1 and 2
98 Blake v. Guatemala (Provisional Measures) ICHR, 18 April 1997, decidendi 2.
99 12 Guatemalan’s Cases, supra 1, para. 33
95
96
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adopted the measures necessary to completely comply with what has been ordered by the
Inter-American Court.” 100
It is similar to when “the Court reminds that upon proceedings on the merits of
the case, more than fourteen years ago, the States acknowledged its international
responsibility for the violation of the HR of […].” 101 Another time reminder is: “the
acknowledgment of responsibility made by the States should be translated into prompt
[…] compliance with the orders of the Court by means of reparation measures. The States
should be consistent with the acknowledgment made [,...]. 102
The Court has repeatedly stated the Viena Convention that indicates that no
domestic law may prevent a State from complying with its international obligations. 103
When prescription is alleged, the Court reminds the States that certain crimes – like
disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and torture – are never subject to a statute of
limitations. 104 When non in bis in idem or res judicata is alleged in cases against Peru, the
Court asserts that no domestic case can be used to dismiss or absolve those responsible
Blake v. Guatemala, supra 1, para. 9
El Amparo, supra 88, para. 20; El Amparo v. Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR, 4 February 2010, para.
13.
102 El Amparo, Id., para. 14; Molina Theissen v. Guatemala (Monitoring) 16 November 2009,
Considering clause No. 18; Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (Monitoring) 16 November 2009, Considering
clause No. 51, and Case of Montero- Aranguren (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela (Monitoring)
17 November 2009, Considering clause No. 14 and Considering Clause 7. There more reminders in
cases such as: Molina Theissen, id, Considering Clause 18; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala
(Monitoring) 16 May 2011, Considering Clause 11; and El Amparo, supra 103 Considering Clause 4;
Vargas Areco v. Paraguay (Monitoring), ICHR, 24 November 2010, para 9; Trujillo Orozca v. Bolivia
(Monitoring) ICHR, 12 September 2005, considering para. 4 (e); Bueno Alves v. Argentina
(Monitoring) ICHR, 5 July 2011, considering paras 21-3; Vargas Areco v. Paraguay (Monitoring),
ICHR, 30 October 2008, para. 20; Vargas Areco, id, para. 156; Vargas Areco, id, para. 11; Manuel
Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), ICHR, 26 May 2010, Ser. C, No. 213, para
216d; Barrios Altos, supra 64, para. 41, operative para. 4; Vargas Areco, supra 47, para. 156; Manuel
Cepeda Vargas, id, para. 156; Vargas Areco, supra 47, para. 156; Manuel Cepeda Vargas, id, para. 156.
103 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 23 May 29169, entered into
forcé 27 January 1988, Art. 27.
104 Convention of the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, UN General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII), entered into force 11 November 1970. The
following OAS members have ratified the Convention: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vicent and Grenadines, Uruguay.
100
101
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for HR violations. 105 In dealing with Guatemala, the Court reiterates that contaminated
domestic judgments (by defects) do not excuse the States from its ICHR-issued
obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish. 106
2.

Stage 5: Sanctioning and its key patterns — enforcement by overreaching

and reporting.
a)

When States acquiesce — the Court slightly increases the issuance of

enforcement measures. This pattern was embodied in 23 of the 56 cases with
acquiescence.
(1)

Reporting
The Court reported 41% of the cases with acquiescence to the General Assembly

of the Organization of American States (GA of OAS). The Blake case has not been
considered in these reported cases even when the current rate of compliance of the Blake
case is less than 50% after 16 years under monitoring. This pattern will be illustrated with
some other instances.
In Benavides Cevallos (Ecuador) case, the acquiescence appears with a friendly
settlement and two commitments: to spread/clarify the truth and to comply with judicial
obligation. However, Ecuador has paid the financial reparation ordered by the Court, but
it refused to comply with the judicial obligation alluding statute barred. Accordingly, the
Court decides to inform the GA, in the application of Article 65 of the AC, about the
failure of Ecuador to comply with investigating, prosecuting and punishing all those

La Cantuta v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 26 November 2006, Ser. C No 162, para.
180; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 06 February 2001, Ser. C No 74,
considering para 14; Gelman v. Uruguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 24 February 2011,
Ser. C No 221, para. 226; Barrios Altos, supra 64, para. 41; Id., para. 41; Gelman v. Uruguay, id, para.
226; Benavides Cevallos supra 47, para, decides 3.
106 Carpio Nicolle, supra 2, para. 132
105
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responsible for the HR violations committed to the detriment of Consuelo Benavides
according to the judgment of June 19, 1998. 107
Consequently, the Court included a resolution detailing Ecuador’s noncompliance
in its yearly report (2003), which it expected to present to the GA of the OAS. 108 The GA
is empowered to examine the report and adopt political measures against the State.
However, the GA never officially discussed the report. The GA inaction weakened the
Court's ability to command enforcement of its judgments. The inter-state lobbying that
prevents that the GA censures States that do not comply in full with Court judgments
needs to be finished.
(2)

Appealing
Recall that this action consists in making a formal appeal to others Court members

or at higher levels of the Organization. With this opinion, the Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi,
in his Concurring Opinion noted, “in keeping with the relevant norms and in view of the
extended, and consequently more than prudent or reasonable, time that has elapsed since
the delivery of the judgment in this case without the State concerned [...] having
complied with its fundamental elements, the Inter-American Court of HR [...] must
advise the General Assembly of the Organization of American States [...] of this
situation.” 109Also, it was established in the appealing, "[...(e)] it is not admissible to
transform the regulatory mechanism of monitoring compliance with a “final and nonappealable” judgment, into the prolongation of the cas[e...].” 110

Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador (Monitoring Compliance) ICHR, 27 November 2003, decidendi 3.;
Annual Report 2003 – Chapter III <www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/chap.3k.htm>
108 Id.
109 El Amparo v. Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR, 20 February 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge
Eduardo Vio Grossi, para: 1(e)
110 Id.
107
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(3)

Overreaching the quasi-judicial review
Overreaching occurs when a Court order enlarges the scope of a judicial

obligation. For example, in the Blake case, on January 22, 1999, the Court issued its
judgment on Reparations and Costs. In this judgment the Court ordered the State to
effectively investigate, prosecute, try and convict those that committed these HR
violations and take measures to prevent future violations. Sixteen years later, the Court
expanded this obligation through a monitoring judgment ordering the duty to remove all
obstacles and mechanisms of fact and law that keep impunity. Eradicating the impunity is
a task that was not considered in the judgment on reparations and costs.
Considering the Blake case, in twelve cases of Guatemala, the Court dictates a
new mandatory course that the State needs to follow to comply with the judicial
obligation. This mandatory course of actions includes ten diverse activities that overreach
the original requirement. These new obligations include that the State cannot invoke as a
defense of its duty to investigate judgments in proceedings that have not met the
American Convention standards. Another is that the AUTHORITIES of the State cannot
resort to four mechanisms: the secret of the State, confidentiality of the information,
reasons for public interest and national security to not supply the information required by
the judicial or administrative AUTHORITIES in charge of the outstanding investigations
or proceedings ordered by the Court. It is also set to additional action that judges must
manage the proceedings to avoid that judicial means delay or hinder the process. The
twelve cases are: Blake, Villagrán, Bámaca, Mack Chang, Maritza Urrutia, Plan Sánchez
Massacre, Molina Theissen, Carpio, Tiu Tojín, Dos Erres Massacre and Chitay Nech. 111

111

12 Guatemalan’s Cases, supra 1, para. 40
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Aside of these twelve measures; the Court used these kinds of enforcements on
more than one occasion, for example in Molina 112 and Carpio (Guatemala) cases. 113 The
remaining illustrations in which the Court overreaches the quasi-judicial review are
Cardenas, Servellon Garcia, Moiwana, Montero, Amparo and Blanco. 114

VI.

EXCEPTIONS TO KEY PATTERNS

There are three exceptions to the relationship between acquiescence and lower
compliance. These exceptions indicate that this interpretation concerning
AUTHORITIES is on the right track. The first relates to cases in which States did not
acquiesce before providing protection to AUTHORITIES. This exception is a first
indication that this interpretation concerning AUTHORITIES is on the right track
because States request a change in the Court decisions to protect their AUTHORITIES.
The second and third exceptions relate to cases in which there is a relationship between
acquiescence and higher (rather than low) compliance. The presented interpretation on
the protection of AUTHORITIES is accurate since most exceptions to the relationship
acquiescence-lower compliance are explainable for a change in the type of
AUTHORITIES or type of victims affected by AUTHORITIES. Moreover, the
interpretation is correct since the lower level of compliance in cases without acquiescence
is also explainable by the presence of AUTHORITIES.

Molina Theissen, supra 104, paras. 25-33, decidendi 2-3.
Carpio Nicolle v. Guatemala (Monitoring) ICHR, 1 July 2009, para. 18
114 Ibsen Cardenas v. Bolivia (Monitoring) ICHR, 14 May 2013, paras 11-2; Servellón García v.
Honduras (Monitoring) ICHR, 22 November 2011, para. 10; Moiwana v. Suriname (Monitoring) ICHR,
21 November 2007, para. 2 (a); Montero Aranguren, supra 104 para. 22; El Amparo v. Venezuela
(Monitoring) ICHR, 18 December 2009, paras. 9-10; Blanco Romero v. Venezuela (Monitoring) ICHR,
22 November 2011, paras. 10-11.
112
113
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A.

States request a change in the Court decisions

There are few instances in which States claim an amendment to the Court rulings.
Since the use of this alternative presupposes an interest in maintaining the structural
impunity – an entrenched policy of protection – on the executive’s part of a powerful
State (Brazil) or that has the support from a powerful State (Peru about U.S). Even when
not all the members States of Inter-American HR System are in a situation of power, this
alternative shows the behaviors/actions of high AUTHORITIES in protecting themselves
or another AUTHORITY. Gomes Lund, the Bello Monte, and the Castro-Castro cases are
instances that illustrate when AUTHORITIES seek protection. In these instances, the top
AUTHORITIES of the State (Rousseff’s actions and Garcia’s declarations) exert an
explicit political pressure to push the Court to accept their request. The Court’s original
decisions negotiated down after the ICHR considered presidential expressions make the
Court rulings substitutable, compliance negotiable and the impunity possible.
1.

The Brazil cases

Rather than reputation, the goal is to protect Brazil’s stature as a rising global
hegemon. Without incentives to comply with the ICHR, making the difference between
impunity in perpetuity and justice is not a priority for the administration of President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and its current President Dilma Rousseff (Dilma).
In the Gomes Lund case (November 2010), 70 members of the Communist Party
of Brazil were detained, tortured and disappeared by the Brazilian Army between 197275 in the context of the military dictatorship that sought to eradicate the Guerrilha do
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Araguaia. 115 The Law No. 6.683/79 and a series of the legislative and administrative
measures were applied to restrict the criminal investigation of the responsible parties and
the information as well helps with the impunity. 116 Thus, the Court ordered Brazil to
dismantle its policies of providing amnesties for HR violators during the dictatorship in
the 1960s–1980s. 117 This possibility was contentious because Brazil refusing to
invalidate its amnesty laws, 118 while domestically prosecuting HR violators gained the
support of the Minister of the Supreme Tribunal. Despite this, he still retracted his
support, saying it was not for him to change amnesty laws. 119 Lula and his successor
were unwilling to lead judges and legislators to change amnesty laws as from top-down
their AUTHORITIES were exposed to prosecutions, including themselves. As a result,
the Court has had zero effect on Brazil’s approach toward accountability. 120
In fact, in another Brazilian case, on April 1, 2011, the ICHR ordered the
suspension of the Bello Monte hydroelectric plant’s license and construction by its
impact on [11 specified] indigenous communities. With this measure, the Court
questioned the legality of the actions of Lula as the highest-ranking political authority
and leader of the Bello Monte project, jeopardizing his reputation and responsibility,
which included his allies, among them Dilma that became president with Lula support.
Before the issuance of the Court decision, Dilma intervened to protect Lula when she
announced in her inaugural address on January 1, 2011, that the Belo Monte Dam
Complex, an anchor project in Lula’s 2007 investment plan, was essential for Brazilian
Gomes Lund v. Brazil (Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) ICHR, 24 November 2010,
paras. 88 and 89
116 Id., para. 2
117 Id., para. 325
118 Id., para. 126. Barrios Alto, supra 64, para. 41; Gelman, supra 107, para. 226
119 Wayne Sandholtz & Mariana Rangel Padilla, Juggling Rights, Juggling Politics: Amnesty Laws and
the Inter--American Court, 32.
120 id. at.
115
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development. After the Court decision, Brazil claimed that the measures were
"precipitous and unwarranted," including the Senate support that called them "[so] absurd
that it even threatens Brazilian sovereignty." 121 To pressure a change in the decision,
Brazil severed formal relations with the Commission, recalled its OAS ambassador, and
froze, as the third largest contributor to the OAS budget, its annual contribution, on
which the ICHR is dependent. 122 On July 29, 2011, the ICHR changed its decision
saying that it went beyond the scope of precautionary measures. 123 In consequence, the
mega project ultimately became a sign of forcible concession of the Court to politicaleconomic pressures by the Dilma administration given the entrenched policy to protect
AUTHORITIES.
2.

The Peru case

Unlike Brazil, Peru is not a powerful State, however, it had the support of a
hegemon like U.S. A reason that explains why for a long time Peru has lacked incentives
to comply with the ICHR and be concerned with international legitimacy, particularly
under Fujimori administration. 124 U.S. policies toward Peru were destined to block drug
exports since the mid-1990s. 125 The U.S strategic support and its close relationship with
the Fujimori government rendered irrelevant the temporary paralyzation of military aid
after Fujimori's 1992 autogolpe and his unconstitutional 2000 election. 126 In fact,
Fujimori used the U.S strategic support instead to fighting necessarily against drug

ALSTON & GOODMAN, International Human Rights 996. 2013.
Id. at. 996
123 Id. at. 996
124 Inter-American Commission on HR. 1998. “Country Report: Peru.” www.cidh.oas.org. (July 17,
2007).
125 Wright-Smith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 252. 2011.
126 Id. at. 251
121
122
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exports, to sacrifice all HR guarantees 127 and torturing, executing, and disappearances in
its efforts to combat Sendero Luminoso during the mid-to-late 1990s. 128 By 1995
amnesty law, political AUTHORITIES and militaries, especially, high-ranking
responsible ones were protected, after its derogation, by networks of corruption. 129
After the Fujimori administration’s violations, García began its second period in
2006. The supposition was that Garcia was going to harness any opportunity for
compliance to show respect for HR and to stop anticorruption issues. Contrarily, it is put
to question whether Garcia wanted to confront entrenched impunity since he relegated
HR by economic development. 130 There has been, indeed, a slight decline in Peru’s
compliance since 2005. The Garcia government’s nationalist discourse sought popular
support for the State’s refusal to comply with the “scandalous” judgment in the CastroCastro (Peru) case. 131 Since the symbolic reparation ordered by the Court affected the
interests of high-ranking militaries and their agents, individuals in the police force,
intelligence agencies, or other hierarchical armed institutions, García required its
U.S. Department of State. 2003. Country Report on HR Practices. Bureau of Democracy, HR, and
Labor. February 25, 2004. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27916.htm. (April 28, 2009)
128 Inter-American Commission on HR. 1998. “Country Report: Peru.” www.cidh.oas.org. (July 17,
2007).
129 United States Department of State. 1999. Country Report on HR Practices. Bureau of Democracy,
HR, and Labor. February 23, 2000. www.state.gov. The U.S. policies of partnership in the drug war
become a priority over human rights not only in Peru but also in Guatemala. Council on Hemispheric
Affairs. 2006. “Guatemala’s Cursed Armed Forces: Washington’s Old Friend is Back in Town.”
http://www.coha.org. (April 28, 2008).
130 Wright-Smith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 103. 2011.
131 Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 824-5 (2008). (The Court’s order
was criticized as being an offense to the memory of the victims of terrorism since the order would
have included the names of people who were presumed, by the media, to be terrorists. See Mario
Vargas
Llosa,
El
ojo
que
llora,
EL
PAIS,
Jan.
14,
2007,
available
at<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/ojoillora/elpepioni/20070114elpepiopi_5/Tes.
>[Spanish (International Sort)] Also, in an article attacking the judgment, the national newspaper,
Correo, reported finding two names of those involved already inscribed on the monument. The
discovery prompted the mayor to vow to remove all the names of “subversives” from the monument.
[Spanish (International Sort)] Terroristas en “El ojo que llora”, CORREO, Jan. 11, 2007, available at
<http: www.correoperu.com.pe/lima_nota.php? Id=40746>.)
127
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replacement. The Court revoked its order 132 seeking “[…t]o overcome the difficulty
reported by Peru [related to a monument called the Eye that Cries] in its brief of February
29, 2008. 133 However, this Court’s backing off was ineffective because the Castro-Castro
case remains in noncompliance as a result that Garcia never started to comply with orders
to investigate and prosecute those AUTHORITIES responsible for HR abuses, including
Fujimori.
These experiences show that under State pressures, the Court can change its
decisions. Maybe the Court knows that its judgments may challenge elected leaders or
presidential agendas, 134 and, in consequence, providing a variation in compliance would
be acceptable. Perhaps, the Court trusts that its decisional changes 135 raise cooperation 136
and counteract perceptions that judges are not faithful to the State preferences expressed
in a treaty or customary international law. To make the requested change or “backing
off” in its decisions, the Court assesses the expected outcomes regarding those States that
do not have a reputational concern. Indeed, the Court should assume that powerful States
(Brazil), those with the support of powerful States (Peru), and those that are rogue or
show a particular conflict with the Court (Venezuela), do not need validation to improve
their reputation. The Court makes apparently its decisions consistent with its knowledge.
In this way, when the Court changes its decisions, the Court attempts to encourage

Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Perú (Mertis, Reparations and Cost) ICHR, 25 November 2006. Ser.
C No. 160, para.3
133 Castro Castro v. Perú (Interpretation) ICHR, 2 August 2008. Ser. C No. 181, para. 57.
134 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On compliance, 47 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 197
(1993).
135 Alexei Trochev, The Role of the Constitutional Court in Russian Politics, 1990–2006 23
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008). See for example Miguel Castro Castro Prison, supra
130, para. 3
136 Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 328. 2013.
132
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serious and long-term HR commitments 137 amidst States in which the Court has a
problem to permeate in reputational terms.

B.

Acquiescence, AUTHORITIES and high

compliance
An indication that this interpretation is on the right track is that most exceptions to
the relationship between acquiescence and lower compliance i.e. cases with
acquiescence, AUTHORITIES but with compliance – can be explained by change in
AUTHORITIES, type of victims affected by AUTHORITIES. 138 In addition, in these
three cases: Trujillo Orozca (Bolivia), Servellon Garcia (Honduras) and Tiu Tojin
(Guatemala), an early monitoring of the Court was joined to a particular State position.
139

In the Trujillo Orozco (Bolivia) case, the State expresses acknowledgement of the
detention, torture and forced disappearance of the José Carlos Trujillo Orozca by military
agents and for the failure to investigate those responsible. And even with
AUTHORITIES such as Colonel Rafael Loayza, Head of Intelligence of the Ministry of
the Interior, Antonio Guillermo Elío, Deputy Secretary, and the Ministry of the Interior
that hide the crimes and ensure the impunity of the authors, 140 the return to democracy
seems to have a direct effect on the high compliance of this case since Bolivia decides to
leave without protection the AUTHORITIES of Banzer's dictatorship, as the following
137 Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 826 (2008). Hawkins & Jacoby,
J. INT'L L & INT'L REL., (2010).
138 The discussed pattern is ultimately corroborated by cases that do not involve AUTHORITIES in
which the early acquiescence and high compliance are presented. Seems to indicates that
acquiescence is sincere, because they do it when then do not have objected and compliance is higher
(from 60 to 80%). Cases such as Kimel and Vargas Areco reveals such tendency
139 Regarding the Honduras and Guatemala compliance, see details in the work of Kali WrightSmith, The decision to comply: Patterns of compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (2011) PURDUE UNIVERSITY).
140 Trujillo Orozca, supra 63 paras. 2, 13, 36-43
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statement stresses “Fell two former officials of the dictatorship of Banzer.” 141 This case
registers a rate of compliance of 71% of compliance.
Publicity increased the State propensity to comply, especially when the State is
unequivocally responsible for the abuse and its victims were children or well-known
persons. This element can explain why the rate of compliance of Servellon Garcia
(Honduras) and Tiu Tojin (Guatemala) cases is high, despite them having
AUTHORITIES to protect. These cases have a rate of compliance of 65%.
The Servellon Garcia case is the first international case of children’s HR. The
Court determines that Honduras was liable for the illegal detention, torture, and
extrajudicial execution of one adult and three children. The State conceded its
responsibility for the operation carried out by the Public Security Force in a context of
violence marked by the victimization of children and youngsters in a situation of social
risk, in which more than 24 AUTHORITIES were implicated. 142 The State complied
quickly with orders to initiate HR training for the police, create a database to facilitate
investigations of missing youth, and publically honor victims. It was highly cooperative
in this case, and the victims’ representatives “acknowledged the good will expressed by
the State.” 143
From the mid-1990s, Honduras has started to comply at a rate of 50-60%.
Honduras’s discourse reveals a commitment to comply within its acquiescence of
responsibility; nonetheless, the State frequently complies to send a signal to international
organizations. This signal improves its reputation and appeases claims by an absence of

Trujillo v. Bolivia (Monitoring) ICHR, 17 November 2004.
Servellón García v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 21 September 2006. Ser. C No. 152,
para. 79
143 Id., para. 58
141
142
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an extensive HR reform. Commitment to compliance from Honduras is largely hindered
by its sovereigntist discourse to avoid the interference of the Court. 144
In Tiu Tojin (Guatemala) case, the State acquiesced for the forced disappearance
of María Tiu Tojín and her daughter Josefa Tiu Tojin and the subsequent denial of
justice. This case is another illustration of high compliance despite implication of
AUTHORITIES. AUTHORITIES are implicated (as the Court established) as part of a
pattern of massive and systematic violations of HR ordered by the State. This pattern is
committed during the internal armed conflict and carried out by military agents and
members of the Civil Self-Defense Patrols in detriment of the Mayan indigenous people
and the communities of populations in resistance. 145
Guatemala's discursive focus on recent administrations' prioritization of HR and
remediation for past abuse is an essential part of its acquiescence. 146 Commitment to
compliance is a recurrent argument of its acquiescence. Its arguments are presented along
with a high number of anticipatory remedial obligations that coincides with its shift
toward greater compliance (at a rate of 40-50%) after 2004. 147 Nevertheless, the
normative commitment does not reach the full implementation due to impunity,

Honduras made severe critics against the Court, declaring that its processes lack ground and truth
(as the Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras (Objections) ICHR, 26 June 1987, Ser. C No. 3, para. 28);
that its judgments are unreasonable since the Court also has prejudice against Honduras (as the Case
of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras (Interpretation) 25 November 2003, Ser. C No. 102, para. 19a
and 34d); that compliance depends on Honduras policy “framework” exclusively (as ServellónGarcía, supra 7, para. 68). In the same vein that in López-Álvarez, Juan Humberto Sánchez, and
Servellón-García cases, Honduras claims the Court cannot demand action that falls outside of its
regular domestic procedures.
145 Tiu Tojín, supra 2, paras. 2, 53.
146 Supra 179
147 Blake, supra 1; Bámaca, 2; Myrna Mack, supra 2; The Plan Sanchez Massacre, supra 2; MolinaTheissen, supra 2; Carpio Nicolle, supra 2; Tiu Tojín, supra 2; Dos Erres Massacre, supra 2; Chitay
Nech, supra 2.
144
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centralization and its weak institutions prevent that the norm of compliance be evenly
accepted and distributed throughout the government.
Honduras and Guatemala are in Central America, regarding their compliance
could be missing as a consequence of the domestic instability, institutional weakness, and
economic damage that characterized the Central America, but compliance has the
opportunity to increase slowly. Each State's discourse includes (most of the time)
commitments rather than justifications of abuses, their discourse apparently matches with
a commitment to comply with HR. Guatemala and Honduras through their acquiescence
have showed themselves as legitimate (as they are interests of States in Stage 1) and
democratic States that recognize that they are unable to neglect norms of justice and
accountability. Nevertheless, unfortunately, there are not entirely collective ideas of
appropriateness and varied responses to HR obligations, domestic failures, and a weak
rule of law, show that the rules are not fully internalized. These values are not intrinsic
parts of their identities, and therefore, full compliance will be difficult to emerge until all
domestic institutions uphold these norms.

C.

Non-acquiescence, AUTHORITIES and little

compliance
Another indication that the presented interpretation on the protection of
AUTHORITIES is right is the lower rate of compliance of cases without acquiescence.
This phenomenon is also explainable by the presence of high-ranking officials. In fact,
the rate it started at 50% and then fell to 37%. As it was explained in Chapter 3, Stage 1,
acquiescing is useless when there is not proof of alleged actions or omissions against
AUTHORITIES or institutions of the State. Two cases, Serrano Sisters and the Garcia
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Prieto (Salvador) illustrated that this results when there is a law obstacle to using or the
evidence is nonexistent or only for people in their condition of individuals. There is no
additional risk for high AUTHORITIES since States could also anticipate that the actions
will be targeted against the scapegoats only.
In fact, both cases were shelved by prescription on May 27, 1998, and on June 9,
2004, respectively. 148 In addition, in the Serrano case, there is no evidence of the
abduction of the victims since the State affirmed that the kidnapping and their fate were
not established. In the same sense, the Supreme Court decided it was inappropriate to
investigate the whereabouts of victims by members of the no longer existing battalion
owing to the Peace Agreements. The Ministry of Defense did not provide information
about the battalion and stated that Captain Jiménez and Officer Ticas are no longer
enrolled in the institution, making it impossible to find them and accuse the battalion
members. 149 In the Garcia Prieto case, Salvador alleged that private individuals that were
found guilty committed Garcia’s homicide. The State rejected that a member of the
Division of Criminal Investigation was the third material perpetrator and a General the
intellectual author; indeed, their charges were dismissed for lack of evidence. 150
The illustrations (narratives that capture the qualitative analysis) presented above
indicate that the presence of AUTHORITIES in this study was a factor of control in all
the emerging patterns – notably since they relate to the interaction between the States and
the Court. This Chapter also noted that AUTHORITIES applies to other contexts.

148 Serrano v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No.
120, para. 48 (25); García v. El Salvador (Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 20
November 2007, para. 91
149 Id., para. 48
150 Id., paras. 72, 75 and 88
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Summary. While in Chapter 3, mixed qualitative/quantitative data revealed
patterns of the interaction between States and the Court to inform the analysis, the picture
of this examination is completed with illustrations of qualitative data in this Chapter. A
more detailed summary and a discussion of the results are presented in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
SUMMARYZING AND DISCUSSING THE RESULTS
I.

SUMMARY
The reality of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR) is that States

fully comply with only 5% of its judgments. I argued that noncompliance is
understandable by the interaction between States and the Court. This dissertation
analyzed patterns of noncompliance resulting from this interaction in both the judicial
proceedings and monitoring processes. The existing theoretical ideas, however, do not
allow us to perceive patterns arising from this systematic interaction for three reasons.
(1) The scholarly tend to be concerned with compliance with norms most of the
time, not judgments, and these show different patterns: mostly compliance with norms
mostly noncompliance with judgments. Moreover, each main IR theory (realism,
institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism) can explain only some portions of
noncompliance, leaving gaps in our understandings about compliance and
noncompliance. (2) Furthermore, the States’ and Court’s roles have not received the
same systematic scholarly attention. Or, put plainly, these leading IR theories do not
systematically consider the Court's participation (at least, to some degree) on the
formation of States’ preferences nor its impact in judgment compliance. However, courts
participation in IR processes does not necessarily mean that courts or their ideas
determine the nature of the interaction by itself or in isolation. Participation is not the
same as the capability to produce specific outcomes such as compliance. (3) These IR
theories seem to provide theoretical importance to the process of interaction between
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States and Courts. However, they do not account that the very process of interaction itself
is fit to explain the problem of compliance.
As a result of these three reasons, those theoretical ideas do not try to account for
the phenomenon of interest in the direction that this dissertation explored. Indeed, none
of the existing approaches explains how the exercise of the interaction between states and
courts may affect the structure and dynamic of compliance and noncompliance, including
the role that ideas might play. By this major flaw in IR theories, it is required a theory of
compliance with judgments that guides the understanding of how the problem of
compliance happens.
This is why the research concern established in Chapter 1 placed the question:
How do States move toward or away from compliance in their interaction with the Court
and its judgments? It was answered by the identification of the process of interaction that
allows the generation of a processual theory. This theory is grounded in the interaction,
and it can place together the problem of compliance developed between two specific
actors: states and the ICHR in certain processes and around principles. These four
combine with the current goals of states and the court. In this theory, those
counterintuitive effects about the interaction between States and the Courts are revealed.
This theory contributes to the extension of prevailing ideas about compliance and
noncompliance.
The reasons and motivation for examining the role, the type, the scope and impact
of the interaction between states and the courts are, as pointed out in Chapter 1, because
this interaction is the missing key to explaining complex and unexpected relationships
between patterns of behaviors that result from the Court and States’ routine or strategic
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responses. The interaction that was addressed by this dissertation is an unexplored and
understudied field. As explained in Chapter 2, this study provides new insights into the
interaction between States and the Court through the method of Grounded Theory. This
approach means that conclusions have been drawn from the ground up, in this instance
from depictions of States members of the Inter-American HR System and the ICHR, who
currently appear as parties in 129 cases started by the violation of HR. This study was
highly exploratory and, aided by NVIVO analytical software, resulted in many potential
findings and patterns of interaction and noncompliance that would be valid topics for
further study.
From initial empirical observations of the problem of compliance, first, emerges
an unexpected preliminary finding: acquiescence leads to lower compliance rates in
which both nature and structure of the interaction between states and the court is
identified.
Second, the nature of the relationship between acquiescence and compliance was
found to be determined by two partially incompatible State and Court goals for the
resolution of a case (protecting versus prosecuting high-ranking authorities). Compliance
and noncompliance decisions and all factors identified in the relationship between
acquiescence and compliance are influenced by the goals of States and Courts in confined
contexts. Thus, they are context-dependent goals, in which; if the context preserves its
status quo, the goals keep their force. On the contrary, if the context is changed, the goals
also (at least, eventually).
As pointed out in Chapter 3, I propose that we can understand the relationship
between acquiescence and compliance by analyzing acquiescence as the first step in a
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series of different actions designed to minimize the consequences for high-ranking
authorities of being prosecuted by an ICHR judgment. These State actions do not
continuously work, as the ICHR for fear it would betray its idealistic goal insists on
obtaining domestic prosecutions that require actions against high-ranking authorities. In
such instances, States, given their goals of protecting high-ranking authorities, either fail
to comply or enter long enforcement monitoring processes.
Third, the nature of the relationship between acquiescence and compliance was
found to be determined by State's material goals that interact with the Court's normative
goals in certain processes. The analysis that defines processes is, thus, consistent with the
observation that without a progressive idea of change is impossible to predict state
behaviors about compliance and noncompliance. Indeed, the central hurdle with the
extant compliance ideas centers on their static, rather than dynamic approach about
change. In these static approaches, the potential change is recognized at a different level
from that it works. In the process revealed by the data, this determination of change was
crucial to understand the effects of each factor within its own particular context. That it is
said because under the argument developed here, States and Courts affect compliance and
noncompliance in predictable ways. For example, it would predict a general occurrence
such as how ruling and compliance can arise from alternative modes of engagement and
negotiation. Or, more specific issues as that compliance is strongest where States propose
anticipatory remedial actions and these remedies link between cooperation and
procedural progress – even if State interests point in the opposite direction. However,
compliance will weaken when the Court diminishes the monitoring process.
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Alternatively, it is possible to predict how ruling and compliance can arise from
alternative modes of engagement and negotiation.
There are five sub-processes, namely stages. These sub-processes are descriptive
and conceptual categories: signaling, exchanging, negotiation, monitoring, and sanction.
It was traced the sequence of events (action/reaction/counteraction) to show how subprocesses build on each other. Since each sub-processes combine problems that move
States toward or away from compliance, it is logical to distinguish factors that are
contributing to compliance from those that are contributing to noncompliance.
The sub-processes by which compliance and noncompliance are produced can
affect the way in which States form their preferences and interests. In that sense, the
analyzed data challenges our preconceived notions about how to understand compliance.
As it was mentioned in Chapter 3, compliance is not an all-or-nothing case; rather, it
results from a story that unpacks contributions from States and Courts. Thus, even when
the data seems to suggest that the judgment compliance can be conceptualized as a form
dominated by calculations of political interest and power, compliance is not an issue to be
resolved just by a treatment of objective information (in isolation) since the interaction
serves to form subjective experiences that States and Courts can develop as a part of their
propositional language. In the process in which compliance is developed, practical
realities/considerations (of the process) join the State instrumental calculations with
normative concerns of the Courts. Thus, it is the interaction between the two that brings
an added element to the equation.
The Courts would affect, in certain ways, State preferences, because they place
their judgments in a process of interaction that are more than a series of standardized
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operations to change or preserve pre-determined preferences or goals. Rather, they are
process in which compliance with the Court judgments is an inherent component of a
language guided by the directly participation of the Courts. In fact, during the decisionmaking processes (such as judicial proceedings and monitoring) the Courts consider how
actions and their intentions are expressed to interpret how these communicated actions fit
with norms to rule. The results of this dissertation illustrate how the Courts judged the
petitions for acquiescence together with the rationales and justifications for State actions.
Then, all these understandings were critical to determining compliance. Because the
Courts have the power to interpret State behavior and stabilize their normative
meanings, the Courts contribute to the creation of a process of interaction and for
change in which the Courts enhance or diminish expectations of States. In this way,
the activities of the Courts interplay a role in a broader identified process.
In the processual theory that the data reveal, the ability of the courts to affect IR is
expressed in that the courts can also create opportunities for states to act in traditional
ways (e.g., by protecting their material power and rejecting compliance). It does so by
reducing the State’s sovereign power through providing legal, symbolic resources that
translate into the power to name violations and violators in particular intrusive law
remedies. This way of interaction displays an alteration in the distribution of power
between States and Courts during the proceedings and monitoring that opens space for
Courts to participate in a broader process. Nevertheless, political factors such as the
presence of high-ranking authorities implicated in international HR processes and the
tensions between powers often limit the Court and its nuanced, complex interaction with
the State. Also, a persistent obstacle to the Court is the asymmetries of power between
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States and the Courts. These asymmetries came from the ability to make (or not)
decisions appropriate to their goals - based on their anticipated knowledge. States make,
for instance, calculations based on it.
My empirical research has revealed patterns that can be analyzed to fill out the
gaps of the current governance theory. What is most impressive about the results, are that
they put in evidence that the reality of compliance problem does not always work the way
the governance theory (IR) says the reality does or should be. The central conclusion is
that rational approaches (e.g., realism and institutionalism) have little to say about how
the Courts (one of the two actors within series of interactions) participate in
noncompliance. Liberalism considers the interests of non-state actors, and states filter
them. However, liberals do not indicate how the preferences of non-state actors connect
with international institutions (such as Courts) in the interaction to form state preferences.
Constructivism explains compliance and noncompliance equally, failing to explain a
normative direction i.e., how the social construction of some ideas (principles around the
interaction between states, non-state actor and international organizations) move towards
compliance or noncompliance. These theories also seem insufficient to explain the
potential change of state and court interests and ideas during the process of interaction;
thus, the idea of change is not considered in all its dimensions that it is an impediment to
the predictability of each theory.
All in all, there is no evidence in the data that contradicts that political factors to
avoid compliance can also impede to the Court leverage the nature of the relationship and
aspects of its frequent interaction with States to remove some of the unprogressive HR
situation. These actions can be tested against empirical evidence from international
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judicial proceedings and monitoring processes. They can be further explored because I
have specified the mechanism, by which interaction works, the conditions in which the
process occurs and the interaction translates into State interests. It brings to the normative
conclusion that to change an unprogressive HR situation it is both appropriate and
necessary for Courts be convinced that States can change their behavior in light of its
interaction. To do so, the Court needs to crystallize its goals toward interconnections that
relegate the idealism by a discourse that needs to be also progressist, pragmatic and even
strategic. In this context, there is a need to implement behavioral changes. Thus, it is the
moment to hypothetically ask: How can Courts leverage their interaction with States in
ways to increase compliance?
I sought to analyze these emerging patterns to offer an explanation of
noncompliance with international judgments to engage scholars and policy makers in a
fresh discourse that is more grounded in actual practice than historical compliance
debates have been. The practical considerations that are ensured by emerging patterns
should be the basis for empirically-based judgment compliance theory, whose process
and mechanism has been defined. I also pointed to issues that must be resolved anew as a
result of my findings through sound statutory and political reform recommendations.
Focusing on interaction, I propose a package of five strategies in the Court actions to
address the problems my analysis identified such as introducing a state report or progress
of the status of the violation; naming responsibility for the abuse and persecutor;
engaging conditional agreements; procuring equal treatment, timely compliance and
understandings and mapping Court reactions. Such matters include the actual impact of
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international HR judgments, which are, in part, meant to act as deterrents to future HR
violations.

II.

THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. Theoretical implications
From the results presented and analysis described in Chapter 3, I have identified
patterns of noncompliance that relate back to the explanations that the IR theories offer to
the extensive noncompliance with ICHR judgments summarized in Chapter 1. First, the
central finding of the analysis supported by the data suggests how many states in the
ICHR system have found ways to subordinate the ICHR to their political interests. My
data indicate that, in cases involving high-ranking political authorities, states parties
evade compliance with the court’s judgments. Thus, the court does not play a stronger
role in restricting sovereign state power—that is the theoretical explanation for why states
parties have moved in the opposite direction in weakening the court through deliberately
frustrating compliance. I also have described how the noncompliance includes an
interaction between states and the court, namely, power and political interests of domestic
political actors and the idealist Court’s participation in state strategies.
Second, the empirical evidence does not support that one theory explains most of
the noncompliance the ICHR system experiences. Thus, noncompliance fits into different
IR theoretical explanations: (1) the domestic political actors that have found ways (a
strategy) to sustain noncompliance resonates with liberalism because liberalism focuses
on domestic factors as the key variable for explaining IR. (2) The power and political
interest of States to avoid compliance seems to fit with rationalist theories of IR, such as

196

realism or institutionalism (e.g., the states fail to comply because the states determine it is
not in their interests to comply with judgments (or, the costs of compliance outweigh the
benefits of complying). (3) The Court’s participation in state strategies seems to connect
to either an institutionalist or constructivist explanation in IR (e.g., from an
institutionalist perspective, the Court is a regime (composed of substantive rules and
procedural mechanisms) or institution that can help through better cooperation and
compliance with mutually agreed rules; from a constructivist perspective, the Court helps
create a process of social construction of ideas about HR and compliance with the ICHR).
Starting with Realism, realists believe they can explain the extensive
noncompliance observed in the ICHR system by showing that compliance with HR
brings no benefits to states regarding their material power, position, and prospects.
Ultimately, realism would demonstrate how unimportant HR rules are to the struggle for
power that dominates the IR. Put more plainly; realism does not need to develop much
interest nor take HR seriously. Thus, realists have three expectations. First, there will be
no case, under realism, in which a state did not comply because an HR international
judgment’s intrusiveness, scale, or substantive conclusions that have threatened state's
material power. Second, rates of compliance to track whether compliance provides
benefits to the state regarding its material power. Third, the realist explanation focuses on
States as the single rational actor that matters in compliance. Thus, the Courts are not and
will not be ineffective (in the realism) since States will not react to restraints neither
possibilities given by them. These three expectations can be erroneous:
(1) Under this view, international institutions like the Courts cannot change the
structure of the IR, and they reflect state calculations of self-interest; as a result,
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institutional outcomes reveal the balance of power. However, the courts do not reflect
state calculations of self-interest based when they are HR Courts that threaten State
material power. The data show, quite clearly, that, compliance with HR might hurt the
effectiveness of key institutions of the state in material power terms. Even more
specifically, the military and intelligence agencies are part of these key institutions that I
call, during my analysis, AUTHORITIES. There is noncompliance because these
AUTHORITIES trigger opposition of states. Realists overlook, thus, that compliance
with international HR judgments can threaten a State’s material power vis-à-vis other
States.
(2) The data demonstrate that compliance with HR judgments holds no material
benefit - when states view the ICHR as a threat to sovereign and a representation of
hegemonic interest. Thus, under the territorial sovereignty and non-intervention
principles, the State urges the Court to back off: through noncompliance and selfmarginalization from the Court’s jurisdiction, the treaty regime and finally, the system.
These cases provide an excellent example of the theoretical failing in the realist logic.
(3) The Courts can be effective since States interacts with Courts in terms of
restraints and possibilities given by them. Realist outcomes reveal contradictory logics,
on the one hand, realists consider that the Court cannot move States toward compliance,
thus, under this logic the Court neither might move States away from compliance. The
data reveal, quite explicitly, that, in certain cases (e.g., judicial obligations of
acquiescence cases), the court (and the ICHR regime overall) does not change the
behavior of states. However, this happens not only since states parties have deliberately
frustrated compliance across time and found ways to protect their political interests and
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power. But also, the analyzed data suggest that the ICHR’s participation in State
strategies produces noncompliance. In fact, the ICHR’s issuance of judicial obligations
and directed against certain people has filled (but also could challenge) the State
motivations. In other words, the court provides incentive or disincentive to states
compliance. On the other hand, the realism explains the court's lack of material power by
treating the courts as states, when with or without material power the Court's judgments
can affect States' material power (as it was said above) and the courts and their systems
do not instate for global government. ICHR installs, for example, its processes to serve in
cooperation and coordination States' efforts to achieve implementation of norms and
judgments - respecting sovereign and non-intervention principles - and do not seek to
intervene internal affairs.
Institutionalism completes some of the gaps in the realism, even when, similarly,
like Realism, accepts that States are unitary rational actors. However, the assertion that
distinguishes institutionalism from realism is that institutionalists claim that, in certain
situations, institutions can have an independent effect on state behavior. The court is an
institution, a regime composed of substantive rules and procedural mechanisms. It is
feasible that institutionalists concentrate on the attributes that the courts have as an active
center; for example, the ICHR does move States toward compliance in non-judicial
obligations via cooperation. Institutionalism recognizes that institutions do not always
have this impact on the rational calculations of states.
The analyzed data show, quite clearly, that, in certain cases, the court (and the
ICHR regime overall) does not have much impact on the rational behavior of states
across time because states continue to find ways to avoid compliance. Just as
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institutionalism explains, in other contexts, why institutions do not have a substantial
impact on state behavior, institutionalism, as a theory, can consider for the phenomenon
of interest to this dissertation. Now, again, the explanation might not be sufficient or
persuasive based on the data. Indeed, the data makes institutionalism insufficient or
unpersuasive since my data provide powerful evidence that the court does not, in fact,
have this “independent role” institutionalists claim theoretical analysis must explain i.e.,
do not support the notion that the court has some power over states that institutionalism
fails to take into consideration.
Institutionalists generalizes that institutions create incentives for cooperation and
assumes institutions able to disincentive States to leave the international community.
Rather, Institutionalism might explain, before placing the success of institutions, how the
nuanced calculation of states (can be based on fears about relative power) when a
complex interaction is placed by the court's issuance of judgments. For example,
Institutionalism cannot explain why, despite high levels of cooperation, noncompliance
persists. 1 Four States 2 have been repeatedly internationally responsible. This chronic and
disproportionate noncompliance by Peru, Guatemala, Colombia and Venezuela is more
than a follow-up issue. 3 The theory fails to explain more serious, complex cases of
noncompliance such as these aforementioned, those illustrated by the States that selfmarginalized from the Inter-American HR System or those in which noncompliance is
mixed with or rooted in costly reparations. Courts like the ICHR have pioneered a range
of remedies for HR violations that accept the possibility that costlier solutions “could be
1 Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 104, (November
28, 2003), for which 166 observations involving 3 IL institutions were issued in 10 monitoring
orders.
2 Representing 66% of cases in the monitoring process as of 2010
3 Peru’s noncompliance (27%) is much more than a follow-up issue.
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an obstacle to compliance.” 4 Domestic factors can also hinder compliance if the Court’s
reparations rely on non-existent, and therefore inapplicable, domestic law. When
noncompliance is the result of multiple actors that interact Institutionalism is best
complemented with a pluralist IR explanation, as in Liberalism and Constructivism
discussed below.
Liberal theory seems to be a persuasive theoretical explanation of the data
generated in cases involving high-level political authorities within states parties in the
ICHR system. This theory argues that political actors and processes within the state shape
the state's international behavior and national interests. According to the data,
AUTHORITIES are these domestic political actors that have repeatedly found ways to
sustain noncompliance with international HR obligations over years and years.
In consequence, under this view, “State decisions in the international realm
[require] understanding the domestic politics that underlie them.” 5 To illustrate, in the
Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago – we see that
despite Trinidad and Tobago’s reservations regarding the application of capital
punishment upon ratification of the American Convention, the ICHR judgment ordered
the State to abstain from executions. Trinidad and Tobago contested the order citing a
domestic legal process that prevented compliance with some reparations ordered in this
case. The judgment was inconsistent with the State’s juridical system by specifying the
cessation of capital punishment instead of the discretionary power of pardon available in
the offending State’s legal system. These ICHR’s attempts to effect positive change in
domestic law made it foreseeable that the judgment would be met with noncompliance.

4
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Liberal theory seems to be a persuasive theoretical explanation of the data
generated in cases involving high-level political authorities within states parties in the
ICHR system. This theory argues that political actors and processes within the state shape
the state's international behavior and national interests. According to the data,
AUTHORITIES are these domestic political actors that have repeatedly found ways to
sustain noncompliance with international HR obligations over years and years. In
consequence, under this view, “State decisions in the international realm [require]
understanding the domestic politics that underlie them.”
To illustrate, in the Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad
and Tobago – we see that despite Trinidad and Tobago’s reservations regarding the
application of capital punishment upon ratification of the American Convention, the
ICHR judgment ordered the State to abstain from executions. Trinidad and Tobago
contested the order citing a domestic legal process that prevented compliance with some
reparations ordered in this case. The judgment was inconsistent with the State’s juridical
system by specifying the cessation of capital punishment instead of the discretionary
power of pardon available in the offending State’s legal system. These ICHR’s attempts
to effect positive change in domestic law made it foreseeable that the judgment would be
met with noncompliance.
Liberalism would acknowledge that the interests of Trinidad and Tobago, one of
the three Commonwealth Caribbean States, emerged from the bottom up (through
domestic legal processes) against the ICHR’s attempts to abolish capital punishment.
Thus, in the absence of means to support norms, rules, and judgments, IL has a minimal
chance of connecting domestic and international institutions and of promoting
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compliance. 6 Therefore, international courts do not make a long-term global policy form
as liberals supposed to do. The data clearly demonstrates how little the court’s “power”
matters in the cases I identify—cases that liberal theory can, in fact, explain in that the
Court's role is illusory until become a preference of non-state actors.
A flaw in liberalism is that the extensive noncompliance begs the question why all
the norms, rules and judgments of the existing Inter-American HR system have not been
enforceable by non-state actors in connection with member states. Liberalists’ focus on
domestic interest formation but does not provide an in-depth explanation of how a nonstate actor’s perception of its interests could come or be altered by State participation in
international institutions.
For instance, in the Trinidad and Tobago case, the question is how those non-state
actors behind the interests of Trinidad and Tobago would interact with the ICHR’s
jurisdictional overreach to produce noncompliance. Liberal theorists do not provide an
explanation about how States filters the domestic preferences of non-state actors in IR.
For example, it does not explain how Barbados made explicit the capital punishment as
an affair unquestionable by the Court since as a rule reflects the decision of its people.
Therefore, liberal theory explains that the process of compliance and noncompliance
results from an interaction between the Courts, States, and non-state actors but without
detailing how. Thus, when noncompliance is the product of multiple and complex
interactions Institutionalism is best complemented with Constructivism discussed below.
Finally, Constructivism argues that IR is explained by looking at the social
construction of ideas that occurs through the interactions of state and non-state actors.

Helfer, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1859 (2002). According to Helfer, linkages that could act to improve
compliance can instead cause a possible counter-reaction.
6
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The presented data show that the idea of full compliance with ICHR judgments is not an
idea socially constructed in the set of ideas and interactions under the ICHR system.
Rather, state actors have strategically, and in a pattern of behavior, the data reflect,
pursued noncompliance. My analysis, in fact, shows how this theory ignored that the
international system could force states to be egoists and sovereign-actors, indeed, states
have managed to construct socially noncompliance in the kinds of cases that demonstrate
this pattern of behavior—and have done so while socially interacting with the ICHR
institutions and non-state actors around political interests.
Constructivism focuses on the process of change, thus, this theory assumes that
states change by intersubjective understandings and expectations of being mutually
conditioned parts of a larger whole (community norms). 7 There are questions about the
value of constructivism as a theory. For constructivists the outcomes are unimportant,
accordingly, constructivism focuses on the process of change rather than on its ends and
cannot predict the future of international politics like compliance. 8 Thus, it does not
answer how this process of social construction of ideas (constructivism) produced such
high levels of noncompliance? This theory merely explains to us that ideas about
compliance and noncompliance, like all significant aspects of IR, are equally social and
historical constructed. 9
In this sense, under constructivism, what is happening between member states of
the Inter-American System is that the Court and its monitoring process (an institution that
facilitates a process of social construction of ideas about HR and compliance with the
ICHR) has failed to socially construct compliance-friendly ideas with ICHR judgments
Mearsheimer, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 140-2 (1994).
Id. at, 132-3.
9 Id. at, 132-3.
7
8
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and attitudes in the set of interactions under the ICHR system that affected communities
(national or regional). However, and despite constructivism considers the potential
change and interaction of state interests and courts, as theory seems insufficient because
constructivism cannot answer why some processes to create noncompliance become
dominant in the set of ideas? Constructivism, as a theory, does not point in any particular
normative direction. In other words, constructivism cannot explain which are ideas are
better than others because we need some other theory to explain why the “more
compliance” idea is better than some other idea.
It is hard to see how one theoretical explanation covers the many complex cases I
have categorized from the ICHR system. In the present analyzes, all IR theories are
united to explain a different portion of the data. The unification makes evident that a
comprehensive theory of judgment-compliance is needed. However, the unification is a
risky operation since it implies to harmonize too much notion, as I said in Chapter 2. My
data and analyzes show how each theory has a problem in its causal logic since they do
not allow us to perceive the profound interaction between the States and Courts. The
analysis makes understandable the role of the interaction between States and the Court in
the problem of compliance. My data contribute to extending the understanding of IR
theories.
It was also hard to decide which of the many possible changes would be the
adequate to overcome the problem of compliance when the evidence shows only a 5%
full compliance rate with court judgments more than three decades after this regime was
established. Context in which, the ICHR is well known as ‘the clearest example of a
Court where noncompliance is the norm,’ as it was mentioned in Chapter 3. The data
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allow me to conclude that the court system needs to move in (at least) three levels –
changes at the State level, inter-State level, and the intergovernmental level. However,
the data strongly raise the question why the court (and its attendant institutional pieces)
has such a weak role in this HR system and why the Court is so routinely, over many
years, manipulated and subordinated by states. Thus, the efforts in changes need to be
preliminarily placed in the Court. Moreover, the data seem able to support a theoretical
explanation about how or why the court has a role that it can leverage in these sets of
interactions. More broadly, the data reveal the ability of the court to participate in IR
processes that create opportunities for states to act in certain ways - it does not
necessarily mean that the tribunals or their ideas determine the nature of the interaction
by itself. As I said above, participation is not the same as the capability to produce
specific outcomes, but it is possible to initiate them.
Based on the evidence five changes regarding the Court practices are presented.
These changes are possible responses anchored on what problems the proposals were
specifically intended to ameliorate, even when Institutionalism and Constructivism serve
as theoretical supports to shifts in the court practices. It is interesting how those theories
have different explanations for why a better Court practices are one of the keys to
improving compliance. These changes are based on the premise that whether the Court
changes the context in which the preferences of States are formed, the State rational
calculations during the proceedings and monitoring processes can be altered favoring
compliance (institutionalism), or at least an idea of change toward compliance could be
constructed (constructivism). However, if the Court practices are the problem with
existing noncompliance, how do we explain how this institutional process
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(institutionalism) or this process of social construction of ideas (constructivism) produced
such high levels of non-compliance? It appears (theoretically) that the evidence suggests
that the Court has not sufficiently (1) shaped state interests (meaning institutionalism is in
trouble here), or (2) socially constructed compliance-friendly ideas and attitudes in the
communities affected (meaning we have questions about the value of constructivism as a
theory). Further, constructivism cannot support moving the social construction of ideas
towards compliance because there is no idea in which “more compliance” idea is better
than some other idea. Thus, let's improve the Court (as a normative argument) does not
seem to answer the deeper problems the combination of the evidence and IR theory
identify. The existing data are, however, insufficient to respond to these theoretical
questions completely, so further research is necessary. Meanwhile the following
recommendations are presented.
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B. Policy implications/recommendations
There is no simple solution to the challenges faced by the Court during its
interaction with States. Albeit, it is expectable, based on overarching themes that
emerged from the data (proceedings and the monitoring), that the greatest challenges will
occur in how the Court can leverage its capabilities to interact with different State
strategies. Given the analyzed relationship between acquiescence and judgment
compliance, the Court must regulate the procedural effects of acquiescence in a careful
way to increase the rate of judgment compliance. Acquiescence is a procedural form that
is insufficiently regulated by the Rules of the Court. However, regulation is possible
because Article 62 of the Rules of Procedure allows the Court to rule upon the impact of
acquiescence. In the same sense, the Convention grants the Court jurisdiction to consider
procedural requirements, to decide to admit or reject acquiescence.
I propose five economically viable strategies within reach of the Court, which
seek a productive, collaborative relationship between States and the Court. These

strategies (summary in Table 1) follow the same logical flow as the five substantive
parts in which the interaction between States and the Court was developed. Below
there is a figure to show the five stages: signaling, exchange, negotiation,
monitoring, and sanctioning – with their respective Court strategies.

Signaling
• Reporting

Negotiation
• Conditional agreements

Exchange
• Naming

Santioning
• Mapping & Deadline

Pressure
• Timely monitoring &
Memoranda
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A. Signaling Stage
States and the Court are the players in the proceedings and, of course, they
understand the proper response and each can act accordingly. Under this view, States can
predict the positive Court’s reaction to the acquiescence and signal their commitment to
protecting AUTHORITIES. The Court often falls prey to States that are particularly
skilled at convincing the Court that good faith is the unique purpose for them to
acquiesce. The Court must assure that acquiescence mirrors good faith before praising
and legitimizing State actions.
The results showed that the Court accepts all offers of acquiescence. Thus, any
proposal must consider that the responsibility is deep-seated within the Court system. The
current reform seeks that the acquiescence translates into good faith efforts to comply
with the Court judgments. In the same way, the change expects to end with the
complacency of the Court that helps States (that have acquiesced) to gain control to the
proceedings. I propose that a document setting out the State acquiescence shall contain a
status or progress report on the situation of the alleged violation to be submitted to the
preliminary consideration of the Court. With this measure, the Court leverages that
especially at the beginning of the proceedings, States show much more inclination to
satisfy the Court. Also, this proposal is based on current States and the Court actions,
specifically, those demands for compliance used by the Court and States’ logic to offer
anticipatory remedial actions (see Stage 4).
Thus, the reform implies that once the Court analyzes the report, its decisions
should urge the State to do something about the violation before admitting acquiescence
and inform the other parties (the Commission, Victims, and their Representatives,
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including, the Public Defender) to emit opinions. The Court can try to obtain from States,
for example, a promise that restrictions and limitations on investigations and prosecutions
will be restricted.
Given that this report would bring extra information about the violation, this
proposal is supported by those members of the Court that have indicated that substantial
understanding of a case depends on the details of the abuse. Moreover, the Court has
made similar changes before, thus, nothing impedes adding an amendment in the sense
proposed. By this change, the Court links to governance strategy and leverages the fact
that States use acquiescence. This proposal also has the potential to achieve better results
on the ground since it is the State who decides the best action to implement at -the first
times of proceedings.
From a political perspective, such change may be viewed as less intrusive than a
legislative proposal. The use of this report could ensure transparency about the real
measures that the State is taking to manage the consequences of violation, and may
provide an incentive to advance the implementation. In fact, domestic actors would have
the capacity to influence state behavior by exerting pressure on the government to
comply. 10 Their role in promoting compliance 11 was identified by their transnational
Judith Goldstein, International law and domestic institutions: reconciling North American" unfair"
trade laws, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 541-64 (1996).; Moravcsik, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 22529 (1997).speak of compliance constituencies that include, among others: lawyers, judges, members
of the business community, national politicians (may favor legalized agreements to tie their hands in
dealing with) domestic interest groups (whose demands they seek to resist or to bind their
successors to policies they favor).
11 The importance of providing incentives for domestic actors, as it was recognized by Raustiala &
Slaughter, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, (2002). Stone explains about the importance of
individual actors in its theory of judicialized governance, developed on the basis of the growing role
of courts in France, the EU and the WTO. Theory depends on the incentives of individuals to bring
disputes before a third-party tribunal, the incentive of judges to maintain and maximize their
legitimacy, the resulting creation and expansion of law, and the resulting likelihood that still more
disputes will be framed in legal terms and brought before a third- party tribunal. This theory is
presented in Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 31 COMPARATIVE
10
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linkages with Courts in other systems. 12 Thus, material incentives must be able to
motivate participation by domestic actors. 13 Incorporation of such incentives could result
in judgments with interpretations that attract participation of domestic actors; 14 and
would make the content of the violated norms more specific.
This reform would be enforceable by non-state actors (civil society, advocates,
NGOs) that can pressure compliance. This advantage begs two questions: why all the
norms and rules of the existing system have not been enforceable by non-state actors in
connection with the high level of non-compliance and why States would allow non-state
actors the use of this report. Particularly, given how NGOs preserve autonomy from State
control, keeping their freedom of action to pressure compliance. These questions need to
be answered with additional data.
In the case that the Court implements the proposal, some problems would be
corrected or avoided. This change represents a cost of surveillance infrastructure.
However, this loss can prevent the report from being joined to the preliminary

POLITICAL STUDIES, 147-84 (1999). , and ALEX STONE, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000).
12 Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The causes and consequences of legalization, 54 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (2000). The importance of domestic and transnational actors in enhancing compliance
was recognized by Kahler in Judith Goldstein, et al., Introduction: Legalization and world politics, 54
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 277-99 (2000).
13 Regarding participation of public and private actors, Stone Sweet concluded that European
constitutional courts enjoy social legitimacy due to their ability to draw 'an ever-widening range of
actors, public and private', into normative discourse in STONE, Governing with judges: constitutional
politics in Europe 149, 152. 2000. But the flipside is that social legitimacy is likely to be limited to
those actors with the capacity to participate in legal discourse. Those who lack such capacity, as
Kahler points out, are likely to resent and resist the expansion of law.
14 Raustiala & Slaughter, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, (2002). They question investigation
of participation, without investigating the motivation behind it. They leave the following questions
open: Yet what exactly motivates the formation of a compliance constituency? Is it the material
benefits to be gained by actors whose interests are advanced through a particular international
agreement? Or is it, as Stone Sweet would argue, the process of engaging domestic actors in ongoing
discursive practices of explanation, justification and persuasion framed by both the existence of legal
rules and a tribunal to interpret them? Are these two sets of variables interrelated? How can they
best be harnessed as a matter of regime design to enhance compliance?

211

proceedings of objections. The streamlining of the proceedings can have positive
outcomes. It will always be necessary to monitor carefully how the change affects both
the overall course of the procedures and relevant individual steps, including the gathering
of evidence and the hearings.
In the same view, it is necessary to prevent the government from changing
unilaterally or creating some ambiguity on accountability regarding the report. The Court
must be flexible to avoiding that States view the request as a coercive method, and the
use of acquiescence is reduced. The feasibility of this proposed policy should be
evaluated after three years. It needs to take into account that if year after year, States
repeat their behaviors concerning anticipatory remedial actions, there is no reason not to
believe that each subsequent year, more States would return with a report on the situation
of the violation at the moment to propose acquiescence.
B. Exchange Stage
States that acquiesce use requests to avoid the Court’s exposure of information of
AUTHORITIES and the Court often views that these requests economize the high
processing volume of cases. The Court should assure that such requests do not become a
strategy for restricting information about the role AUTHORITIES played in HR
violation. Data demonstrated that in cases with acquiescence the streamlining helps to
hide information about AUTHORITIES. For instance, it was impossible to find
identifying information about implicated AUTHORITIES in 14 cases. Supporting the
same point, the data shows that even when there is acquiescence, prosecute those
responsible is possible. For instance, there is a range from 6 to 17 convictions in cases
such as the Massacres: Mariparan, Dos Erres and Pueblo Bello and Myrna Mack and
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Huilca Tecse cases. These sentences are related to having named responsible. Thus, the
proposal is that Court incorporates narratives of acknowledged facts in acquiescence
judgments that consistently require naming responsible AUTHORITIES.
Table No. 1 Summary of the Court Strategies
Stages of the
Interaction
Signaling

Government
strategies
Save
reputation

Court
strategies
Requiring State
report/progress in
acquiescence instead
of praising

Advantages

Exchange

Restrict
information

Enforceable by
non-state actors

Negotiation

Control
scope of
prosecution

Monitoring

Exonerate
and law
obstacles

Naming
responsibility in
factual narratives
instead of omitting
Conditional
agreements in ruling
and compliance
instead of
endorsement
executives
agreements/reports
Regulate a timely
monitoring and
memoranda of
understandings
instead of late
demands

Sanctioning

Nonreporting

Mapping and
deadlines to report
OAS and use the
UPR system (short
time) instead of late
enforcement
measures

Enforceable by
non-state actors
Links the Court
to governance
strategy
Respect State
boundaries

Respect
boundaries

Respect
constitutional
boundaries
Flexible
application
Capacity
building
Enforceable
Clear
designation of
roles and
responsibilities
Clear lines of
accountability
May improve
linkages and
relations with
other branches
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Disadvantages

Potential area of use

May be
changed
unilaterally by
government
May be
viewed as
coercive
method to
admit
acquiescence
May diminish
state use of
acquiescence
as a tool
Creates some
ambiguity as
to
accountability
May be
changed
unilaterally by
government
Limits to
enforceability

Surveillance
commitment in
combination with
meeting report
requirement

Least
enforceable

Standardization of
behaviors a regional
level

Dependent on
existence of
appropriate
authority
May damage
relations with
other
branches
Inflexible

Mechanism to
ensure domestic
prosecutions
Mechanism to
transfer information
to ICHR

Mechanism to
transfer information
to ICHR
Authority to
oversee and guide
response to ICHR

This proposal is possible because even when it is mandatory for the Court to
decide the State liability without punishing perpetrators, as individual criminal
responsibility is reserved for domestic courts; the use of factual descriptions of those
responsible is not restricted to the Court. This proposal maybe does not work in all cases
but in the subset of instances in which the barriers to prosecution are less entrenched. 15
The Court should name not only violators but also name their persecutors. This
alternative is because finger pointing HR violators make sense only if the Court receives
support from domestic judicial authorities. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is possible that
after States acquiesce (even in good faith), government institutions (such as judiciaries
and prosecutors) within that State or those States refuse complying with the resulting
judgment. In those cases, the Court needs to strengthen their linkages to that State’s
government institutions.
Appointing judges and prosecutors should consider a direct dialogue (without
intermediation) since the beginning of the proceedings. Particularly, at the moment that
the Court is investigating alleged violations (e.g., requesting a document directly from the
institution in charge). To decide how and when to open a dialogue, the Court must be
aware who is attempting to comply. It is the will of various institutional actors within the
State (the executive, the judiciary –disaggregated into civil and military, the legislature,
and the public ministry) that the order calls to action. So, to fully open a dialogue, the
structural incentives and institutional cultural of these state actors must be taking into
account.
Such a policy requires to be “attractive to judges and prosecutors, after the
interaction, they can learn about the ICHR jurisprudence, feel more directly responsible
15

Huneeus, CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 143 (2011).
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for compliance, and begin to identify as a part of the transnational judicial dialogue.” 16
Thus, if the Court implements this proposal about naming, it needs to observe carefully
that their action does not alienate the inter-branches relationships. In addition, it needs to
observe that each branch cannot reduce the information unilaterally.
A benefit of this strategy is that with information about the violation and violators
in acquiescence judgments, the Court can restrict the States freedom of action as third
parties are empowered to use this information to mobilize international and domestic
pressure on governments that do not comply. These third parties are local advocates and
non-state actors. In that sense, this information serves to replace the lack of enforcement
mechanism of the Court.
C. Negotiation Stage
States that have acquiesced used remedial actions to temper the Court judgments.
These measures exhibit the State interests to redress the victims, comply with selfimposed obligations and control the outcomes. The data demonstrate that the Court has
not made an active participation in the anticipatory remedial actions presented by States.
On the contrary, the Court is limited to endorse them. However, there is a strong
predisposition of the States to comply with the agreements reached in cases with
acquiescence. In fact, this proposal is based on the data that exhibit that 15 out of 54
cases with acquiescence have a high compliance rate (72 to 100%) when States use
anticipatory remedial actions. Thus, the Court can use (leverage) these agreements to
produce compliance and to remain informed of the political considerations of existing
law and jurisdictional boundaries of States. The Court can maximize the impact of these

16

Id. at, 144.
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agreements on establishing conditions for them or by combining them with another
strategy.
Regarding the use of agreements with particular conditions, these agreements
should anticipate the consequences of operational difficulties that States face in
implementing judgments and agreements. In addition, they must allocate resources to
support efforts on compliance. For instance, they can contain special provision for onefifth of OAS members that have lower-middle income such as periods to implement
agreements, measures to support to help them build their capacity/know how, and
individual initiatives to achieve standards set by the agreements.
Regarding the use of agreements with other strategies, a degree of flexibility is
needed to incorporate in these agreements some severe obligations (like the judicial
obligation) that are in general difficult for States. The existences of strict obligations are
beneficial, but require some adjustment to be executable. These changes can be
negotiated considering, for instance, that the poorest, least-developed countries need
flexibility in the time they take to implement the judicial obligation (e.g., individual
assistance and concessions). It is important to consider, that, lowering demands is a
visible means of encouraging compliance with the Court obligations. Concerning 50% of
OAS members that are developing countries and economies in transition more
information will be necessary to know which conditions are required to achieve
compliance with judicial obligations. 17

17 For the current 2016 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita,
calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Low income $1, 045 or less (Haiti); Lower-middle
income $1,045 to 4,125 (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua); Uppermiddle income $4,126 to 12,735 (Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Dominica,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Granada, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
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D. Monitoring Stage
The Court should not discriminate States that have not acquiesced from those that
do. If the Court grants rewards (such as a diminished control) all States must have that
right. As analyzed in Chapter 3, the Court applied an intense control for States that have
not acquiesced. My recommendation is that — to save costs to its legitimacy, the Court
should see compliance-related issues in a broader perspective that transcends State
individual views, consequently, accounts for the various interests of, and differences
among OAS members. This proposal is based on cases with full compliance in which the
Court makes a very intense (and early) monitoring.
Moreover, equal treatment should ensure a timely monitoring and avoid that
States (that have acquiesced) can leverage the diminished monitoring to gain control to
the outcome and that the impunity of AUTHORITIES sets firm roots. Indeed, cases with
acquiescence for which monitoring began between 63-74 months had been open for more
than 22 years since States have not complied with the domestic prosecution order. To
bypass legal gaps contributing to impunity, memoranda of understanding could be used
to block the use of means to exonerate the guilty and legal obstacles. The memoranda can
be based on the UN Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International HR Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, in particular, Principles 15-24, 59 and the Set of
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of HR through Action to Combat Impunity,
Principles 31-34.

Grenadines); High income $12,736 or more (Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Canada, Chile,
Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela).
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Regarding cases with acquiescence, the data revealed that impunity arises for 147
(out of 155) AUTHORITIES responsible for HR violations. In such instances, the use of
guidelines on procedure and practice can play a role in educating institutions or State
agents on how to face the impunity in topics like the accountability of subordinates; using
non-judicial mechanisms; set the duty to prosecute; requirements for an effective
domestic investigation and victims in the investigation.
These measures serve to maximize the potential of some actions that States are
performing and minimizing those steps that are limiting compliance with the judicial
obligation. They are not invasive in political terms, and they can be rapidly modified to
cover changes and challenging situations, however, are not binding, thus, likely to be
effective when combined as a first step with other measures.
E. Sanctioning Stage
The application of enforcement measures does not follow specific criteria. These
measures are applied very late to States that acquiesced. In fact, when these measures are
applied, States have used exculpatory means. Thus, States are currently leveraging the
late application in order to protect high-ranking authorities. Two proposals are presented
specifically intended to ameliorate this problem.
The Court must give equal treatment among States as it was contemplated in the
prior reform. In this way, my first recommendation is that the Court should set a deadline
for reporting noncompliance to the OAS GA.
As my analysis showed in Chapter 1 and 3, the OAS GA should assume the role
of Enforcer to the Court System — even though, neither exercises its powers to that end.
Recall that the GA was empowered to discuss the cases in which States are in
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noncompliance and adopt political measures against them. I.e., the political bodies of the
OAS have no interest in pursuing noncompliance cases. Unfortunately, the fact that the
GA has never discussed the reported noncompliance becomes a constant characteristic of
the current Court System. 18
This absence of political debate (to support judgment compliance) could be filled
out it through legislative changes concerning the duties of OAS ambassadors. However,
any legal approach tends to be viewed as intrusive. Moreover, States that assert their
independence and sovereignty often obscure the consensus that the legislative approach
requires to be successful. This core issue cannot be divorced from the attitude of
governments by which the Court’s repeated demands to make the GA’s
pronouncements/discussions obligatory 19 and to work into a new body of monitoring
that replaces the Court in its surveillance functions 20 remain unanswered after 15 years.
The ICHR seems to need the power to enforce judgment compliance and to be more than
good intentions supported by a weak System.
This is why my proposal is destined to add deadlines for reporting to the OAS
affect that problem in the system. Since the data demonstrate that States tend to comply
during the first years of the monitoring. Concurrently, during the first years of the
monitoring, the Court cases received high public attention. The data also reveals that

The XXIV Congress of IHLADI addressed this problem (Instituto Hispano Luso Americano Filipino
de Derecho Internacional). The congress was held in September 2006 in Granada, Spain.
19 CANCADO TRINDAE, ANTONIO ET VENTURA ROBLES, MANUEL, El Futuro de la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 3era. Edición, San José, Costa Rica, 2005. (As indicated by the
honorable Judge ANTONIO CANCADO TRINDAE, Article 65 could be modified by adding the following
text: “The General Assembly will send it to the Permanent Council, who will study the matter and
prepare a report so that the General Assembly may deliberate.”)
20 Cavallaro & Brewer, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 784 (2008). (“the salience of the lack
of a permanent monitoring body in the OAS becomes apparent when one considers [the high
percentage of cases that remain in the phase of supervision of compliance…] […][which increase year
after year]”, sparking questions about the viability of the monitoring process.)
18
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States fear to be exposed to the public opinion (as the stage 2 makes clear). Thus, it is
feasible that the Court can leverage this period (of 24 months) to put pressure on States.
States will know that at the moment in which the measures are applied - the public
opinion will be yet participative. The idea of this proposal is to obtain compliance by
combining the possibility to turn visible the noncompliance in the correct moment. This
plan assumes that the intergovernmental level with States in the OAS is uninterested in
discussing noncompliance, but, it is also true that when noncompliance of States was
reported to the OAS early, States opt to take measures to avoid publicity. It happened, for
instance, when the Court included a resolution detailing Ecuador’s noncompliance in its
second monitoring process, which it expected to present to the GA of the OAS. Ecuador
started an inter-State lobbying to prevent the submission of the ICHR report. 21 Despite,
Ecuador complied promptly with its outstanding reparations to avoid the public
exposition.
This proposal seeks, thus, States can fully anticipate both the benefits of
compliance and the consequences of noncompliance — to choose the best option. Also, it
seeks the proper balance between stability and predictability in the application of
enforcement measures. In this way, the Court can avoid considerations of what is fair or
unfair in each case.
The system needs clearly defined timetables for completing operations and
responsibilities. These deadlines are necessary for both anticipating and ensuring
compliance in the term in which a case should be deliberated. The chart below shows the

Benavides Cevallos v. Ecuador (Monitoring Compliance) ICHR, 27 November 2003, decidendi 3.;
Annual Report 2003 – Chapter III <www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/chap.3k.htm>
21
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new stages in the proceedings as a consequence of the strategies proposed, including the
terms of the application of enforcement.
STRATEGIES TIMETABLE
At 2 months
At 3 months
At 6 months
At 9 months
At 10 months
At 12 months
At 36 months

Proceedings

Monitoring

State action report after acquiescence or with acquiescence
Consultations and observations
Propose conditional agreements
Parties adopted final agreement
Memoranda of understandings endorses by the Court and States
The issuance of Judgment
Application of enforcement measures

The State’s willingness to make efforts to comply can be affected by the potential
visibility of their noncompliance. In fact, States recognized as a threat that the Court
could include a resolution detailing State noncompliance in its yearly report to OAS. In
effect, as noted in Chapter 3, States lobbied in a political campaign to avoid the measure
and even threatened to withdraw their acceptance of the Court jurisdiction before the
report was submitted. This is why my second reform proposes that the deadlines for
reporting noncompliance to the OAS GA should be complemented with including the
report that informs such noncompliance in each country’s Universal Periodic Review
(UPR). 22 The UPR hinges on States' compliance with the commitments assumed during
the review that States make every fourth year. In this way, reports on noncompliance of
ICHR are publicly disseminated and place States under the state's peer’s pressure, which
eventually damage their moral stand and reputation. 23
The appeal to the UPR proposing moving ICHR noncompliance out of the ICHR
system into the broader UN system, which (1) might be seen as an admission that the
ICHR system is not capable of handling its noncompliance (alone). Also, (2) assumes the
22 A/RES/60/251, 3 April 2006. By the UPR, all State members of the United Nations must undergo
the periodic scrutiny of their HR policies and practices, each review containing reports by the
country concerned
23 This exemplification should be carried out in conformity with letter d) of Decision 6/102 and
Article 2d) of Resolution 5/1.
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UPR process produces better compliance with HR obligations by states (at best a
debatable assumption). However, this proposal can overcome these obstacles if both
systems work together effectively since even when there are certainly differences
between the UPR and ICHR processes; they share concern for HR and collaborative
structure, 24 making easily interaction with reporting systems. 25
The Palamara (Chile) case provides an example when during the UPR review it
cited the country’s political reality as a hindrance to align the domestic law system with
international standards regarding military criminal jurisdiction that the judgment issued
by the Court in 2005 demanded. 26 During the UPR review, the state reported that
proposal and approval of legal reformation of military justice have been delayed by
difficulty reconciling with members of the military regime. So, compliance was impeded
by the inability to reach a political agreement during the Bachelet administration and by
the Piñera administration’s lack of political will. 11 countries made recommendations
about this situation, that: the Code of Military Justice be brought into alignment with
international human rights norms; 27 the provisions pertaining to court-martials in times of
peace be revised 28 and; extension of military law to civilians should be avoided. 29 One
country recommended eliminating military law. 30 Repeal 31 and/or modification of the

General Assembly Resolution 60/251, A/RES/60/251, April 3, 2006
The European and Inter-American Courts of HR are more focused on judicial processes than policy.
However, the HRC (which oversees the UPR) is more concerned with policy. Interaction between the
two should become commonplace, thereby improving the overall system.
26 Palamara Iribarne v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs) ICHR, 22 November 2005, Ser. C No 73,
para 2, resolution 14.
27 Recommendation made by the following states: Nicaragua; Argentina; Switzerland
28 Recommendation made by the following state: France
29 Recommendation made by the following states: Canada; Switzerland; Azerbaijan; Argentina; Czech
Republic
30 Recommendation made by the following state: Argentina
31 Recommendation made by the following state: Italy
24
25
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Amnesty Law applied to perpetrators of human rights abuses were requested. 32 Chile
complies with the Court’s obligation before that a new UPR started.
These policies are feasible as they depend on the practices of the Court to make an
equal and rigorous application of the enforcement measures along with the use of the
appeal to the UPR as a complement. If these proposals were followed, their effect on
compliance should also be analyzed.
Other proposals to implementation and monitoring
The Court must avoid remoteness that makes it “appear out of touch with [the
day-to-day] realities [of each country].” The Court System requires an additional
mechanism that allows the Court to pay attention to the factors behind noncompliance.
The Court has little access to compliance information and what States do have is selfreported. Ongoing challenges such as surveillance are likely to be handled better through
more collaborative approaches that combine with linkages with domestic institutions. A
two-level, domestic-international linkage mechanism is necessary. It connects sets of
domestic players with a third-party (the ICHR) to trigger enforcement strategy and
reinforce cooperation.
In this way, one of the Court’s current members could be nominated as a visiting
judge who travels to each State’s headquarters at least once a year to glean in situ insight
into national implementation processes and provide technical advice based on historical
regional best practices. The visiting judge can obtain unfiltered information from
monitored States. The knowledge gleaned by the visiting judge could gradually translate
into monitoring that is consistent with State realities. Links between the ICHR and

32

Recommendation made by the following state: Canada
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domestic institutions could be established to overcome the tensions created by
enforcement actions. 33
The visited system is complemented with an adequate domestic institution. Each
State should establish a permanent inter-institutional, ministerial body –comprised of
ministers of the executive branch, representatives from the judicial and legislative
branches as well as the victims – to coordinate ICHR judgment implementation. Such a
body would report twice a year on progress on ICHR processes. This single body within
every States has the responsibility to communicate to the Court about the situation of HR
alleged.
This proposal is based on examples of collaboration between the States and the
ICHR. First, inter-ministerial commissions were established to coordinate
implementation. Second, via decree number 1595, approved on February 26, 2009,
Paraguay created a committee composed of 16 State entities. 34 The following States have
followed one of the two options: El Salvador, Paraguay, Colombia, Argentina, and
Suriname.
For instance, in the Serrano Cruz (Salvador) case it was approved on February 6,
2006, an Inter-Institutional Commission to trace disappeared children during the armed
conflict with the participation of two Ministers; one member of the Policy forces; one

Conventions that demand the establishment of a domestic mechanism for the implementation of
treaties already exist. For example, Article 3 of the Optional Protocol of the Convention against
Torture relative to the periodic visits to places where there are persons deprived of liberty, stipulates
that “[e]ach State Party shall set up, designate or maintain at the domestic level one or several
visiting bodies for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.)”
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 18 December 2002, 2375 U.N.T.S. 237, art. 3, GA Res. A/RES/57/199
(entered into force 22 June 2006).
34
See
Paraguay’s
Ministry
of
the
Interior
online:
<www.cej.org.py/files/
decreto1595_ComisionInterinstitucionalCumplimientoSentenciasInternacionales.pdf>.
33
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academic; one persecutor and one procurator. 35 In Goiburú (Paraguay) case, the State
informed that the Inter-Institutional Working Team has been created to fully and comply
efficiently with the terms ordered in the Judgment. 36 In the Mariparan Massacre
(Colombia) case was designated an official mechanism to monitor the judgment ordered
by the Court by an Act of the Intersectorial Commission on HR. The act dated February
28, 2006. 37 In the Garrido (Argentina) case, an ad hoc Investigation Commission was
created to carry out the investigation ordered by the Court. 38 Finally, in the Moiwana
(Suriname) case, the State creates some entities to guarantee “an effective and efficient
implementation” of the Judgment. These institutions are a Ministerial Coordination;
Commission of HRs; Working Groups; Foundation; National Commission on Land
Rights (NCLR), responsible for an integral approach to the land rights; Coordination
Team that include a mechanism for periodic visits. 39
System experiences set the basis for the proposal that would demonstrate how
coordination is necessary for compliance. However, it is true that this long-term plan
poses challenges and its feasibility must be evaluated in terms of resources, time,
impartiality, security, and so on.

III. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Before turning to the further research of the study, it is important to acknowledge
some limitations encountered during the sampling. This research focused on the 129
listed cases in the Inter-American Court’s 2010 Annual Report. The Court has ruled 216

The Serrano Cruz sisters v. El Salvador (Monitoring) ICHR, 22 September 2006, para. 4
Goiburú v. Paraguay (Monitoring) ICHR, 6 August 2008, para. 7
37 Mariparan Massacre v. Colombia (Monitoring) ICHR, 26 November 2008, considering 8
38 Garrido v. Argentina (Monitoring) ICHR, 27 November 2007, considering 6 (b) (1)
39 Moiwana v. Suriname (Monitoring) ICHR, 21 November 2007, para. 4
35
36
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cases as to 2014. There is a need to update the cases since more than half of all
acquiescence has occurred since 2005, thus, there was data about acquiescence that was
not available at 2010. In consequence, even when these 129 cases provide enough to test
patterns of interaction, the use of all instances would strengthen the empirical results of
this research.
Another limitation that was encountered in the codification was that the project
was focused on two actors: States and the Courts. The reason was that if in the study all
the players in the interaction were considered, the amount of data could become
unwieldy. For this reason, there is also a need for integrating more players to allow
further assessment of their participation in the interaction. A full picture requires
considering the following actors: The Inter-American Commission on HR, Victims
including their Representatives, and non-state actors (including, especially NGOs and
when the NGOs are in particular representatives of victims). The idea is to deepen
understanding of other relationships, for instance, if the Courts can give a role to the
pressure by empowering non-state actors to encourage State compliance or the
relationship between compliance and NGOs. Addressing the work of particular NGOs
would allow knowing if the NGOs do respond to the ICHR or the Victims if the NGOs
work in communication with others States, and of if they pay attention all States equally,
or unevenly. Or even, corroborating if NGOs have deflected their attention from cases
with the acquiescence and overlooked to put international pressure campaigns able to
leverage strategic moments for advocacy. In such instances, an additional question relates
to whether NGOs exhibit similar patterns to the Court if they frame their interests
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differently to affect compliance, and if they interconnect to influence the distribution of
power of States and the Court.
Moreover, I erroneously employed three codes in the early stages of coding my
data. These three codes were: violation, obligation, and institution. These three codes
collect descriptive information for all judgments within a case. However, I did not realize
the importance of using them as attributes of the data when I coded. When I realized the
pervasiveness of them to make comparisons, filter cases and identify patterns of
association between cases, it was very late in the process. These three codes contain
abundant information, thus, they can complement the current results or be used as part of
quantitative studies. For instance, a way to take advantage from my database is to connect
the information of these three attributes with information gathered from the victims by
survey/interview.
Despite these limitations, there is abundant data gleaned from this project that was
set aside in order to focus on the central finding of this dissertation. Likewise, subsequent
studies are needed to test the accuracy of the presented findings, and their generalizability
in other proposals and to other States and Courts.
In summary, this Chapter has presented some possible responses the ICHR system
could take to address the problems that my analysis has identified. First, these possible
responses are not anchored in theories. Rather they are based on what problems the
proposals were specifically intended to ameliorate. These responses map to the patterns
my data produced concerning the nature and structure of the interaction between States
and the ICHR and the analytical framework I used to explain the patterns, making my
normative proposals more accessible for the reader.
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Second, the data facilitate the understanding of how, in the ICHR's experience
with noncompliance, cooperation ex-post is not working in all instances. Thus, it
becomes necessary to extend substantively from the stale and dominant “paradigm of
assistance and deterrence” (the well-known carrots and sticks) 40 into joining preventative
control measures (even in a better way) with emerging, nuanced modes of international
engagement and negotiation that should be opportune, impartial and enforced.
Third, the contribution of my analysis is to be a required understanding for
changing the Inter-American Court system. Just as the Americas built this System, the
watchdogs of the Americas (such the Court) can improve upon it; in effect, the Court can
reinvigorate their practices and thus, have a role in changing the process of compliance
and unprogressive HR situation (of noncompliance) among members of the OAS. Also,
the Court has a role in solving its substance and in devising shared understandings to
future regime agenda. In effect, this Chapter focused on proposals that depend on the
Court’s exercise of its powers since it is a variable component of the System of
compliance that allows changes.
Fourth, and relatedly, I proposed substantial statutory and political reforms that
considered the interaction between States and the Courts to show that the Courts might be
able to thwart State efforts to use acquiescence (and others actions) as a tool to protect
high-ranking authorities from the responsibility of States through strategies. By using
these alternatives, the Courts potentially counteract damaging aspects of State strategies
and leverage them (to control noncompliance). The expectation is that the Court can
provide a frame of discussion about changes. This is why all my proposals appeared
procedural in nature – entail that if the Court would modify procedures in a certain way
40

Raustiala & Slaughter, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 552 (2002).
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(e.g., requiring reporting in cases of acquiescence), then compliance would increase. The
data reveal that when the Court changes the context in which the State preferences are
formed, then the preferences and outcomes also vary (see stage 2 in Chapter 3). It is, for
example, feasible that the Court produces sub-processes for promoting changes when
there is a deeply entrenched political interest in not complying with ICHR judicial
obligations. The Court's ability to overcome the impunity by itself is an unrealistic
expectation of Courts as international actor. Considering that impunity derives from
historical, ethnic, politics, social, and ideological tensions which cannot even be resolved
through bilateral efforts.
Fifth, and for now, all my proposals focus on what the court can do to counteract
during the Court proceedings and monitoring processes State strategic actions since those
proposals that rely on collective efforts of States members of the OAS are uncertain.
They are uncertain since additional data is required to address problems/noncompliance
at the State level, inter-State level, and the intergovernmental level. 41 The Court is
between noncompliance at the state level and the lack of political willingness at
intergovernmental level to confront noncompliance (e.g., States in the OAS uninterested
in discussing noncompliance and this is why the OAS General Assembly “has never
discussed the reported noncompliance”). Thus, the data also suggest that the problem of
noncompliance is far more than a function of what the court does nor does not do. Given
For now, the presented proposals do not address noncompliance at the State level, inter-State
level, nor the lack of political willingness at intergovernmental level to confront noncompliance in
the ICHR system since that it is necessary to explore the following types of relationships. There is a
need to elaborate on the relationship between impunity, structural impunity and level of compliance
regarding each State member of OAS (measure to assess the impunity) to address problems at the
State level. It is equally necessary to elaborate on the partnership among States concerning the InterAmerican HR System to address problems at the inter-State level. Likewise, it is a need to elaborate
on the participation of States (embassadors OAS) in the political debates of the OAS, in the
relationship between the Court and the OAS about other matters, in the relationship between the
Court and States outside of contentious cases, to address problems at the intergovernmental level.
41
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the seriousness of these problems, future proposals for reform should make some attempt
to address them.
Finally, whatever the combination of alternatives used by the Courts, their
ultimate success will depend on the development of appropriate desire, capacity, and
working relationships at all levels of the interaction with States.
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Appendix A.
Only Objecting

No.
1

Name of the Case
Neira-Alegría et al.

State
Peru

Year
1996

2

Loayza-Tamayo

Peru

1998

3

Castillo-Páez

Peru

1998

4

Castillo-Petruzzi

Peru

1999

5

Paniagua Morales

Guatemala

2001

6

The “Street Children”

Guatemala

2001

7

Mayagna Awas

Nicaragua

2001

8

Baena

Panama

2001

9

Ivcher-Bronstein

Peru

2001

10

Constitutional Court

Peru

2001

11

Cesti-Hurtado

Peru

2001

12

Cantoral-Benavides

Peru

2001

13

Durand and Ugarte

Peru

2001

14

Cantos

Argentina

2002

15

Hilaire

Trinidad

2002

16

Juan H. Sánchez

Honduras

2003

17

Five Pensioners v. Peru

Peru

2003

18

19 Tradesmen

Colombia

2004

19

Herrera Ulloa

Costa Rica

2004

20

Tibi

Ecuador

2004

21

The Yean and Bosico Girls

Dominican Republic

2005

22

Yatama

Nicaragua

2005

23

The Serrano Sisters

Salvador

2005

24

Moiwana

Suriname

2005

25

Almonacid Arellano

Chile

2006

26

The Pueblo Bello Massacre

Colombia

2006

27

Dismissed Congressional Employees

Peru

2006

28

Boyce

Barbados

2007

29

García Prieto

Salvador

2007

30

Saramanka People

Suriname

2007

31

Bayarri

Argentina

2008

32

Castañeda Gutman

Mexico

2008

33

Heliodoro Portugal

Panama

2008

34

Apitz Barbera

Venezuela

2008

35

Dacosta Cadogan

Barbados

2009

36

Escher et al.

Brazil

2009

37

Garibaldi

Brazil

2009

38

Tristan Donoso

Panama

2009
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Doing Nothing

Objecting &
Acquiescing

39

Anzualdo Castro

Peru

2009

40

Acevedo Buendía

Peru

2009

41

Reverón Trujillo

Venezuela

2009

42

Usón Ramírez

Venezuela

2009

43

Ríos et al.

Venezuela

2009

44

Perozo et al

Venezuela

2009

45

Gomes Lund

Brazil

2010

46

Cabrera Garcia

Mexico

2010

No.
1

Name of the Case
Suárez Rosero

State
Ecuador

Year
1999

2

The last templation of Christ

Chile

2001

3

Ricardo Canese

Paraguay

2004

4

De la Cruz-Flores

Peru

2004

5

Gómez-Paquiyauri

Peru

2004

6

Lori Berenson-Mejía

Peru

2004

7

Palamara

Chile

2005

8

Acosta Calderon

Ecuador

2005

9

Raxcacó Reyes

Guatemala

2005

10

Fermín Ramírez

Guatemala

2005

11

The Yakye Axa

Paraguay

2005

12

Caesar

Trinidad

2005

13

Claude Reyes

Chile

2006

14

López Álvarez

Honduras

2006

15

Yvon Neptune

Haiti

2008

16

Barreto Leiva

Venezuela

2009

No.

Name of the Case

State

Year

1

Caballero

Colombia

1997

2

Blake

Guatemala

1999

3

Trujillo Oroza

Bolivia

2002

4

Las Palmeras

Colombia

2002

5

Bámaca Velásquez

Guatemala

2002

6

The Plan Sanchez

Guatemala

2004

7

Molina-Theissen

Guatemala

2004

8

The Children’s Institute

Paraguay

2004

9

The Mapiripan Massacre

Colombia

2005

10

Gutierrez Soler

Colombia

2005

11

Garcia Asto

Peru

2005
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Only
Acquiescing

12

Ximenes Lopez

Brazil

2006

13

Ituango Massacres

Colombia

2006

14

Acevedo- Jaramillo

Peru

2006

15

Montero Aranguren

Venezuela

2006

16

Myrna Mack Chang

Guatemala

2003

17

Chaparro Alvarez

Ecuador

2007

18

Cantoral-Huamani

Peru

2007

19

Dos Erres Masacre

Guatemala

2009

20

Campo Algodonero

Mexico

2009

21

Radilla Pacheco

Mexico

2009

22

Cepeda Vargas

Colombia

2010

23

Chitay Nech

Guatemala

2010

24

Fernandez Ortega

Mexico

2010

25

Rosendo Cantu

Mexico

2010

26

Velez Loor

Panama

2010

No.

Name of the Case

State

Year

1

Amparo

Venezuela

1996

2

Garrido

Argentina

1998

3

Benavides-Cevallos

Ecuador

1998

4

Barrios-Altos

Peru

2001

5

El Caracazo

Venezuela

2002

6

Bulacio

Argentina

2003

7

Maritza Urrrutia

Guatemala

2003

8

Carpio Nicolle

Guatemala

2004

9

Gomes-Palomino

Peru

2005

10

Huilca-Tecse

Peru

2005

11

Blanco-Romero

Venezuela

2005

12

Servellon-Garcia

Honduras

2006

13

Goiburú

Paraguay

2006

14

The Sawhoyamaxa

Paraguay

2006

15

Vargas-Areco

Paraguay

2006

16

La Cantuta

Peru

2006

17

Baldeón-García

Peru

2006

18

Miguel Castro-Castro

Peru

2006

19

Bueno Alvez

Argentina

2007

20

Rochela Massacre

Colombia

2007

21

Escue Zapata

Colombia

2007

22

Zambrano Velez

Ecuador

2007
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23

Alban Cornejo

Ecuador

2007

24

Kimel

Argentina

2008

25

Ticona

Bolivia

2008

26

Valle Jaramillo

Colombia

2008

27

Tiu Tojin

Guatemala

2008

28

Kawas

Honduras

2009

29

Ibsen Cardenas

Bolivia

2010

30

The Xakmok

Paraguay

2010

* Bold indicates a case’s membership in the sample that included AUTHORITIES
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Appendix B.

RELATIONSHIP ACQUIESCENCE AND COMPLIANCE

PROCEEDINGS

Stage 1: SIGNALING

STATES

doing
nothin
g

objecting

Stage 2: EXCHANGE

COURT

acquiescing

praisin
g

MONITORING

rewarding

STATES

requesting

Stage 3:NEGOTIATION

COURT

endorsing

restrictin
g

STATES

declaring
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remedyin
g

COURT

considering

endorsing

Stage 4: PRESSURE

STATES

strategic
compliance

restricting
and limiting
investigatio
n

Stage 5:
SANCTIONING

COURT

STAT
E

COURT

demand
-ing

nonrepor
-ting

enforcing

The following schema lists the initial codes:
I.

II.

III.

The Compliance Outcomes
A. Full Compliance, Partial Compliance & Noncompliance
1)
Toward compliance
2)
Away from compliance
3)
Unresolved issues of compliance
a) Tending toward & Tending away
Judgment Attributes
A. The type of violation in each case
1) Physical integrity rights
2) Political and civil rights
3) Social, economic and cultural
4) Justice
5) Privacy and property rights
B. State institution invoked & type of obligation imposed
1) Executive
a. Reparations
b. Socio-educational
c. Symbolic-cultural
d. Case-specific changes/Re-establishing civil & political rights
e. Policy changes/Non-repetition
2) Non-executive
a. Legislative changes/Non-repetition
b. Judicial accountability
State responses and Court requests
A. Remedial State words
1) Accepting responsibility
a. With High-ranking authorities/covering-up & without
b. Total &Partial
c. Early & Later
d. Limited statements of responsibility
2) Signaling
a) Normative commitment
b) Promising compliance
a. Requesting inter-branch pro-compliance alliances”
b. Never fulfilled due to other State motives
3) Arguing that hands are tied
a) Law obstacles: amnesty, prescription, non in bis in idem
b) Others like sovereignty
4) Requests for compliance and control
a) Time, information, economic issues based on government capacity/incapacity to respond effectively
b) Cover-up or to frame the Court proceedings
B. Remedial State actions
1) Anticipatory
2) Actions other than those ordered
3) Institutional or political resistance
a) Silence (“the bitter pill”)
a. Intermittent
b. Prolonged to Permanent
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IV.

b) Denounce the Convention
4) State-consent enforcement actions like overreach
C. Statements of Court
1) Statements of authority & responsibility
2) Demands for compliance
D. Actions of Court authority
1) Problem-solving actions
a) Dispute settlement assistance
b) Enforcing agreements
c) Negotiating with States about compliance
2) Enforcement actions
a) Overreaching the jurisdiction and the quasi judicial-review
b) Referrals and making a formal appeal to others at higher levels in the organization
State-Court Relationship
A) Impact (strategies)
a) Rational Persuasion
b) Pressure, including emotional appeals
c) Negotiation (exchange)
d) Upward appeals/sanctions/blocking
e) Signaling & Praising
f) Coalition/alliance
g) Conserving status quo
h) Disengagement
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Appendix C.

STATE SUBMIT
PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS

FIRST PHASE:
WRITTING
STAGE

CONTROLLING
COURT
PROCEEDINGS

COURT RULED
ADMISSIBILITY
STATE
ACQUIESCENC
E

THE
APPLICATION
IS FILED BY
THE
COMMISSION
OR STATES

STATE
WRITTEN
ANSWER TO
THE
APPLICATION

SECOND
PHASE: ORAL
STAGE
After hearing
the witnesses
and experts
and analyzing
the evidence
presented, the
Court issues
its judgment.

STATE
EVIDENCE

ORAL
PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS

THIRD PHASE:
RULING*

PUBLIC
HEARINGS

COMMITMEN
TS AND
PROMISES OF
COMPLIANCE

REQUESTS

CONTROLLING
OUTCOMES
STATE DISPUTES FACTS AND
CLAIMS OF THE
APPLICATION

STATEMENTS
OF AUTHORIRY
ANTICIPATORY
REMEDIAL
ACTION

TESTIMONIES
OF WITNESSES
AND EXPERTS

MERITS
REPARATIONS
AND COSTS
STRATEGIC
NONJUDICIAL
OBLIGATION
COMPLIANCE
STATE
REPORTING

Once the
judgment has
been adopted,
it is notified to
all the parties
to start the
monitoring
phase

EXONERATING OF
CULPABILITY AND
LAW OBSTACLES
NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH JUDICIAL
OBLIGATION

FOURTH
PHASE:
SUPERVISION
MONITORING
JUDGMENTS &
HEARINGS

Courts demands for
compliance
Enforcement
measures

*Once submitted to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, a case will proceed through a
jurisdictional, or preliminary objections stage, followed by a merits stage, a reparations and costs stage, and
monitoring. It is now common for the Court to resolve all three stages of litigation (preliminary, merits and
reparations and costs) in one written decision published after a single public hearing and a jugment decision
then enters into a compliance phase.
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